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FORGOTTEN LIMITS ON THE POWER TO AMEND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Jonathan L. Marshfield 
ABSTRACT—There seem to be no limits on what can pass through state 
constitutional amendment procedures. State amendments have targeted 
vulnerable minorities, deeply entrenched specific fiscal strategies, and 
profoundly restructured institutions. The malleability of state constitutions is 
significant because in many states there are legitimate fears that special 
interests dominate amendment politics, and that fundamental change is 
occurring with minimal opportunities for constructive deliberation or 
inclusive participation. The state doctrine of “referendum sovereignty” is a 
key condition fueling this dynamic. The doctrine holds that there are no 
substantive limits on any state amendment processes so long as amendments 
comply with federal law, explicit state procedural requirements, and are 
subject to a referendum. The doctrine assumes that a referendum is the full 
institutional embodiment of the people’s sovereignty, and it has led courts to 
uphold amendments that strip minorities of deeply embedded rights and even 
replace constitutions wholesale. 
This article provides the first systematic assessment of the doctrine of 
referendum sovereignty. To do this, it relies on a set of largely neglected 
sources: the debates of all known state constitutional conventions where state 
amendment processes were forged (ninety-one conventions from 1818 to 
1984). These sources suggest that the underlying logic of state 
constitutionalism is inconsistent with the presumption of a limitless 
amendment power. Properly understood, state amendment processes are 
built on the assumption that only a constitutional convention of specially 
elected delegates is presumed to have inherent power to create or destroy a 
constitution. Extra-conventional amendment actors, on the other hand, are 
presumed to be subordinate creations of the existing constitution with the 
limited authority to propose modifications and without authority to destroy 
the constitution’s fundamentals. This distinction came from a deep distrust 
of existing officials and private groups. My findings are important in light of 
the ever-expanding use of extra-conventional amendment processes to 
effectuate large-scale change. They provide a coherent framework for state 
courts to assess whether a reform is an appropriate use of the amendment 
power or an unauthorized intrusion on the role of the convention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, venture capitalist Tim Draper financed an effort to amend the 
California Constitution to dissolve California into several entirely new 
states.1 Although Mr. Draper’s effort was ultimately stymied on procedural 
grounds, he is not alone in his perception that there are no meaningful limits 
on what can pass through state constitutional amendment procedures. Other 
successful state amendments have targeted vulnerable political minorities,2 
deeply entrenched specific fiscal strategies,3 and fundamentally restructured 
government institutions.4 Singular amendments have even been used to 
replace entire state constitutions. To be sure, state amendments must satisfy 
explicit state procedural requirements and comply with federal law, but those 
 
 1 Draper’s first initiative was a constitutional amendment to split California into six states. See Katy 
Steinmetz, Proposal to Split California into Six States Moves Forward, TIME (July 15, 2014), 
https://time.com/2983496/california-six-state-proposal-vote/ [https://perma.cc/4BXK-9F45]. He restyled 
that amendment as a statutory initiative proposing three states, presumably to avoid California’s non-
revision rule. See Tim Draper, Dear Fellow Californians: You Don’t Get to Vote!, CAL3, http://cal3.com 
[https://perma.cc/79J3-H3PM]; see also Richard L. Hasen, California’s Supreme Court Can Kill Cal-3 
Quickly and Save Us All a Lot of Trouble, L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2018, 4:15 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-hasen-split-california-proposition-legal-problems-
20180625-story.html [https://perma.cc/EHV4-HH2N] (explaining the history of Draper’s project). 
Although the second measure qualified for the ballot, the California Supreme Court recently enjoined the 
Secretary of State from placing it on the ballot “[b]ecause significant questions have been raised regarding 
the proposition’s validity, and because we conclude that the potential harm in permitting the measure to 
remain on the ballot outweighs the potential harm in delaying the proposition to a future election . . . .” 
Planning & Conservation League v. Padilla, No. S249859, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 5200 (July 18, 2018) (order 
to show cause issued). 
 2 See OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 4(a) (amended 1910), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/ 
questions/17.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6MK-4ZZC] (imposing a “literacy” suffrage requirement); Guinn v. 
United States, 238 U.S. 347, 355–56, 364 (1915) (describing the 1910 amendment to the Oklahoma 
constitution as implicitly designed to limit African-Americans’ right to vote); see also CAL. CONST. art. 
I, § 7(a) (amended 1979) (amending California’s equal protection guarantee to eliminate any 
requirements for school integration beyond requirements of federal law). See generally JOHN DINAN, 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: GOVERNING BY AMENDMENT IN THE AMERICAN STATES 132–43 
(2018) (describing various amendments designed to limit rights of minorities, including marriage 
amendments adopted before Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)). 
 3 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (amended 1970) (setting a maximum interest rate on all 
general-obligation bonds and limiting the legislature’s ability to incur debts over $300,000); COLO. 
CONST. art. XXVII, §§ 1, 3 (1993) (creating “Great Outdoors Colorado” program and requiring certain 
lottery revenues be allocated to environmental, wildlife, and parks programs); MINN. CONST. art. 14, § 10 
(authorizing fuel taxes and fees to be allocated for road re-construction). See generally John Kincaid, The 
Constitutional Frameworks of State and Local Government Finance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 45, 71–72 (Robert D. Ebel & John E. Petersen eds., 2012) 
(explaining the role that constitutional amendments have played in regulating state and local finance). 
 4 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. V, § 42 (establishing legislative review of agency regulations); OR. 
CONST. art. IV, §§ 1 (amended 1902) (adopting procedures giving citizens a legal process for initiative 
and referendum); see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial 
Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1146 (2010) (tracing state constitutional 
amendments that instituted judicial elections). 
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limitations leave wide latitude for constitutional reformers seeking to remake 
a state’s highest law.5 
The malleability and increasing significance of state constitutions raise 
the important question of whether there are any inherent substantive limits 
on state amendment processes.6 This is a question of mounting consequence 
because, as state amendment practice has accelerated and expanded, 
concerns about democratic defects in amendment processes have 
heightened.7 In many states, there are legitimate fears that well-financed 
special interests dominate amendment politics, and that fundamental change 
is occurring with minimal opportunities for constructive deliberation or 
inclusive participation. These fears are especially poignant because spending 
limits and regulation of referenda campaigns are ineffective or nonexistent.8 
Notwithstanding these concerns, contemporary state judicial review of 
amendments has been almost universally deferential.9 Provided that an 
amendment complies with federal law and explicit state amendment rules, 
state courts generally uphold even the most sweeping changes as valid uses 
of the state amendment power.10 The prevailing justification for these rulings 
 
 5 Some state amendment rules impose explicit substantive limitations on amendment in the form of 
single-subject requirements, non-revision rules, and subject-matter restrictions on initiative amendments. 
A few state constitutions also purport to make particular provisions unamendable. In general, however, 
state amendment processes place few explicit, substantive limitations on amendment. 
 6 See Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State Constitutional 
Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1519–20 (2009). 
 7 See John F. Cooper, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend State Constitutions: A Concept Whose 
Time Has Passed, or a Vigorous Component of Participatory Democracy at the State Level?, 28 N.M. L. 
REV. 227, 260 (1998) (describing concerns with citizen initiative processes); Jonathan L. Marshfield, 
Improving Amendment, 69 ARK. L. REV. 477, 477–78 (2016) (describing defects with legislative 
amendment process). 
 8 Long before Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the Supreme Court held that states 
cannot impose individual or corporate contribution limits on ballot question campaigns. See Citizens 
Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); First Nat’l Bank of 
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Thus, there are minimal restrictions on how special interest groups 
spend money related to state constitutional amendment proposals, although some states impose disclosure 
requirements for ballot question spending. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 22A (West 2019). 
 9 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 402 (2009) (explaining 
that courts impose “virtually no substantive restrictions on state constitutional amendment and revision 
(other than federal constitutional constraints)”). Unlike disputes under Article V, which the Supreme 
Court has declared nonjusticiable political questions in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), state 
courts will resolve disputes under state amendment rules. See id; see also G. ALAN TARR, 
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 26 (1998). 
 10 See, e.g., Omaha Nat’l Bank v. Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Neb. 1986) (refusing to consider the 
argument that an amendment was invalid because it conflicted with core of the existing constitution); 
Assoc. Indus. of Okla. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 55 P.2d 79, 82 (Okla. 1936) (“Subject to the limitations 
imposed by the Federal Constitution, the reserved power of the people of the state to amend their 
Constitution is unlimited.”); see also FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DRAFTING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, REVISIONS, AND AMENDMENTS 3 
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is that state constitutional amendment processes, especially those 
incorporating a public referendum, reflect the sovereign preferences of the 
people, which courts are obliged to enforce no matter how far-reaching or 
deeply incongruous with the existing constitution.11 Thus, state courts have 
gone so far as to hold that state legislatures can propose entirely new 
constitutions as singular amendments.12 
A few state courts have noted the oddity of an unlimited state 
amendment power. In 2006, Justice Greaney of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court responded to a proposed amendment limiting marriage to 
heterosexual relationships by noting that the amendment was “mutually 
inconsistent and irreconcilable” with the Adams Constitution’s “elegantly 
stated, and constitutionally defined, protections of liberty, equality, 
tolerance, and the access of all citizens to equal rights and benefits.”13 
Similarly, in an important but widely overlooked 1936 case, the Alabama 
Supreme Court held that the amendment power could not be used to 
“temporarily suspend the Constitution or any part thereof . . .” because 
popular suspension of a constitution would contradict the document’s 
essential purpose.14 
Besides these few instances, and a handful of largely overlooked 
cases,15 courts and scholars have generally dismissed the suggestion that 
there are implicit, judicially enforceable limits on state amendment 
 
(2006) (“Other than these relatively rare federal constitutional restrictions, . . . there are no legally 
enforceable restrictions on the content of what may be placed in the state constitution.”). 
 11 See, e.g., Smith v. Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d 11, 17–18 (Idaho 1970) (“We retain our faith in our people 
and their intelligence for being informed in matters of their government. Theirs will be the final 
determination as it should be ideally in all matters of their government.”); Omaha Nat’l Bank, 
389 N.W.2d at 278 (holding that the court has no authority “to tell the voters of this state that although 
the Constitution states that the people have reserved the power to amend that Constitution, they may only 
amend it in ways that [the court] determine[s]”). A related justification is that courts are obligated to 
reconcile inconsistent provisions and have no authority to declare one provision superior over another. 
See, e.g., Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let’s Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337, 341–42 (Fla. 1978). 
 12 See, e.g., Wheeler v. Bd. of Trustees, 37 S.E.2d 322, 327 (Ga. 1946) (upholding Georgia’s 1945 
constitution, which was adopted through the amendment procedures prescribed in the operative 1877 
constitution, as lawful because the 1877 constitution authorized the legislature to create amendments 
subject to a referendum); Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d at 17–18 (upholding the state legislature’s power to 
propose an entirely new constitution as an amendment or revision to the existing constitution); see also 
A. E. Dick Howard, Constitutional Revision: Virginia and the Nation, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (1974) 
(arguing that Virginia’s 1970 constitution, which was adopted as a singular amendment to the 1902 
constitution, was lawful because of Virginia Supreme Court precedent). 
 13 Schulman v. Att’y Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505, 512–13 (Mass. 2006) (Greaney, J., concurring). 
 14 Houston Cty. v. Martin, 169 So. 13, 15 (Ala. 1936) (invalidating amendment while acknowledging 
that it was procedurally perfect). 
 15 See infra Sections III.A.2, III.B.2 (discussing overlooked state court jurisprudence enforcing 
functional limitations on extra-conventional amendment processes). 
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procedures.16 Contemporary high courts around the country generally take 
the position that there is no doctrinal basis to invalidate a procedurally 
perfect, federally compliant amendment.17 To the extent scholars have 
entertained the idea at the state level, they suggest that it can be justified only 
by appeals to natural law or by borrowing exotic foreign doctrine from other 
countries.18 
 
 16 See, e.g., Scott L. Kafker & David A. Russcol, The Eye of a Constitutional Storm: Pre-Election 
Review by the State Judiciary of Initiative Amendments to State Constitutions, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1279, 1317 (“[T]o challenge a properly passed state constitutional amendment on grounds that it generally 
violated the state constitution as it existed prior to amendment would be novel, to say the least.”). 
 17 See, e.g., Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let’s Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337, 341–42 (Fla. 
1978) (“When a newly adopted amendment does conflict with preexisting constitutional provisions, the 
new amendment necessarily supersedes the previous provisions. Otherwise, an amendment could no 
longer alter existing constitutional provisions and the amendment process might, in every case, be 
frustrated by the judicial determination that a given proposal conflicts with other provisions.”); Opinion 
of Justices to Senate, 436 N.E.2d 935, 944 (Mass. 1982) (“We cannot comprehend how a proposed 
amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution could be found to violate that Constitution.”); Omaha Nat’l 
Bank v. Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269, 278 (Neb. 1986) (“[I]t is difficult to comprehend how the proposed 
constitutional amendment can be ‘unconstitutional’ under our Constitution.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). In a series of cases from the 1920s, the United States Supreme Court summarily dismissed 
similar arguments under Article V. See Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920); Rhode Island 
v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920). Those cases involved challenges to the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments as violating the Constitution’s core commitment to federalism and going beyond the 
amendment power of Article V. See W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, 30 YALE L.J. 321, 
335–38 (1921). The Court rejected those arguments, and, in 1939, effectively foreclosed the issue by 
holding that disputes under Article V are nonjusticiable political questions. See Coleman v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 972, 980 (1939). 
 18 Contemporary scholars have largely failed to engage with the issue at the state level. See Teresa 
Stanton Collett, Judicial Independence and Accountability in an Age of Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendments, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 327, 339–48 (2010) (describing substantive judicial review of 
amendments as necessarily tied to theories of natural law and concluding that “[i]n the American legal 
scheme” there is therefore “little constitutional basis for substantive review”); Mary Jane Morrison, 
Amending the Minnesota Constitution in Context: The Two Proposals in 2012, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & 
POL’Y 115, 117–18 (2012) (exclaiming that “the concept of an ‘unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment’ is an oxymoron” and that “American constitutional law may lag behind foreign 
constitutions” in this regard). However, there is a significant body of literature theorizing this issue under 
the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 238 (Expanded ed., 2005); 
Richard Albert, The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution, in COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13, 13–19 (András Koltay ed., 2015); 
John R. Vile, The Case Against Implicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process, in RESPONDING 
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 191, 213 (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 1995); John R. Vile, Limitations on the Constitutional Amending Process, 2 CONST. 
COMMENT. 373 (1985). There is also a rapidly growing literature exploring the issue from comparative 
and theoretical perspectives. See YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: 
THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS 106 (2017) (providing definitive work on amendment limitations 
from comparative and theoretical perspectives); Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and 
Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 1–2 (2018). Although this work is groundbreaking in 
conceptualizing limits on amendment, none of it examines the question from the standpoint of state 
constitutionalism. 
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This Article analyzes whether state constitutional history, doctrine, and 
theory support prevailing judicial conceptions of a limitless state 
constitutional amendment power. To do this, I rely on a set of largely 
neglected sources: the debates and proceedings from the 233 state 
constitutional conventions that have occurred since the Founding.19 I 
collected and reviewed all known deliberations regarding the design of 
amendment processes (ninety-one different state convention debates 
spanning 1818–1984).20 I also draw on an original database of several 
hundred state cases reviewing the constitutionality of state amendments in 
all fifty states.21 Based on this review, I find that the underlying logic of state 
constitutional theory is inconsistent with the presumption of a limitless 
amendment power and that a body of forgotten and neglected case law has 
implied functional limitations on the amendment power. 
A full understanding of the state tradition suggests that there are implicit 
functional limits on what can be done through amendment.22 Specifically, 
there is a standing presumption that amendments developed outside of a state 
constitutional convention cannot fundamentally destroy or create a state 
constitution. Foundational changes of that nature are presumed lawful only 
 
 19 See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 1, 28 (2006) (noting that 
states have held 233 conventions and that records of debates are available for 114 of those). 
 20 This review was facilitated by the groundbreaking work of Professor John Dinan. Dinan has 
essentially catalogued by subject all known state convention debates. See id. at 27. Regarding amendment 
and revision, he has identified the precise portions of all convention proceedings that addressed the design 
of amendment and revision rules. See id. at 31 n.13. With the help of the Young Law Library, I collected 
and reviewed all of those debates for this project. Appendix A provides a complete list of the convention 
debates that I collected and reviewed. Appendix B illustrates the temporal (Figure 1) and geographic 
(Figure 2) distribution of this dataset. 
 21 To generate a representative sample of how state courts review amendments, I identified all 
provisions in all currently operative state constitutions that relate to amendment and revision. I then used 
Westlaw to generate KeyCite reports for those provisions. Together with a team of research assistants, I 
reviewed all cases in the KeyCite reports to identify cases where the validity of a state constitutional 
amendment was at issue.  
 22 Of course, there is great variety in how the states have approached government over the centuries. 
See John Dinan, “The Earth Belongs Always to the Living Generation”: The Development of State 
Constitutional Amendment and Revision Procedures, 62 REV. POLS. 645, 648 n.10 (2000) (“There are, 
admittedly, certain difficulties in speaking of a constitutional tradition that is common to the fifty states.”). 
Meaningful variations are observable across time, between states, and even between institutions and 
groups, and officials within states. See id. at 648–49 n.10. However, the historical development of state 
constitutionalism suggests a few core shared understandings regarding how popular sovereignty has been 
institutionalized. See id. at 649 n.10. (“[S]tate amendment and revision procedures are sufficiently similar, 
and the general outlines of the development of these procedures have enough in common, that it becomes 
possible to speak of a state constitutional tradition.”); see also TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 9, at 50–55 (explaining state constitutional convergence and a common 
tradition). My argument here is that in reviewing state constitutional amendments, state courts have lost 
sight of a core understandings that is common to the state tradition: namely, that only a constitutional 
convention of specially-elected delegates has the inherent power to create or destroy a constitution on the 
people’s behalf. See infra Parts II, III. 
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when formulated by the people acting in their sovereign constituent capacity 
through a convention of specially elected delegates. Indeed, the 
constitutional convention came from the belief that for a constitution to 
originate from the people, it had to originate from an institution separate 
from existing officials and insulated from undue influence by private 
faction.23 Thus, in the state tradition, because a constitution depends on 
popular consent for legitimacy, there is a presumption that it must originate 
with a convention of specially elected delegates whose sole mandate is to 
craft a constitution on behalf of the people. No other institution is presumed 
to have inherent power, without an explicit constitutional grant, to create 
government on behalf of the people. 24 
Consequently, states developed extra-conventional amendment 
procedures with the background understanding that no ordinary official, 
institution, or private group has the inherent power to formally initiate 
changes to the people’s fundamental law. Although state legislatures 
unquestionably have plenary legislative power, that authority does not 
include the power to propose or initiate constitutional change. Indeed, the 
separation between ordinary legislative power and the power to make or 
change a constitution was one of the key breakthroughs in American political 
thought.25 Thus, state constitutionalists recognized that if there was to be an 
extra-conventional method of amendment, it would have to be a new and 
 
 23 See infra notes 215–219 and accompanying text. 
 24 Many state constitutions include provisions stating that the people retain the right to change their 
constitution in whatever manner they choose. See TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 9, at 74. If we assume (incorrectly, I argue) that the referendum procedure can be equated with the 
full sovereign capacity of the people, then these provisions might support the doctrine of referendum 
sovereignty and the idea that extra-conventional amendment processes are inherently unlimited when 
subject to referenda. Part of my argument in this Article is that these provisions are better understood as 
declarations that although the constitution granted limited amendment powers to certain officials and 
institutions, no ordinary institution or official ever has the inherent authority to create or change a 
constitution on the people’s behalf. See infra notes 215–219. They are declarations of where residual 
power exists. They appear in preambles or state bills of rights to clarify the limits of the grants of power 
effectuated by the rest of the constitution. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: 
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 477–81 (1994) (arguing that these 
provisions support the view that amendment rules are not exclusive means for lawful constitutional 
change). 
 25 See WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND 
THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (Rita Kimber & Robert 
Kimber trans., Univ. of North Carolina Press 1980) (1973); MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY 
& LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 28–29 (1997) (explaining that 
early American constitution-making was galvanized around the belief that legislatures were creations of 
the constitution with delegated law-making power subordinate to the people’s sovereign power to create 
a constitution); TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 9, at 70 (“The shared 
understanding that the people are the source of constitutional authority alerted the states to a further 
problem: if a legislature could not create a constitution, then neither could it re-create the constitution by 
altering it.”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 (1998). 
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explicitly authorized power. It would have to be a power that they created 
through positive law by engrafting language into their constitutions that 
authorized certain agents to participate in constitutional amendment outside 
of a convention.26 The important consequence of this was that the power of 
a legislature to make or propose “specific” amendments was not understood 
to be synonymous with the original power of the people to make (or change) 
their constitution. In the state constitutional tradition, the extra-conventional 
amendment power is presumed to be a limited and explicitly “constituted 
power.”27 It is a power derived entirely from the express language in the 
constitution that creates it, and it has no inherent or implied authority. 
This same logic underlies the constitutional initiative.28 Although the 
initiative is heavily cloaked in the rhetoric of popular sovereignty, the 
debates regarding adoption of the initiative centered on concerns about 
constitutional agency.29 Opponents of the initiative argued that the initiative 
process did not directly empower the people, but created constitutional 
agents of individuals who were inevitably prone to act out of self-interest,30 
thus actually undermining popular sovereignty.31 Proponents of the initiative, 
on the other hand, emphasized that the existing deputies (the legislators) 
were themselves self-interested or captured by special interests, and, 
 
 26 See infra Part III (providing evidence from convention debates). This point is powerfully 
illustrated by one of the earliest known convention debates addressing amendment by a legislature. At 
the Maine convention of 1819, a delegate exclaimed in response to a first-of-its-kind proposal to allow 
the legislature to formulate amendments for popular ratification: “It appears to me this section delegates 
to our Legislature a stretch of power, that no Legislature on earth has a right to exercise.” THE DEBATES 
AND JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MAINE 1819–’20 AND 
AMENDMENTS SUBSEQUENTLY MADE TO THE CONSTITUTION 345–47 (1894). 
 27 See ROZNAI, supra note 18, at 106; 11 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN 
THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 413 (1905) (a delegate arguing that in regard to extra-
conventional amendment “[t]he very object of a constitution is to control Legislatures”). 
 28 I use the phrase “constitutional initiative” to refer to the process whereby citizens can craft a 
proposed amendment to a state constitution and qualify it for a referendum by obtaining signatures as 
proscribed by law. In this article, I also use the phrase “citizens’ initiative” to refer to this process, 
although the phrase can be used in the literature to refer to a process whereby citizens can draft and 
propose ordinary statutes in addition to constitutional amendments. 
 29 See infra Section III.B. See generally DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT 
INITIATIVE REVOLUTION (1989) (tracing history of constitutional and statutory initiative in states). By 
“constitutional agency,” I mean the delegation of the people’s sovereign power to make or change 
government to some institution, group, or official to act as the people’s agent in the process of constitution 
making or constitutional reform. 
 30 See, e.g., 1 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
OHIO 688–89 (1912) (“A measure to be submitted under this method is drawn up in some back office by 
someone personally interested therein . . . .”). 
 31 See id. at 688 (“The result will be that you will have laws passed for the government of the honest 
people by the worst class of the citizens of our state.”). 
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therefore, were unfaithful constitutional agents.32 The initiative, they argued, 
would deputize individual citizens who were not entangled with powerful 
special interests and could propose amendments that truly represented the 
people or at least counteracted legislative capture.33 Both sides 
acknowledged, however, that the debate centered around who to deputize for 
purposes of amendment. And in places where the initiative was adopted, all 
seemed to agree that the legal effect of initiative provisions was to authorize 
private citizens to act as amendment agents in a way that they would not 
otherwise have a legal right to act.34 
These findings suggest that state amendment rules are properly 
understood as deputizing agents of constitutional change. Because those 
agents derive their authority entirely from the existing constitution, they 
implicitly lack the authority to destroy or replace the source of that power. 
Only the people in their sovereign capacity have the inherent authority to 
create or destroy government, and the constitutional convention is the only 
state institution with the implied authorization to exercise that authority on 
behalf of the people. To be sure, the people can delegate their authority to 
destroy or create government to existing officials or institutions. In fact, a 
small minority of states have adopted provisions that allow legislatures or 
other agents of constitutional change to propose entirely new constitutions.35 
 
 32 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 560 (1907) (“The history of legislatures for the recent past decades is prolific with disregard 
for the prayers of the people.”). 
 33 See, e.g., THE RECORDS OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1910 189 (John S. 
Goff ed., 1991) (“I believe it initiates a true republican form of government, and will enable the people 
of this state to hold the government within their control.”). 
 34 See infra Section III.B.1 (providing evidence from convention debates of this understanding). See 
generally KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 23 (2009) (explaining that 
initiative was first introduced into the American constitutional system by positive law adopted during the 
Progressive Era). Something like the initiative had existed at the local government level since before the 
Revolution. See ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA 369–73 (1900) 
(describing various initiative-type processes used to handle disputes regarding the location of county 
capitals, whether “live stock shall be allowed to run at large,” and local liquor regulation). However, the 
initiative was never recognized as a matter of state law in any form until South Dakota constitutionalized 
the statutory initiative in 1898 and Oregon adopted the statutory and constitutional initiative in 1902. See 
DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION, supra note 19, at 64 n.132. There was, of 
course, a long standing right in American and English law allowing citizens to petition the legislature. On 
the legal differences between the initiative and the preexisting right to petition the legislature in state 
constitutions, see OBERHOLTZER at 368–69, 384 (noting that the right to petition was legally subordinate 
to the legislature whereas initiative was a legal right designed to be independent of the legislature). 
 35 Three state constitutions explicitly allow the legislature to create and propose an entire constitution 
for the people to ratify at a referendum. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“Amendment of a section or revision 
of one or more articles, or the whole, of this constitution may be proposed by . . . the legislature.”); GA. 
CONST. art. X, § 1, para. I (“Amendments to this Constitution or a new Constitution may be proposed by 
the General Assembly . . . .”); OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 2(1), available at https://www.oregonlegislature. 
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But absent an explicit and clear delegation of the power to create or destroy 
a constitution, courts should presume that the constituent power inheres only 
in the people acting in convention. To hold otherwise misunderstands how 
the states have institutionalized popular sovereignty. 
These findings are important in light of the ever-expanding use of state 
constitutional amendment procedures to effectuate large-scale change. They 
provide a coherent framework for state courts to assess whether a proposed 
amendment is an impermissible use of the amendment power. If an 
amendment actually or effectively creates a fundamentally new constitution, 
it exceeds the presumed scope of amendment. Courts should uphold such 
far-reaching changes as lawful “amendments” only if the constitution 
explicitly authorizes the relevant amendment agent—legislature, 
commission, or private group—to formulate a new constitution. 
Of course, line-drawing will be difficult, and the proposed doctrine will 
surely require further delineation, refinement, and critical assessment. For 
now, my findings reveal that state constitutional history, doctrine, and theory 
are inconsistent with the prevailing judicial notion that amendment processes 
can be equated with the people’s sovereign right to create or replace 
government. If nothing else, the findings suggest that courts should 
reevaluate their approach to reviewing extra-conventional amendments and 
recognize that a limitless amendment power may actually undermine popular 
sovereignty. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains state amendment 
practice and the doctrine of referendum sovereignty. Part II explores how 
state constitutionalism is grounded in the assumption that only a convention 
of specially elected delegates has the inherent power to create a constitution 
on behalf of the people. Part III argues that the states developed extra-
conventional amendment processes with the assumption that the amendment 
power was a limited and explicitly constituted power separate from the 
people’s inalienable and foundational right to create government. Part IV 
explores how these findings could support judicially enforceable limits on 
state amendment processes and provides a preliminary assessment of likely 
costs and impediments to judicial enforcement. Part IV also illustrates how 
courts might implement the doctrine by analyzing two hypothetical 
amendments: an amendment to eliminate the initiative and referendum under 
the Oklahoma Constitution, and an amendment to eradicate public education 
under the New Hampshire Constitution. 
 
gov/bills_laws/Pages/OrConst.aspx [https://perma.cc/3WX6-8DE2] (“[A] revision of all or part of this 
Constitution may be proposed in either house of the Legislative Assembly . . . .”). 
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I. STATE AMENDMENT PRACTICE AND REFERENDUM SOVEREIGNTY 
As state constitutional amendment procedures have grown in frequency 
and significance, legal doctrine regarding the permissible substance of 
amendments has treated the amendment power as highly deferential to 
amendment actors. This Part presents an overview of state constitutional 
amendment processes and charts the development of legal doctrine 
supporting a limitless state amendment power. I first provide an overview of 
state amendment rules and illustrate the significance of formal amendment 
in contemporary state constitutional politics. I then discuss the jurisprudence, 
or doctrine of referendum sovereignty, that has developed around a theory 
of limitless state amendment power. 
A. State Amendment Practice and Procedure 
Although state constitutions contain a variety of nuanced approaches to 
amendment, two general methods dominate contemporary state politics.36 
First, all state constitutions authorize their legislatures to formulate 
amendments.37 The dominant approach is the “legislative-referral” method, 
which allows legislatures to craft proposed changes and place them on the 
ballot for ratification at a referendum.38 All states except Delaware have a 
legislative-referral method of amendment,39 and the vast majority of 
legislative-referral states allow legislatures to submit proposals to a public 
referendum after only a single legislative session.40 A minority of states 
 
 36 See TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 9, at 130; G. Alan Tarr & Robert 
F. Williams, Getting from Here to There: Twenty-first Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State 
Constitutional Reform, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1092 (2005) (reporting that 90% of amendments are by 
legislative method); Marshfield, supra note 7, at 489 (providing a detailed breakdown of amendments by 
method in all citizen-initiative states between 2005 and 2014). 
 37 See John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2016, in THE COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2017, at 12–13 tbl.1.2 (2017) (charting the constitutional 
amendment procedure of each state legislature). 
 38 States impose a variety of requirements on the legislative-referral method. For example, most 
states impose a “single-subject” rule of some kind, which limits proposals to one general issue. See, e.g., 
LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1(B) (“A proposed amendment shall . . . be confined to one object . . . .”); see also 
Tarr & Williams, supra note 36, at 1092. Several other states similarly place a cap on the total number of 
amendments the legislature can propose at a single election, and a few states prohibit the legislature from 
resubmitting a failed amendment to voters within a certain timeframe. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIX, 
§ 22 (“But no more than three amendments shall be proposed or submitted at the same time.”); N.J. 
CONST. art. IX, ¶ 7; see also Tarr & Williams, supra note 36, at 1092–93. 
 39 See Dinan, supra note 37, at 12 tbl.1.2. Delaware is unique in that it allows the legislature to amend 
the constitution without a public referendum provided that a proposed amendment is approved by 
supermajorities in both houses in two successive legislative sessions. 
 40 DINAN, supra note 2, at 14. These states generally allow the legislature to place proposals on the 
ballot after a majority or supermajority in each house approves the amendment. See id. 
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require the legislature to approve amendments in two successive sessions 
before they can be sent to a referendum.41 
Second, eighteen states allow for amendment by citizen initiative (“the 
initiative” or “the constitutional initiative”).42 Requirements for the initiative 
vary, but generally it allows private citizens to craft amendment proposals 
and place them on the ballot for ratification by gathering a set number of 
signatures in support of the proposal.43 Together, the legislative-referral and 
initiative processes account for 99% of all contemporary state amendments.44 
Additionally, the vast majority of state constitutions explicitly allow for 
constitutional change by the calling of a convention.45 The particulars vary, 
but the standard approach is to allow the legislature to begin the process by 
submitting to referendum the question of whether to convene a constitutional 
convention.46 If the public approves, delegates are specially elected to the 
convention, which deliberates and formulates proposals for ratification at 
another referendum.47 Although the convention was the dominant method of 
state constitutional amendment during the nineteenth and much of the early 
twentieth century, there have been no convention-generated amendments in 
over thirty years.48 One final point regarding the text of state constitutions is 
relevant and important to this discussion of limits on the amendment power. 
 
 41 The states that require this are Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. 
 42 See Dinan, supra note 37, at 14 tbl.1.3 (summarizing procedures for initiative in all eighteen 
states); see generally John Dinan, State Constitutional Initiative Processes and Governance in the 
Twenty-first Century, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 61, 93–103 (2016) (detailing many nuances and variations in 
constitutional initiative rules). 
 43 Signature thresholds and denominators vary. See id. (describing various approaches). 
 44 Marshfield, supra note 7, at 489. In addition to these two methods, plus the option of calling a 
constitutional convention, the constitutional commission has become an important institution in 
contemporary state constitutional change. 
 45 See Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 177, 192 (G. Alan 
Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (all but nine provide for conventions); Dinan, supra note 37, at 
15–16 tbl.1.4 (describing procedures in all state constitutions). State constitutions can contain a great 
amount of detail regarding the structure and operation of conventions. See Benjamin, supra note 45, at 
192 (providing a taxonomy of state approaches to regulating conventions through their constitutions). In 
addition to conventions, state constitutional commissions have become important institutions in 
contemporary state constitutional change. 
 46 Even when the constitution does not explicitly allow for this, state constitutional doctrine generally 
holds that legislatures can propose a convention without explicit constitutional authorization. See Tarr & 
Williams, supra note 36, at 1079. 
 47 See 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 197–99 app. (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006). The states use 
the convention method to adopt entirely new constitutions and to reform their existing documents. See id. 
at 199; Dinan, supra note 38, at 15–16. 
 48 DINAN, supra note 2, at 30. 
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Several state constitutions appear to distinguish between constitutional 
“amendment” and “revision.”49 Although the texts are mostly unclear as to 
the substance of the distinction, scholars and courts have tried to define the 
concepts. Professor Richard Albert, for example, describes an amendment as 
a specific change that “alters the constitution within the existing framework 
of government while revision amounts to a fundamental change that departs 
from the presuppositions of the constitution and may even reshape its 
framework.”50 
When looking at the twenty-three state constitutions that refer to both 
amendment and revision, four general categories emerge. First, several 
initiative states provide that the initiative can be used for amendments, but 
legislatures or conventions may propose amendments or revisions—thus 
creating the inference that broad change cannot occur through the initiative 
process.51 Second, some non-initiative states authorize the legislature to 
propose only amendments but provide that conventions may propose 
amendments or revisions—thus creating the same inference regarding 
legislative proposals.52 Third, some non-initiative states explicitly authorize 
legislatures to propose amendments or revisions to the constitution—thus 
creating the inference that the legislature can propose broad changes.53 
Finally, several states seem to use “revision” as a more general reference to 
constitutional change than a term of particular legal significance.54 As 
 
 49 See generally Benjamin, supra note 45, at 178 (noting that twenty-three state constitutions contain 
both amendment and revision in reference to constitutional change). 
 50 Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 913, 
929 (2014); see Benjamin, supra note 45, at 178 (defining amendment as “the alteration of an existing 
constitution by the addition or subtraction of material” and “revision” as “replacement of one constitution 
by another”); see also Jonathan L. Marshfield, Amendment Creep, 115 MICH. L. REV. 215, 269–71 (2016) 
(discussing an illustrative case regarding amendment-revision distinction). 
 51 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (“The electors may amend the Constitution by initiative.”); 
OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 2(1) (“In addition to the power to amend this Constitution granted by section 1, 
Article IV, and section 1 of this Article, a revision of all or part of this Constitution may be proposed in 
either house of the Legislative Assembly.”). Florida is an interesting exception because it explicitly allows 
revision by initiative. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (“The power to propose the revision or amendment of 
any portion or portions of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people . . . .”). 
 52 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 284 (“Amendments may be proposed to this Constitution by 
the legislature in the manner following . . . .); id. § 286 (“[N]othing herein contained shall be construed 
as restricting the jurisdiction and power of the convention, when duly assembled in pursuance of this 
section, to establish such ordinances and to do and perform such things as to the convention may seem 
necessary or proper for the purpose of altering, revising, or amending the existing Constitution.”). 
 53 See Tarr & Williams, supra note 36, at 1082 n.35. 
 54 See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (“The people of this State reserve the power to amend this 
Constitution and to adopt a new or revised Constitution. This power may be exercised by either of the 
methods set out hereinafter in this Article, but in no other way.”); see also Staples v. Gilmer, 33 S.E.2d 
49, 56 (Va. 1945) (holding that terms as used in 1902 Virginia Constitution were effectively 
interchangeable); State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor, 133 N.W. 1046, 1051 (N.D. 1911) (holding “revision” 
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explained below, only a small minority of courts have enforced a distinction 
between amendment and revision. 
Regarding amendment practice and substance, state constitutions 
operate very differently than the Federal Constitution. One of the Federal 
Constitution’s defining characteristics is its onerous formal amendment 
procedures, which divert pressures for constitutional change into informal 
processes such as constitutional litigation.55 State constitutions, on the other 
hand, are universally more susceptible to formal amendment through 
political processes.56 Whereas the Federal Constitution has been amended 
only twenty-seven times over 230 years, state constitutions average 1.3 
amendments per year and there have been 7,586 amendments to current state 
constitutions.57 
Aside from their frequency, state amendments have great substantive 
and political significance. They address almost every aspect of public life—
from contentious cultural issues like marriage equality, abortion rights, 
marijuana criminalization, and gun rights; to high-stakes regulatory and 
structural issues such as taxation, education financing, public debt, judicial 
review, and redistricting. State amendments have become a go-to political 
device for citizens, interest groups, and public officials.58 
Not surprisingly, therefore, state amendment practice attracts 
significant capital investment by interest groups hoping to influence the 
amendment process in their favor. In 2018, for example, Ballotpedia 
confirmed $1.185 billion in contributions to 167 different ballot question 
campaigns.59 The average amount contributed per campaign was over $7 
 
and “amendment” are interchangeable); Albert, supra note 50, at 930–32 (finding that foreign national 
constitutions frequently use terms interchangeably). 
 55 See Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 319 (2009) 
(explaining the common understanding that Article V’s rigidity has rerouted constitutional change into 
judicial review and “superstatutes”). 
 56 See DINAN, supra note 2, at 11; TARR, supra note 9, at 139–40. 
 57 See DINAN, supra note 2, at 23 (as of 2017). 
 58 See generally id. (explaining that reformers resort to amendments in the states). 
 59 See Ballot Measure Campaign Finance, 2018, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/ 
Ballot_measure_campaign_finance,_2018 [https://perma.cc/6MHQ-XN33]. Of course, these numbers 
capture statutory ballot questions unrelated to constitutional amendments. However, they are informative 
for the purpose of illustrating the significant amount of money interest groups spend in amendment 
campaigns. In 2016, for example, a proposed constitutional amendment in California related to taxes on 
tobacco attracted more than $74.79 million in contributions. See Elaine S. Povich, Big Money Pours into 
State Ballot Issue Campaigns, PEW TRUSTS (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/09/23/big-money-pours-into-state-ballot-issue-campaigns 
[https://perma.cc/N7KG-MXU5]. 
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million.60 Moreover, a recent study by The Pew Charitable Trusts found that 
most money given to ballot question campaigns “comes from businesses or 
other interests with financial stakes in the outcome.”61 Indeed, many 
observers note that initiative and referendum politics has been 
“industrialized” and weaponized by well-financed special interests who 
manipulate the process to obtain favorable substantive policies.62 
To be sure, amidst this high-stakes political activity, many state 
amendments are “ordinary” in the sense that they make relatively minor 
adjustments, deletions, or updates to the constitution.63 But amendments can 
also fundamentally restructure state governance or even abolish a 
constitution’s core commitments. Indeed, some of the most significant and 
far-reaching developments in American public law have occurred through 
singular state amendments crafted by legislatures or private citizens.64 The 
popular election and recall of state judges,65 legislative term limits,66 and even 
 
 60 Ballot Measure Campaign Finance, 2018, supra note 59. Total contributions were $32 million in 
2015, $1.012 billion in 2016, and $102 million in 2017. Id. In 2018, $1.185 billion was contributed to 
campaigns for or against 167 ballot measures. Id. 
 61 Povich, supra note 59. 
 62 See Marshfield, supra note 7, at 477–79. 
 63 See TARR, supra note 9, at 142 (“[M]ost twentieth-century amendments have facilitated the 
operation of state government, making adjustments in an existing body of law rather than introducing 
grand changes.”). 
 64 See id. at 24. Combinations of amendments and amendments over time can also fundamentally 
reconstitute state governance. See id. While this phenomenon might present its own problems and 
concerns, my focus in this article is with singular attempts to re-constitute a state. 
 65 The adoption of judicial elections was a momentous change from the appointment model. Indeed, 
no other advanced democracy in the world elects judges in the same way. See David E. Pozen, The Irony 
of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266 (2008). It was intended to fundamentally restructure 
the balance of power between courts, legislatures, political parties, and the people. As Professor G. Alan 
Tarr has explained, proponents of judicial elections often argued that elections would preserve judicial 
independence by releasing judges from party control and political elites. See G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT 
FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES 51 (2012). 
Judicial elections were intended to ensure that courts practiced judicial review of legislation with more 
independence and were not afraid to strike down unconstitutional legislation. Id. 
 66 Fifteen states currently have legislative term limits, several of which were adopted by ordinary 
constitutional amendment. See DINAN, supra note 2, at 38 (noting that voters in nearly one-third of the 
states approved constitutional amendments limiting the number of terms legislators can serve). These 
amendments can have the effect of dismantling professional policy making and fundamentally reshaping 
governance in a state. See generally THAD KOUSSER, TERM LIMITS AND THE DISMANTLING OF STATE 
LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM (2005) (documenting and analyzing the significant impact of legislative 
term limits on state government). Professors Bruce Cain and Roger Noll have observed, for example, that 
California’s 1990 term limit amendment “substantially weaken[ed] the legislature’s leadership, 
institutional knowledge, oversight capability, and committee system.” Cain & Noll, supra note 6, at 1524–
25. Moreover, “[i]n so doing, the amendment shifted power from the legislature to the executive and 
increased lobbyists’ influence on the legislative process.” Id. Interestingly, the California term limit 
amendment was ratified by a mere 4% margin. See The Term-Limited States, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
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the initiative and referendum itself were all adopted in various states as 
singular state amendments.67 Amendments can also attack a constitution’s 
core normative commitments.68 Rights-stripping amendments, for example, 
 
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-
limits-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZPG5-4UFX]. 
 67 The statutory initiative was first introduced into the United States by an amendment to the South 
Dakota Constitution in 1898. See M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 391 
(2003). Several other states subsequently adopted the initiative via extra-conventional amendments; 
including California in 1911 and, finally, Mississippi in 1992. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 16–17 
tbl.1-1 (tracing each state’s adoption of initiative). The initiative’s impact has nevertheless been 
substantial, and it was intended to have far reaching effects on state governance. See generally DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (Shaun Bowler & Amihai Glazer eds., 
2008) (providing a collection of essays assessing the wide-ranging impacts of the initiative on governance 
and politics); DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 130, 
137–48 (2004) (outlining the historical justifications for introducing initiative as a corrective institutional 
measure, and the accepted, far-reaching effects on governance, and assessing its impact). Most directly, 
the initiative aimed to fundamentally restructure legislative power. The initiative had its origins in the 
Progressive Era concern that, as structured, state legislatures were unresponsive to popular will and 
captured by wealthy special interests. See generally JAMES QUAYLE DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 214–15 (1915). The initiative was intended to correct these agency costs by 
allowing citizens to create law without any legislative intervention, which would not only fix 
unrepresentative policies, but would change the decision-making incentives for sitting legislators. See 
SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 26. Thus, the initiative formalized an entirely new institution in state 
governance with the goal of fundamentally restructuring legislative authority and, ultimately, democratic 
practice. See generally THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, 
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 38–59 (1989). As Professor Elizabeth Garrett has argued, the initiative 
created a new “hybrid democracy” that is “neither wholly representative nor wholly direct, but a complex 
combination of both.” See Elizabeth Garrett, Crypto-Initiatives in Hybrid Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 
985, 985 (2005). Garrett concludes that this new approach to democracy has deep impacts on candidate 
elections, legislator policy decision-making, and party strategy. See id. at 985–86. It is no stretch to 
suggest that states with a robust initiative are constituted around a fundamentally different theory of 
democratic governance. See MILLER, supra note 34, at 19–40 (describing this as an “epic debate”). See 
generally NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCSL I&R TASK FORCE 1–3 (2002), 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/irtaskfc/IandR_report.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/WQ2W-DXTV] (providing an overview of the initiative process). 
 68 Most scholars recognize that constitutions are animated by “broad norms and basic commitments” 
that exist underneath the enforceable rules. See Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of 
Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 275, 276–80 (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 1995). Professor John Rawls has argued, for example, that the normative values reflected 
in the First Amendment represent deep and pervasive commitments that underlie the United States 
Constitution. See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 237–40. Professor Walter Murphy has similarly argued that 
the “most fundamental” value reflected in the United States Constitution over time is “human dignity.” 
Walter F. Murphy, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing, in ESSAYS ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 130, 147, 156 (M. Judd Harmon ed., 1978). Some scholars have 
argued that state constitutions are too chaotic to reflect any coherent underlying commitments or 
normative values. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 761, 822 (1992); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 1147, 1160 (1993). Others have argued that a state constitution—like any constitution—can 
reflect unique political choices and circumstances suggestive of coherent priorities and values. See 
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can directly undermine a constitution’s deep counter-majoritarian 
commitments to equal protection and due process.69 In short, experience with 
state amendment processes shows that they are susceptible to manipulation 
by interest groups and can be used not only to incrementally modify, but also 
to instantaneously destroy or fundamentally recreate the underlying 
constitution. 
B. The Doctrine of Referendum Sovereignty 
State courts have done little to curb dangers posed by unlimited state 
amendment practices.70 As Professor Robert Williams notes, state courts 
 
DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (3d ed. 1984); DONALD S. LUTZ, 
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 16 (1988); Daniel J. Elazar, A Response to Professor 
Gardner’s The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 975, 975 (1993). These 
competing perspectives on state constitutionalism are important, but the disagreement should be kept in 
perspective. Although all state constitutions may not be tightly encased around an identifiable ethos, some 
state constitutions surely reflect deep, pervasive, and identifiable constitutional values. See, e.g., John 
Bretting & F. Chris Garcia, New Mexico’s Constitution: Promoting Pluralism in La Tierra Encantada, in 
THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 743 (noting that New Mexico’s Constitution contains 
several unique provisions demonstrating a deep commitment to cultural pluralism); Brian A. Ellison, 
Wyoming: The Equality State, in THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 666, 667 (George E. 
Connor & Christopher W. Hammons eds., 2008) (observing that the Wyoming constitution centers around 
its commitment to political pragmatism, libertarianism, and anti-national government sentiment); 
Kenneth L. Manning, The Massachusetts Constitution: Liberty and Equality in the Commonwealth, in 
THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 35 (similarly observing that Massachusetts’s 
constitution is fundamentally committed to liberty and equality). And, despite California’s chaotic 
constitutional development, the California Supreme Court has emphasized that the state’s constitutional 
tradition remains firmly grounded on at least the structural commitment to an independent state judiciary. 
See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Cal. 1990). Thus, if it is true that at least some state 
constitutions have identifiable core values that guide political actors and courts, then amendments may 
reshape, change, or even destroy those values and fundamentally influence constitutional trajectory. 
 69 The marriage-equality issue under the Massachusetts constitution is illustrative. In 2003, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that state laws denying same-sex couples the opportunity 
to marry violated state due process and equal protection guarantees. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). Groups that opposed the ruling mobilized around an initiative 
to amend the state constitution to define marriage “only as the union of one man and one woman.” See 
Schulman v. Attorney General, 850 N.E.2d 505, 506 (Mass. 2006) (explaining the content and history of 
the initiative). The initiative was challenged as violating the provision in the amendment rules prohibiting 
the use of the initiative for “reversal of a judicial decision.” See id. The court held that the initiative did 
not violate that provision. Id. at 507. However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Greaney observed that 
the marriage amendment would “look so starkly out of place in the Adams Constitution, when compared 
with the document’s elegantly stated, and constitutionally defined, protections of liberty, equality, 
tolerance, and the access of all citizens to equal rights and benefits.” See id. at 512–13 (Greaney, J., 
concurring). Justice Greaney continued that the marriage amendment appeared “mutually inconsistent 
and irreconcilable” with the Massachusetts Constitution’s emphasis on equality and liberty. Id. at 512. In 
other words, Justice Greaney believed that the marriage amendment was significant not only to the 
outcome of the immediate marriage-equality dispute, but also because the amendment represented a 
change to one of the constitution’s core values. 
 70 Although the United States Supreme Court has held that disputes arising under Article V are 
nonjusticiable, state courts universally assume responsibility for enforcing state amendment rules. See 
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enforce “virtually no substantive restrictions on state constitutional 
amendment and revision (other than federal constitutional constraints).”71 
Indeed, the dominant perception of state court review is that courts evaluate 
amendments to ensure only that they satisfy explicit procedural requirements 
and that review of an amendment’s substance is beyond the judicial pale.72 
In this regard, courts in a minority of states—nine at most according to 
my research—have enforced an explicit textual distinction between 
“amendment” and “revision.”73 State courts have struggled to clearly 
distinguish between amendment and revision,74 but the general approach 
defines revision as a “wholesale or fundamental alteration of the 
constitutional structure” and an amendment as something of comparatively 
less significance.75 Because the structure of amendment rules vary between 
states, the holdings in these cases take a few different forms. 
First, in two initiative states (California and Oregon), courts have held 
that the constitution limits initiative proposals to amendments and that 
 
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939) (declaring disputes under Article V to be nonjusticiable 
political questions); TARR, supra note 9, at 26 (explaining state court review of amendments). State courts 
also generally hold that their constitutions may only be lawfully amended by the processes outlined in the 
constitution itself. See James Wilford Garner, Amendment of State Constitutions, 1 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
213, 219 (1907) (“It is now well settled that amendments are to be made only in the modes pointed out 
in the constitution, and that any departure therefrom is revolution.”); see also Watland v. Lingle, 85 P.3d 
1079, 1090–91 (Haw. 2004) (collecting cases from other states); Penn. Prison Soc’y v. Commonwealth, 
776 A.2d 971, 976 (Pa. 2001); Moore v. Brown, 165 S.W.2d 657, 659–60 (Mont. 1942); State v. Boloff, 
7 P.2d 775, 776–77 (Or. 1932) Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59 So. 963, 967–68 (Fla. 1912); 16 AM. JUR. 2D 
Const. Law § 19 (2018) (“Any attempt to revise a constitution or adopt a new one in any manner other 
than that provided in the existing instrument is almost invariably treated as extraconstitutional and 
revolutionary.”). 
 71 WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 402. As Williams notes, state court review of amendments is to ensure 
only that explicit amendment rules are satisfied. See id. For example, courts have enforced single-subject 
requirements, publication requirements, “regular session” requirements, journal-entry requirements, and 
caps on the number of amendments the legislature can propose at one time. See generally Stephen B. 
Niswanger, A Practitioner’s Guide to Challenging and Defending Legislatively Proposed Constitutional 
Amendments in Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 765 (1995) (outlining judicially enforceable 
limits on amendment in Arkansas and elsewhere). 
 72 See GRAD & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 3 (“[O]ther than . . . federal constitutional 
restrictions . . . there are no legally enforceable restrictions on the content of what may be placed in the 
state constitution.”). 
 73 See WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 403–04 (describing how state courts have approached the 
distinction). 
 74 See DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 152 (2006) (quoting Albert Sturm 
that in practice, the distinction is “conceptually slippery, impossible to operationalize, and therefore 
generally useless”) (citation omitted). 
 75 See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 61 (Cal. 2009) (“[T]he category of constitutional revision 
referred to the kind of wholesale or fundamental alteration of the constitutional structure . . . .”). See also 
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 403–04 (describing definitions). 
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revisions must proceed through the legislature or a convention.76 Second, in 
three other initiative states (Florida, Michigan, and Nevada), courts have 
held that the constitution limits initiative and legislative proposals to 
amendments, and revisions must proceed through a convention.77 Third, in a 
few non-initiative states (Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, and perhaps Kansas), 
courts have held that the constitution requires “revisions” to occur through a 
convention and the legislature may propose only “amendments.”78 Courts 
have applied the amendment-revision distinction to strike down both 
initiative and legislative amendments.79 However, all of the cases relied on 
explicit constitutional language distinguishing between “amendment” and 
“revision.”80 
Outside of the few jurisdictions that have enforced a textual distinction 
between amendment and revision, courts have balked at arguments 
suggesting implied substantive or functional limits on the amendment 
power.81 Instead, contemporary state amendment practice has developed 
 
 76 See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 100 (providing an exhaustive summary of California’s doctrine); Holmes 
v. Appling, 392 P.2d 636, 638 (Or. 1964) (rejecting a constitution proposed as amendment through 
initiative). 
 77 See Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 1958); Citizens Protecting Mich.’s  Const. v. 
Sec’y of State, 761 N.W.2d 210, 222 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). It should be noted that since the Florida 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Rivera-Cruz, the amendment rules were changed to allow the legislature to 
propose revisions. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. Additionally, the only opinion I could find in Nevada 
was a federal district court opinion, which is not binding on questions of state constitutional law. See 
PEST Comm. v. Miller, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1207 (D. Nev. 2009) (“Through an initiative, Nevadans 
cannot revise their entire Constitution; this may only be done by constitutional convention.”). 
 78 See State v. Manley, 441 So. 2d 864, 877 (Ala. 1983) (enforcing a distinction to enjoin the state 
from submitting a new constitution as an amendment to the existing constitution); Bess v. Ulmer, 
985 P.2d 979, 987 (Ala. 1999) (invalidating as “revision” amendment that required Alaska courts to 
follow Supreme Court precedent on certain state constitutional issues); Op. of Justices, 264 A.2d 342 
(Del. 1970); Moore v. Shanahan, 486 P.2d 506, 513 (Kan. 1971) (acknowledging doctrine in dicta). 
Before adopting the initiative, North Dakota Courts analyzed the distinction but rejected the notion that 
it had legal significance. See State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor, 133 N.W. 1046, 1051 (N.D. 1911). 
 79 See, e.g., Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824, 832 (Fla. 1970) (striking initiative that proposed 
unicameral legislature); Bess, 985 P.2d at 987–88 (striking legislative proposals that imposed forced 
linkage between state and federal constitutions). 
 80 Indeed, some scholars have called them procedural rulings for this reason. See WILLIAMS, supra 
note 9, at 402–04 (introducing discussion of the amendment–revision distinction in state court 
jurisprudence by noting: “While there are virtually no substantive restrictions on state constitutional 
amendment and revision . . . there are significant procedural requirements”). 
 81 See, e.g., Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let’s Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337, 341 (Fla. 1978) 
(“‘[C]onflict’ with existing articles or sections of the Constitution can afford no logical basis for 
invalidating an initiative proposal.”); Answer of Justices to House of Representatives, 377 N.E.2d 915, 
916 n.2 (Mass. 1978) (“It is difficult to comprehend how the proposed constitutional amendment can be 
‘unconstitutional’ under our Constitution.”); Pig Pro Nonstock Coop. v. Moore, 568 N.W.2d 217, 222 
(Neb. 1997) (“In a case involving such a constitutional amendment, it is not the province of this court to 
judge the wisdom or the desirability of the amendment.”). Scholars have also summarily dismissed these 
arguments under state law. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 
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around the doctrine of referendum sovereignty. In short, the doctrine holds 
that state amendment processes can be used to effectuate any imaginable 
constitutional reform so long as the proposal complies with federal law and 
state procedural requirements and is subject to a referendum. The prevailing 
justification for this is that the amendment process (whether by initiative or 
legislative proposal) represents the sovereign actions of the people.82 And, 
consequently, the judiciary is required to harmonize new amendments with 
the existing constitution or give effect to recent amendments as implicit 
repeals of any earlier irreconcilable provisions.83 To support the notion that 
amendment processes are equivalent to the people’s inherent sovereign right 
to create and alter government, courts cite to language in the state 
constitution’s preamble or Bill of Rights affirming that the people retain the 
right to alter or abolish government,84 as well as provisions in the amendment 
rules declaring that a successful amendment “becomes a part of this 
Constitution” on equal footing with all other provisions.85 Based on these 
principles, courts effectively refuse to hear arguments challenging 
procedurally perfect amendments as unconstitutional under state law.86 
This basic line of reasoning was put to the test in a string of cases from 
Georgia (Wheeler v. Board of Trustees),87 Kentucky (Gatewood v. 
Matthews),88 and Idaho (Smith v. Cenarrusa).89 In all three cases, the 
legislature adopted an entirely new constitution subject to a ratification 
 
1511 n.28 (1990) (“Naturally, the fact that the voters enact a constitutional amendment rather than a 
statute effectively precludes the possibility of substantive judicial review under the state constitution.”). 
 82 See, e.g., State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale, 734 N.W.2d 290, 298 (Neb. 2007) (equating amendment 
power with popular sovereignty); Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 830 (N.J. 1977) (equating 
referendum to popular sovereignty); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 26–27 (same regarding state 
amendment). See generally Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying 
an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395 (2003) (exploring agency problems 
inherent in referendum). 
 83 See Floridians Against Casino Takeover, 363 So. 2d at 341–42 (“When a newly adopted 
amendment does conflict with preexisting constitutional provisions, the new amendment necessarily 
supersedes the previous provisions. Otherwise, an amendment could no longer alter existing 
constitutional provisions and the amendment process might, in every case, be frustrated by the judicial 
determination that a given proposal conflicts with other provisions.”); Cohen v. Att’y Gen., 237 N.E.2d 
657, 661 (Mass. 1968) (“[A]n attempt to amend a constitutional provision is not open to objection because 
it is inconsistent with that provision.”). 
 84 See, e.g., Omaha Nat’l Bank v. Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269, 278 (Neb. 1986). 
 85 See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 16, § 1(c). 
 86 See, e.g., Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 420, 430 (Neb. 2000) (“Obviously, [Appellant] 
cannot claim that the amendment violates the Nebraska Constitution. Conflict with existing articles or 
sections of a constitution can afford no logical basis for invalidating an initiative amendment.”); Staples 
v. Gilmer, 33 S.E.2d 49, 52 (Va. 1945) (holding that amendment power is effectively limitless). 
 87 37 S.E.2d 322 (Ga. 1946). 
 88 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966). 
 89 475 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1970). 
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referendum.90 All three proposals were challenged as beyond the legislature’s 
amendment power.91 And, in all three instances, the court affirmed the 
proposals as lawful adoptions of new constitutions primarily because the 
constitution would ultimately be subject to a ratifying referendum.92 
Wheeler is especially illustrative of how courts apply and understand 
the doctrine of referendum sovereignty. In that case, a twenty-three-member 
commission appointed by the governor drafted a constitution and submitted 
it to the legislature.93 The legislature made a few changes to the draft 
constitution but then approved it for the ballot as an amendment to the 
existing constitution.94 The proposal was procedurally perfect under the 
existing amendment rules: it was approved by more than two-thirds of the 
members of each house.95 It was then approved by the required majority of 
voters.96 The apparent political motivation for pursuing a new constitution 
through this process was to “overcome the opposition of rural legislators who 
feared that a convention would reapportion the state legislature and eliminate 
the overrepresentation of rural areas.”97 
The court upheld this as a “legal” process for adopting a new 
constitution,98 because “the people” have a “right . . . to adopt a new 
constitution framed by any one, or submitted from any source” so long as 
“the expression of the people was made manifest in a legal way.”99 In 
 
 90 See Wheeler, 37 S.E.2d at 327; Gatewood, 403 S.W.2d at 717; Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d at 12–13. 
 91 See Wheeler, 37 S.E.2d at 322, 327 (noting that the amendment was challenged in court by 
taxpayer claiming that it violated the amendment process outlined in the constitution); Gatewood, 
403 S.W.2d at 718 (noting that the amendment was challenged by a taxpayer as violating exclusivity of 
the state constitution’s procedures for constitutional change); Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d at 12–13 (noting 
taxpayer challenge was that revision process exceeded legislative authority). 
 92 See Wheeler, 37 S.E.2d at 328–29 (“When the people adopt a completely revised or new 
constitution, the framing of submission of the instrument is not what gives it binding force and effect. 
The fiat of the people, and only the fiat of the people, can breathe life into a constitution.”); Gatewood, 
403 S.W.2d at 720–21 (holding that pursuant to the ordinary amendment process, “the legislature does 
nothing unless and until the people ratify and choose to give the revised constitution life by their own 
direct action,” and, therefore, the new constitution was valid “[s]o long as the people have due and proper 
notice and opportunity to acquaint themselves with any revision, and make their choice directly by a free 
popular election, their will is supreme, and it is to be done”); Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d at 17–18 (“We retain 
our faith in our people and their intelligence for being informed in matters of their government. Theirs 
will be the final determination as it should be ideally in all matters of their government.”). 
 93 For background on the proposed constitution, see Albert B. Saye, American Government and 
Politics: Georgia’s Proposed New Constitution, 39 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 459, 459–61 (1945).  
 94 See Wheeler, 37 S.E.2d at 327. 
 95 See id. at 329 (results of 38–9 in the senate and 180–3 in the house). 
 96 See id. It was approved by more than 60,000 votes at the polls. Id. 
 97 See Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative 
Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1483 (1987). 
 98 Wheeler, 37 S.E.2d at 329. 
 99 Id. at 328–29. 
114:65 (2019) Forgotten Limits 
87 
response to the argument that a convention was required for a new 
constitution, the court responded that the existing constitution did not 
explicitly require a convention, and the court would not infer any restrictions 
on the people’s inherent and expressed right to create government.100 The 
court concluded that because the referendum was held in compliance with 
state election law, the people had exercised their sovereign right to create a 
new constitution.101 
As Wheeler illustrates, the doctrine of referendum sovereignty assumes 
that a lawful referendum is the full institutional embodiment of the people’s 
sovereignty. This assumption leads to the conclusion that the judiciary has 
no authority to review the substance of amendments because the judiciary is 
subordinate to the people as sovereign. In other words, state courts presume 
 
 100 Id. at 329. 
 101 Id. (“We conclude that the constitution of 1945 was and is a valid and legal expression of the will 
of the people, and that the instrument now under consideration has been duly and legally proclaimed as 
the constitution of Georgia.”). The court explained: “When the people adopt a completely revised or new 
constitution, the framing or submission of the instrument is not what gives it binding force and effect. 
The fiat of the people, and only the fiat of the people, can breathe life into a constitution.” Id. at 328–29. 
Similarly, in Gatewood, the Kentucky legislature adopted a new constitution and submitted it to the voters 
after the voters rejected three prior convention calls. See Colantuono, supra note 97, at 1487–88. The 
constitution was drafted by a Constitutional Revision Assembly, which consisted of delegates appointed 
by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Chief Justice, and Speaker of the House. Id. at 1488. The 
legislature made changes to the draft prepared by the Revision Assembly, and then approved it by 
extraordinary majorities in both houses for submission at a referendum. Id. at 1489 (results of 32–0 in the 
senate and 79–17 in the house). The constitution was challenged in court before the referendum as an 
impermissible attempt to adopt a new constitution through the legislature’s amendment process. See 
Gatewood, 403 S.W.2d at 717. The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the legislature’s process as a valid 
method for adopting a new constitution. Id. at 720–21. The court first noted that the Bill of Rights in the 
existing constitution affirmed that “[a]ll power is inherent in the people” who “have at all times an 
inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may 
deem proper.” Id. at 718. The court concluded that pursuant to the ordinary amendment process, “the 
legislature does nothing unless and until the people ratify and choose to give the revised constitution life 
by their own direct action.” Id. at 720. Thus, the court held that a new constitution is valid “[s]o long as 
the people have due and proper notice and opportunity to acquaint themselves with any revision, and 
make their choice directly by a free and popular election, their will is supreme, and it is to be done.” Id. 
at 721. Although the court cleared the constitution for the referendum, the people rejected it. See 
Colantuono, supra note 97, at 1491. In Cenarrusa, a commission drafted a new constitution for Idaho and 
submitted to the legislature. 475 P.2d at 12–13. The legislature approved it by two-thirds majorities in 
both houses. Id. Citizens then sued to enjoin the Secretary of State from submitting the constitution to a 
referendum. Id. at 11. In upholding the process as a valid use of the legislature’s amendment power, the 
Idaho Supreme Court essentially recited the reasoning in Wheeler and Gatewood. The court emphasized 
that the constitution grants the legislature broad powers, and, therefore, it can use discretion in deciding 
the best process for crafting a new constitution. Id. at 17–18 (noting also that the constitution’s 
amendment rules suggested that a convention was permissive but not required for revision). Ultimately, 
however, the court’s ruling turned on its assessment that the referendum was sufficient process for 
creating a constitution. Id. (“We retain our faith in our people and their intelligence for being informed 
in matters of their government. Theirs will be the final determination as it should be ideally in all matters 
of their government.”). 
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there are no implicit, substantive, or functional limits on state constitutional 
amendments. However, as detailed in Part II, this understanding fails to 
account for the role of the convention in state constitutional history, theory, 
and practice. Indeed, the doctrine of referendum sovereignty runs afoul of 
state constitutionalism’s clear historical development and context. 
II. FORGOTTEN FOUNDATIONS OF THE STATE AMENDMENT POWER 
This Part argues that in the state constitutional tradition, the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty presumes that a convention is necessary for the 
foundational act of creating government. This understanding took time to 
develop, but from at least 1829 virtually all states have operated under the 
assumption that the full sovereign power of the people can be lawfully and 
validly summoned only through the calling of a temporary convention of 
specially elected delegates who are subject to extraordinary popular 
accountability.102 Although aberrations have occurred,103 no other mechanism 
has ever been equally recognized as an appropriate “repository of the 
sovereign power of the people.”104 The widespread use of ratification 
referenda after 1829 did not change this. The ratification referendum was 
directed to concerns about convention accountability. It did not replace the 
convention as the preferred institution for formulating a constitution in the 
first instance. Indeed, early state constitutionalists were very clear in their 
understanding that ordinary officials and institutions had no inherent power 
to create or change constitutions. Constitution-making was understood to be 
an extraordinary power that inhered only in the people themselves acting 
through a convention. This foundation is crucial for properly understanding 
state amendment provisions as affirmative delegations of power that are 
entirely derivative of the existing constitution and necessarily inferior to the 
people’s sovereign constituent power institutionalized in the convention. 
In this Part, I first analyze the historic origins of the state constitutional 
convention and show that it was a device created from the conviction that 
ordinary officials and institutions had no inherent authority to make 
constitutional law. I then argue that although the constitutional convention 
has been refined over the centuries, it persists as the only institution 
presumed to have authority to formulate a constitution on the people’s 
behalf. 
 
 102 See TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 9, at 70 n.37. See generally 
WOOD, supra note 25, at 310–19 (describing the history of convention as a political concept in England, 
Europe, and the United States). 
 103 See DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION, supra note 19, at 12–13 
(discussing aberrations); Tarr & Williams, supra note 36, at 1083–84 (same). 
 104 See Garner, supra note 70, at 214. 
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A. Origins of the State Constitutional Convention 
The initial creation of state constitutions was inextricably linked to the 
revolution.105 As Professor Gordon Wood has observed, the revolution was 
concerned not only with winning independence from Great Britain, but with 
establishing new governments in the colonies that would be “fixed on 
genuine principles” of popular sovereignty.106 Additionally, as a matter of 
strategy, many revolutionaries viewed “the erection of new governments as 
the best instrument for breaking ties with England.”107 Many states also found 
themselves struggling without well-organized governments following the 
retreat of British governors.108 
Thus, by the end of 1775 there was mounting pressure for the colonies 
to institute new forms of government.109 Following a series of petitions from 
the states to the Continental Congress for guidance, Congress issued two 
famous Congressional Resolutions on May 10 and 15, 1776.110 The May 10 
resolution recommended to the colonies that “where no government 
sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs have been hitherto established,” 
the colonies should “adopt such Government as shall, in the Opinion of the 
Representatives of the People, best conduce to the Happiness and Safety of 
their Constituents in particular and America in general.”111 The May 15 
resolution added: “[T]he exercise of every kind of authority under the crown 
should be totally suppressed, and all powers of government, exerted under 
the authority of the people of the colonies . . . .”112 
These resolutions, combined with the Declaration of Independence, 
provided the states with vague procedural guidelines and ideological 
 
 105 See WOOD, supra note 25, at 129 (finding that revolutionary pamphlets often blended the 
revolution with issues related to framing a new government). 
 106 See id. at 128–29 (“The building of this permanent foundation for freedom thus became the 
essence of the Revolution.”); see also ADAMS, supra note 25, at 62. See generally DONALD S. LUTZ, 
POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS (1980) (explaining popular sovereignty at the core commitment of early state 
constitutionalism). 
 107 WOOD, supra note 25, at 127–29. 
 108 See ADAMS, supra note 25, at 28–29 (recounting how governors in North Carolina, New 
Hampshire, and New York abandoned theirs posts because the Revolution left their colonies without an 
organized government). 
 109 See id. at 29. 
 110 For a detailed account of the petitions and Congress’s responses, see id. at 49–62; see also WOOD, 
supra note 25, at 129–31. 
 111 ADAMS, supra note 25, at 61 (quoting resolution). The full texts of the resolutions are available 
in JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 17741789 (Kenneth E. Harris & Steven D. Tilley eds., 
1976).  
 112 See ADAMS, supra note 25, at 61 (quoting resolution). 
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commitments.113 They did not, however, offer details as to what state 
constitutions should contain or describe any implementable process for 
creating state constitutions.114 The states were thus left to develop their own 
constitution-making processes.115 This was no simple task.116 Revolutionary 
Americans had expressed a clear commitment to popular sovereignty, but 
they had no useful precedent for how to operationalize a government where 
all power was “vested in and derived from the people.”117 
One immediate solution to this problem was for sitting state legislatures 
to adopt constitutions on the people’s behalf. Three of the four states to first 
adopt constitutions in 1776 took this approach.118 Almost immediately, 
however, there were concerns about the competency of a regularly elected 
legislature to adopt a constitution for the people.119 
First, from a theoretical perspective, there was a burgeoning recognition 
that constitutions were meant to operate as “higher” law that constrained 
government officials, especially legislatures, on behalf of the people.120 
Written constitutions were tied closely to the emerging commitment to 
popular sovereignty.121 Constitutions were understood as an instrument that 
would help the people create and control their own government.122 As a 
consequence, there was an early awareness that constitutions were different 
 
 113 See id. at 61–62. 
 114 See id. There was debate regarding a model state constitution from Congress that was rejected in 
favor of individualized, popular constitution-making by the states. See id. at 55–56. 
 115 See DINAN, supra note 2, at 19 (describing this as period of “wide-ranging experimentation” with 
processes of constitution-making). 
 116 See ADAMS, supra note 25, at 63 (noting states were “faced with a task that had never before been 
accomplished in political entities of comparable size”). 
 117 TARR, supra note 9, at 69 (quoting N.C. CONST. pmbl.); see ADAMS, supra note 25, at 63. 
 118 Legislatures in South Carolina, Virginia, and New Jersey adopted inaugural constitutions in the 
late spring and summer of 1776. See ADAMS, supra note 25, at 70–73. However, Professor Marc Kruman 
has argued that no “ordinary legislature” wrote any of the first state constitutions. KRUMAN, supra note 
25, at 22–24. This is so because provincial assemblies were unique revolutionary bodies “more likely to 
involve something approximating a direct representation of the people.” TARR, supra note 9, at 69 n.33 
(explaining the unique character of revolutionary legislatures). 
 119 TARR, supra note 9, at 69. Jefferson most famously raised this objection regarding the Virginia 
constitution of 1776. JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 25 (1992). 
 120 The idea of a higher law that constrained legislatures on behalf of the people was in contrast to 
the British constitutional system which located sovereignty in Parliament. WOOD, supra note 25, at 348; 
see also id. at 363 (explaining that British parliamentary sovereignty was theoretically grounded on 
popular representation but agency gaps were so great that representation was only a theoretical 
justification for sovereignty and not an actual description of Parliament’s claim to power). American 
revolutionary thought sought to wrestle sovereignty from government and lodge it directly in the people. 
See id. Americans displayed a deep distrust of legislatures and a strong desire to make clear that 
legislatures had only derivative authority and no original sovereignty. See id. 
 121 See id. at 306. 
 122 See id. at 337. 
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from ordinary law because they were intended to deputize and constrain 
public officials on behalf of the people.123 The significance of this was that 
sitting legislatures, or other officials, were not appropriate for creating or 
changing constitutions.124 In fact, doing so would dissolve the distinction 
between the people as the source of sovereignty and the legislature as the 
recipient of delegated authority from the people.125 
Second, experience had taught the revolutionary Americans that 
officials in power were inclined towards the abuse of power for their own 
self-interest.126 Americans were fundamentally suspicious of all officials 
because of the foundational belief (and repeated experience) that the 
attainment of power would lead towards corruption.127 This distrust was also 
fueled by the nature of existing institutions.128 Existing legislative bodies 
were often more representative of the propertied elite who had a stronger 
connection to Britain than to the people.129 British Parliament, which claimed 
authority over the colonies based on the colonies’ supposed representation 
and consent, was also unresponsive to the colonies’ needs and preferences.130 
The pervasive distrust of elected officials, especially legislators, that 
stemmed from early American experience led to the conclusion that “no 
legislative assembly, however representative, [was] capable of satisfying 
 
 123 See id.; TARR, supra note 9, at 69; see also WALTER FAIRLEIGH DODD, THE REVISION AND 
AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1–2 (1910) (noting that the concept of a constitution, even in 
British law, included the notion of a law beyond legislative power). 
 124 ADAMS, supra note 25, at 63; WOOD, supra note 25, at 337; see also KRUMAN, supra note 25, at 
25 (quoting an early American political writer as asserting that a legislature “could not draft a constitution 
[because] a constitution ‘is an act that can only be done to [legislatures] but cannot be done by them’”). 
 125 ADAMS, supra note 25, at 63; WOOD, supra note 25, at 342 (stating that the convention was 
developed in part so that “the constitution [could] rest on an authority different from the legislature’s”). 
 126 ADAMS, supra note 25, at 63 (quoting the Pennsylvania Journal from May 22, 1776 as stating 
that “officers of the old constitution” should not be “entrusted with the power of the making of a new one 
when it becomes necessary” because “[b]odies of men have the same selfish attachments as individuals, 
and they will be claiming powers and prerogatives inconsistent with the liberties of the people”); WOOD, 
supra note 25, at 328 (“The mistrust of all men and institutions set above the people-at-large was precisely 
the point.”). 
 127 See WOOD, supra note 25, at 328; see also id. at 340 (explaining that Americans became 
suspicious of their own institutions in the same way they suspected the Crown). This skepticism and the 
evolution of the special election also developed out of the chaos that ensued after the development of the 
principle of popular sovereignty. See id. at 332. Once popular sovereignty became the norm, the concept 
of “the people” became a political bargaining chip. See id. at 330–33 (“[T]he people were the undisputed, 
ubiquitous source that was appealed to by [everyone]. But who were the people? What institutions 
expressed their will?”). Everyone presumed to speak on the people’s behalf, but there was no established 
tradition or institution that could make this claim within the existing political culture. See id. at 331 
(“[T]he people were rapidly becoming a permutable force whose will could never be embodied by any 
representative institution.”). 
 128 See id. at 332–38. 
 129 See id. at 336, 340. 
 130 See id. at 348–54. 
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[the people’s] demands and grievances” regarding the creation of a 
constitution.131 
Thus, early constitutionalists were in need of a new institution that was 
distinct from ordinary government, more closely tied to the people, and 
sufficiently practical, to create a constitution by and for the people.132 The 
towns of Massachusetts are often credited with first imagining the 
constitutional convention in response to these demands.133 In October 1776, 
the town of Concord debated and voted on “the question of authorizing the 
legislature to frame a constitution.”134 In an extraordinary resolution, the 
town concluded that “the Supreme Legislative, either in their proper 
capacity, or in Joint Committee, are by no means a body proper to form and 
establish a Constitution, or form of Government.”135 The town justified its 
conclusion as follows: 
[F]irst, because we conceive that a Constitution in its proper idea intends  
a system of principles established to set the subject . . . against any 
encroachments of the governing part, second, because the same body that forms 
a constitution have of consequence a power to alter it, third, because a 
constitution alterable by the Supreme Legislative is no security at all to the 
subject against any encroachment of the governing part on any, or all on their 
rights and privileges.136 
The town recommended instead that a constitution should be drafted by 
a “convention of delegates elected for that purpose alone.”137 The town of 
Acton, Massachusetts adopted a similar resolution in November 1776, and 
 
 131 Id. at 328; see also id. at 332–38 (explaining the details of how existing institutions were not truly 
democratic and led Americans to distrust them). 
 132 See id. at 307; KRUMAN, supra note 25, at 22 (assigning these attributes to extraordinary 
legislatures of the revolutionary period); see also supra text accompanying note 118 (explaining the 
unique characteristics of the revolutionary legislatures).  
 133 ADAMS, supra note 25, at 64; ROGER SHERMAN HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR 
NATURE, POWERS, AND LIMITATIONS 7 (1917) (attributing the convention idea to the town of Concord, 
Massachusetts in October 1776). But see DODD, supra note 123, at 5–6 (tracing the state constitutional 
convention to the New Hampshire town of Hanover); ADAMS, supra note 25, 88–89 (explaining 
competing claims to the origin of the convention). See also WOOD, supra note 25, at 310–19 (explaining 
the European understanding of convention as an extra-legal convening of the public); id. at 338 
(explaining how the European concept of convention morphed into a distinct institution in America). 
 134 HOAR, supra note 133, at 7. 
 135 See id. at 7. A copy of the original resolution is reproduced in THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, A MANUAL FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1917 (2d ed. 1917) [hereinafter 
“MANUAL”]; see WOOD, supra note 25, at 340 (referencing town returns). 
 136 See HOAR, supra note 133, at 7. 
 137 See MANUAL, supra note 135, at 15. 
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at least twenty-three other towns rejected the legislature’s authority to 
formulate a constitution for the people.138 
In response to these resolutions, the Massachusetts state legislature 
proposed that “in the next general election” the people would “give to the 
new members of the house of representatives full authority to draft a 
constitution, along with the ‘ordinary Powers of Representation.’”139 After 
the general election in mid-1777, the newly elected body met and adopted a 
constitution that it sent to the citizens for approval in March 1778.140 
In a remarkable moment, the electorate of Massachusetts resoundingly 
rejected the constitution by a ratio of more than 5-to-1.141 The “material 
factor” defeating the constitution was: 
[T]he widespread belief that the only convention which could stand for all the 
people . . . and determine its form of government, was a convention consisting 
of delegates to whom the powers of the people were delegated for the sole 
purpose of framing a constitution, and not a body of representatives entrusted 
at the same time with other duties.142 
In other words, a convention could claim the sovereign constituent 
power of the people only if it was directly and specially elected solely for 
that purpose.143 The Massachusetts legislature subsequently took steps to call 
“a State convention, for the sole Purpose of forming a new Constitution.”144 
The convention met in September 1779, and was the “first true constitutional 
 
 138 See id. These resolutions appear to be the earliest conceptions of the American constitutional 
convention as we now understand it. See id.; HOAR, supra note 133, at 7. 
 139 ADAMS, supra note 25, at 90. 
 140 See id. at 91. 
 141 See id. (the final vote was 9,972 votes against and 2,083 for). 
 142 HOAR, supra note 133, at 5 (noting that Massachusetts towns rejected the constitution “because 
they resented the legislature’s assumption that it could call a convention without first obtaining an 
authorization from the people”); OBERHOLTZER, supra note 34, at 74 (stating that towns’ rejection of the 
constitution solidified the norm that legislature should not “mix in the work of making the constitutional 
and fundamental law of a State”); Arthur Lord, The Massachusetts Constitution and the Constitutional 
Conventions, 2 MASS L.Q. 1, 5 (1916) (emphasis added). Another factor that defeated the constitution 
was the perception that the constitution-making process should be more inclusive than a general election. 
See ADAMS, supra note 25, at 91 (“Arguments frequently brought against the draft were: the 
disqualification of Negroes, Indians, and mulattoes as voters was not justifiable; property qualifications 
were too high . . . and—the most frequent objection—distribution of seats in the house of representatives 
was unfair.”). 
 143 See WOOD, supra note 25, at 341 (quoting the Boston return: “‘A Convention for this and this 
alone, whose existence is known no longer than the Constitution is forming, can have no prepossessions 
in their own favour.”); see also R. R. PALMER, THE AGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL 
HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760–1800, at 214 (2014) (connecting a special election to the 
convention’s extraordinary mandate). 
 144 ADAMS, supra note 25, at 92. Moreover, it broadened the electorate for purposes of electing 
delegates to include “all free men.” See KRUMAN, supra note 25, at 15. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
94 
convention in Western history” because it was the only body ever assembled 
from “representatives elected for the exclusive purpose of framing a 
constitution.”145 
Following the 1779 Massachusetts convention, a clear theory of 
constitution-making emerged across the states. There was soon a widespread 
understanding that a constitution could be created “only [by] ‘a Convention 
of Delegates chosen by the people for that express purpose and no other.”146 
Indeed, by the 1780s, a specially elected convention “had become such a 
firmly established way of creating . . . a constitution that governments 
formed by other means actually seemed to have no constitution at all.”147 
B. State Convention Theory 
The spread of the Massachusetts model was not an accident in political 
history. The Massachusetts convention became an archetype for state 
constitutionalism because it purported to solve the practical problems 
associated with how to form a government grounded in popular sovereignty. 
If sovereignty belonged only to the people, then only the people could 
establish legitimate government. But, as Samuel West explained in 1776, “it 
is very difficult, and in many cases impossible, for all to meet together.”148 
Additionally, as illustrated by the Massachusetts Convention, it was illogical 
and impractical for the people to trust existing government officials with the 
 
 145 ADAMS, supra note 25, at 91–92 (explaining adoption of constitution and difficulties in counting 
the votes). Ironically, despite the debate and extensive deliberation regarding the process for convening 
and populating the convention, the constitution was drafted by essentially one man, John Adams. See id. 
at 86–93. 
 146 WOOD, supra note 25, at 342 (quoting the South Carolina legislature from 1787); see KRUMAN, 
supra note 25, at 15–16; PALMER, supra note 143, at 213–35 (explaining how convention became 
institutionalized in public law); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: 
Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287, 353 
(1997) (stating that conventions became the “established mechanism for creating or revising 
constitutions”). 
 147 See WOOD, supra note 25, at 342 (quoting the South Carolina legislature from 1787: only “a 
Convention of Delegates chosen by the people for that express purpose and no other” could establish or 
alter a constitution); see also Ernest R. Bartley, Methods of Constitutional Change, in MAJOR PROBLEMS 
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 21, 32 (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1960) (“Historically and legally, 
the convention is the direct ‘voice of the people’ in matters affecting general constitutional overhaul.”); 
Garner, supra note 70, at 214 (noting the norm of a convention for creating a constitution); Lord, supra 
note 142, at 5 (observing that as early as 1776 in Massachusetts there was “widespread belief that the 
only [institution] which could stand for all the people and best define its rights and determine its form of 
government, was a convention consisting of delegates to whom the powers of the people were delegated 
for the sole purpose of framing a constitution and not a body of representatives entrusted at the same time 
with other duties”). 
 148 SAMUEL WEST, NATURAL LAW: THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (1776); see WOOD, 
supra note 25, at 307. 
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power to create a constitution limiting their own authority.149 Thus, the states 
devised the constitutional convention as a temporary institution subject to 
extraordinary democratic accountability and with the exclusive mandate of 
drafting a constitution on behalf of the people.150 Far from being an accident, 
the state constitutional convention was rigorously designed to realize the 
theoretical commitment to popular sovereignty. In the words of Judge 
Willard Hall, a delegate to Delaware’s 1831 convention, a constitutional 
convention “bring[s] into exercise [the people’s] sovereign power” to create 
government.151 
In this section, I argue the constitutional convention has three core 
attributes, each of which is closely tied to popular sovereignty as the basis 
for legitimating a new state constitution. My claim is that since the founding 
era, state constitutionalism has continued to develop around the assumption 
that only a convention of (1) specially elected delegates; (2) subject to 
extraordinary political accountability; and (3) with the sole mandate of 
debating and drafting a constitution, has inherent authority to act as “a 
repository” of the people’s sovereign constituent power to create 
government.152 This presumption is crucial for understanding the state theory 
of extra-conventional constitutional amendment, which is grounded in the 
 
 149 See WOOD, supra note 25, at 338 (“[N]othing can be a greater violation of reason and natural 
rights, than for men to give authority to themselves.”). 
 150 See id. at 342. On the significance of the convention as an innovation in constitutional design and 
political science, see Stephen M. Griffin, Constituent Power and Constitutional Change in American 
Constitutionalism, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007) (describing the convention as “an 
extraordinary invention, the most distinctive institutional contribution . . . the American Revolutionaries 
made to Western politics”). 
 151 See DEBATES OF THE DELAWARE CONVENTION, FOR REVISING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE, OR ADOPTING A NEW ONE 227 (1831); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS 177–78 (1991) (noting that even Federalists treated “constitutional conventions as if they 
were perfect substitutes for the people themselves”). This understanding of the convention is visible in 
many convention documents and records. See, e.g., DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 2524 (1958) (“[Convention delegates] are 
the people; they are derived from the people; they are the direct delegates from the people.”); DEBATES 
IN THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF 
LOUISIANA 104 (1864) (“[I]t is for the purpose of sustaining the sovereign power in the hands of the 
people that this Convention is assembled.”). A 1968 Commission report from Arkansas—prepared in 
anticipation of a constitutional convention—recounts how “it [is] almost inherent in the definition of a 
constitutional convention that most or all of its delegates be elected by the people. This relates to the basic 
nature of a constitution . . . which derives its strength and authority from the people themselves.” 
ARKANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STUDY COMM’N, REVISING THE ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION 28 
(1968); see also VA. CONST. of 1902, preamble (“[W]hereof the members of this Convention were elected 
by the good people of Virginia, to meet in convention for such purpose. We, therefore, the people of 
Virginia, so assembled in Convention through our representatives, . . . do ordain and establish the[] 
following revised and amended Constitution for the government of the Commonwealth.”). 
 152 Garner, supra note 70, at 214. 
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notion that amendment actors do not exercise the same fundamental and 
inherent power held by a convention. These three elements of a valid 
constitutional convention and their persistence over time are each explored 
in turn. 
1. Specially Elected Delegates 
The norm favoring a special election for convention delegates was 
crucial in the development of state convention theory. Revolutionary 
Americans galvanized around the notion that only the people could create 
legitimate government, and that existing officials and institutions had no 
inherent authority to create or destroy government for the people.153 
Consequently, the people had to specifically and directly deputize delegates 
with this power before it could be claimed by any agent.154 The special 
election of convention delegates served this function by giving delegates a 
temporary and extraordinary mandate to create government for the people.155 
Thus, as Professor Marc Kruman has observed, the early states “did not 
conduct special elections simply to gather a better understanding of the 
public’s views.”156 Instead, “they held them to gain popular approval for the 
extraordinary acts of framing and founding constitutions.”157 In the state 
 
 153 See DODD, supra note 123, at 21 (“We are now accustomed to the practice of having state 
constitutions framed by conventions entirely independent of the regular legislature . . . .”); id. at 22 
(finding that the most “fundamental” commitment in state constitutional theory is “distinction between 
the constitution and ordinary legislation, and the development of a distinct method for the formation of 
constitutions”); WOOD, supra note 25, at 337–38. 
 154 Courts have affirmed this. The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated in 1935: 
A constitutional convention is an assembly of the people themselves acting through their duly 
elected delegates. The delegates in such an assembly must therefore come from the people who 
choose them for this high purpose and this purpose alone. They cannot be imposed upon the 
convention by any other authority. Neither the Legislature nor any other department of the 
government has the power to select delegates to such a convention. The delegates elected by and 
from the people, and only such delegates, may and of right have either a voice or a vote therein. 
In re Opinion to the Governor, 178 A. 433 (R.I. 1935); see, e.g., State v. Manley, 441 So. 2d 864, 872 
(Ala. 1983) (discussing Alabama’s history of constitutional conventions); Pryor v. Lowe, 523 S.W.2d 
199, 202 (Ark. 1975) (“[A] constitutional delegate is an agent of the people ‘for the purpose of acting in 
their stead in the exercise of their inherent power in working out the substance, form and content of a 
constitution to be submitted to all the people of Arkansas for their approval or rejection.’”) (citation 
omitted); Op. of the Justices, 264 A.2d 342, 345 (Del. 1970) (“[A] Constitutional Convention, specially 
elected for its expressed purpose, is more the direct agent of the people for that purpose than is a General 
Assembly.”). 
 155 See KRUMAN, supra note 25, at 28–29. 
 156 See id. at 21. 
 157 See id. This was precisely Jefferson’s point in his famous critique of the 1776 Virginia 
constitution that was adopted by a generally elected legislature. See Fritz, supra note 146, at 328–29. 
Jefferson complained that “‘no special authority had been delegated by the people to form a permanent 
constitution’” because the sitting legislators “had been elected for the ordinary purposes of legislation 
only, and at a time when the establishment of a new government had not been proposed or contemplated.” 
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tradition, the people deputize agents with their constituent power only 
through a special election that clearly confers that power. 
From a practical perspective, the special election was intended to 
promote public accountability and reduce agency costs by separating 
constitution-making delegates from ordinary government officials.158 As 
Professor Kruman further observes, “because constitutions defined and 
limited governmental powers, only a special, temporary convention with no 
permanent institutional interests should undertake the task.”159 Allowing 
existing legislatures to create constitutions was “unacceptable, [because] it 
would empower the legislature to write . . . a document designed to restrict 
legislative and other government power.”160 Existing officials “could hardly 
‘divest themselves of the idea of their being members’ of government, and 
this ‘may induce them to form the government, with particular reference to 
themselves.’”161 Specially elected delegates, on the other hand, could better 
represent the people and would be less likely to use their position for 
personal gain because their appointments were temporary and the 
constitutions they designed would be deployed by a different group of 
people, or at least a group of people with no immediate conflict of interest.162 
 
Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Hambden Pleasant (April 19, 1824), in 10 THE WORKS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1892–1899)). 
 158 See ADAMS, supra note 25, at 63–66 (explaining that the special election of delegates to a 
convention “originated in the mistrust the towns and counties felt toward the house of representatives” 
and a need to separate the people’s constituent power from the legislature’s “supreme delegate power”). 
The special election was also intended to reduce agency costs by impressing on delegates (and the 
electorate) the extraordinary nature of the constitution-making process. See KRUMAN, supra note 25, at 
18–19. By electing delegates solely for the purpose of creating a constitution, it was hoped that delegates 
would “view their responsibilities as requiring a longer time perspective than is generally expected of 
legislators and an obligation to rise ‘above politics’ and pursue the public interest.” G. Alan  
Tarr, Explaining State Constitutional Changes, 3 REVISTA DE INVESTIGAÇŌES CONSTITUCIONAIS 9, 21 
(2016) (Braz.). 
 159 KRUMAN, supra note 25, at 25. 
 160 See id. at 29. 
 161 WOOD, supra note 25, at 341 (quoting return from City of Boston). 
 162 See KRUMAN, supra note 25, at 22. On whether this agency theory holds true in practice see Tarr, 
Explaining State Constitutional Changes, supra note 158, at 18–19 (2016) (summarizing political science 
literature criticizing whether this agency theory holds true in practice and noting that the literature may 
be oversimplified); OBERHOLTZER, supra note 34, at 97–98 (noting the general political neutrality of the 
convention participants). But see TARR, supra note 9, at 57 n.124 (noting that if the normal participants 
in the political process do not participate in the convention, the proposed document may lack support for 
ratification). Modern empirical research appears to be mixed on whether special elections reduce agency 
costs as intended. See Tarr, supra note 158, at 18–20 (examining evidence and finding that although 
conventions can operate under conditions that suggest “politics as usual” there is also compelling 
evidence that convention delegates “view their responsibilities as requiring a longer time perspective than 
is generally expected of legislators and an obligation to rise ‘above politics’ and pursue the public 
interest”). 
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Popular sovereignty and public accountability justifications for 
specially elected delegates have largely prevailed in state constitutional 
tradition. As Professor Albert Sturm has observed, a constitutional 
convention of specially elected delegates “is the best known and by far the 
most universally accepted method . . . for formulating new state 
constitutions.”163 Indeed, Thomas Cooley famously stated that “[i]n 
accordance with universal practice,” state constitutions “must be prepared 
and matured by some body of representatives chosen for the purpose.”164 
Leading modern scholars confirm this assessment. Ernest Bartley has 
observed that “[t]he convention method, based upon the people’s election of 
delegates for the specific purpose of constitutional revision, carries with it a 
sanction and a prestige not found in other methods.”165 And several scholars 
have concluded that the use of a convention of specially elected delegates 
“became the norm” for creating new state constitutions.166 Indeed, most state 
conventions since 1800 that successfully proposed new constitutions were 
comprised of specially elected delegates.167 
To be sure, scholars have noted anomalous attempts to dispense with 
the requirement of separately elected delegates in the drafting of new 
constitutions.168 In 1974, for example, Texas assembled a constitutional 
convention comprised entirely of sitting state legislators.169 In 1944, the New 
Jersey legislature operated as a constitutional convention,170 and in 1992 the 
 
 163 See ALBERT L. STURM, METHODS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 80 (1954). Professor 
Sturm has further explained that “[s]ince constitutional conventions are basically assemblies of the people 
on a small scale, organized for the high purpose of formulating basic law, selection of their membership 
rightly belongs to the electorate.” Id. at 94. 
 164 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON 
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 32 (3d ed. rev. 1874); see Garner, 
supra note 70, at 214 (“Everywhere the idea was strong that a convention made up of popularly chosen 
delegates was a repository of the sovereign power of the people, and had a right to establish a frame of 
government.”). JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, 4 A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS; THEIR 
HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 259 (1887) (“It is believed that the precedents 
developed thus far in our history . . . conform to the principle [that a convention must be comprised of 
specially elected delegates].”). 
 165 Bartley, supra note 147, at 32. 
 166 DINAN, supra note 2, at 19; William B. Fisch, Constitutional Referendum in the United States of 
America, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 485, 492 (2006) (“Historically, the preferred vehicle for major revisions of 
existing state constitutions and creation of new ones has been the popularly elected convention . . . .”). 
 167 See DINAN, supra note 19, at 12. 
 168 See Tarr & Williams, supra note 36, at 1082–84. 
 169 Janice C. May, Texas Constitutional Revision, 66 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 64–65 (1977). See generally 
JANICE C. MAY, INSTITUTE FOR URBAN STUDIES, THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION EXPERIENCE 
IN THE ’70S (1975) (providing a critical assessment of the process and substance of the 1974 Texas 
constitutional convention). 
 170 See RICHARD J. CONNORS, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN NEW JERSEY: 1940–
1947, at 76–112 (1970). 
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Louisiana legislature did the same.171 The Texas convention failed to produce 
a proposed constitution, and voters soundly rejected proposals from both the 
New Jersey and Louisiana legislatures.172 
There have been successful twentieth century efforts to adopt new 
constitutions without calling a convention of any kind. This occurred in 
Florida (1968),173 North Carolina (1970),174 Georgia (1945, 1976, 1982),175 
and Virginia (1970).176 In all of these instances, legislatures worked to bypass 
a convention and propose a new constitution directly at a referendum. The 
most common approach was for a state legislature to employ a commission 
to study constitutional reform and propose a new constitution.177 The 
 
 171 See DINAN, supra note 19, at 12. 
 172 See Tarr & Williams, supra note 36, at 1082–83. In New Jersey, scholars have noted that the 
voters likely rejected the legislature’s proposed constitution because of its perceived illegitimacy. Id. 
(preceding discussion of New Jersey’s failed 1944 constitution by saying “because the state legislature is 
created by and subordinate to the state constitution, voters generally have not been sympathetic to 
legislative efforts to substitute for popularly elected conventions”). Scholars have similarly described the 
Louisiana “convention” as having “questionable pedigree.” DINAN, supra note 19, at 12 n.16. After voters 
overwhelmingly rejected the proposed constitution, the governor apologized for calling the convention. 
See Janice C. May, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1992-93, in 30 COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1994-95, at 2, 4 (1996). Unsuccessful attempts to rewrite state 
constitutions without a convention of specially elected delegates have also occurred in Indiana (1911), 
Kentucky (1966), Idaho (1970), Oregon (1970), and Alabama (1983). See Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1 
(Ind. 1912) (describing the legislature’s adoption of Indiana’s 1911 constitution and declaring it void); 
Colantuono, supra note 97, at 1488–91 (describing the Kentucky Legislature’s adoption of the 1966 
constitution and voters’ rejection of it); Smith v. Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d 11, 12–13 (Idaho 1970) (describing 
the process of drafting Idaho’s 1970 constitution); Idaho Constitutional Amendment History, IDAHO 
SECRETARY OF STATE https://sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/hst60_70.htm [https://perma.cc/K9XG-VXPA] 
(showing official referendum results rejecting Idaho’s 1970 constitution); Albert L. Sturm & Janice C. 
May, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision: 1980-81 and the Past 50 Years, in 24 COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 115, 119 (1983) (stating that the Oregon Legislature adopted 
a new constitution); Jim Westwood & Charlie Hinkle, An Oregon Constitutional Convention?, OREGON 
STATE BAR (Apr. 2009) https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/09may/constitution.html 
[https://perma.cc/WH76-8NFX] (describing a failed referendum regarding Oregon’s 1970 constitution); 
State v. Manley, 441 So. 2d 864, 868 (Ala. 1983) (describing Alabama’s 1983 constitution and blocking 
referendum). 
 173 Florida’s 1968 Constitution was adopted as a series of amendments proposed by the legislature. 
Albert L. Sturm, The Procedure of State Constitutional Change—With Special Emphasis on the South 
and Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 569, 592 (1977). 
 174 See John V. Orth, North Carolina Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1759, 1790–91 (1992). 
 175 See Sturm & May, supra note 172, at 119; see also Tarr & Williams, supra note 36, at 1083–04. 
 176 See DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION, supra note 19, at 12–13 
(discussing other states); see also Thomas Raeburn White, Amendment and Revision of State 
Constitutions, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1132, 1134 n.6 (1952) (discussing Virginia’s 1928 Constitution as 
perhaps another example of wholesale change outside of a convention). 
 177 See Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The Increasing 
Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 1, 
5–6 (1996). 
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legislature then reviewed, changed, and approved the proposal for 
submission to a referendum.178 
Some have suggested that this “commission” process represents a new 
norm for state constitution-making, and the constitutional convention may 
be a “thing of the past.”179 Adding to this idea is the increasing reluctance of 
voters to approve convention calls.180 Thus, as state constitution-making and 
revision has become professionalized in the states, conventions may now be 
superseded, at least in practice, by other vehicles for wholesale change.181 
There are, however, good reasons to doubt that this has replaced state 
constitutionalism’s underlying logic and theory. North Carolina’s 1970 
Constitution, for example, was not a truly new constitution in substance.182 
The majority of the changes were non-substantive updates to archaic 
language and structure.183 Indeed, the Commission singled out substantive 
changes for separate review and consideration by the legislature.184 The 
legislature then separately reviewed and approved some of those changes, 
which were then submitted to voters.185 Voters ultimately approved only six 
of those substantive changes.186 Thus, Professor Sturm characterized North 
Carolina’s 1970 constitution as merely an “editorial revision.”187 Florida’s 
1968 Constitution and Georgia’s 1976 and 1982 Constitutions were all 
adopted pursuant to provisions in the preexisting documents that explicitly 
allowed the legislature to propose entire constitutions to voters at a 
referendum.188 
 
 178 See Tarr & Williams, supra note 36, at 1083. 
 179 Williams, supra note 177, at 1–3. 
 180 See Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y 
SYMP. 53, 69–70 (1996); Eleonora Bottini, Who is Afraid of the Constitutional Convention? The Rejection 
of Constitutional Change in the State of New York, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Nov. 22, 2017), 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/11/who-is-afraid-of-the-constitutional-convention-the-rejection-of-
constitutional-change-in-the-state-of-new-york [https://perma.cc/7PDW-BRYH]. 
 181 TARR, supra note 9, at 170. 
 182 See Sturm & May, supra note 172, at 119. 
 183 See ELAINE F. MARSHALL, N.C. DEP'T OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 
2011-2012, at 82–83 (2012). 
 184 Id. at 81.  
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 82. 
 187  Sturm & May, supra note 172, at 119–20. 
 188 See FLA. CONST. art. XVII, § 4 (amended 1964) (adding section 4 to article XVII, which stated, 
“[a]s a method of revising the entire constitution of Florida, and as an additional method of revising or 
amending any portion or portions of it, either branch of the legislature, at any regular session, or at any 
special or extraordinary session called for the purpose, may propose by joint resolution a revision of the 
entire constitution or a revision or amendment of any portion or portions thereof and may direct and 
provide for an election thereon”); GA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (1945). 
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Thus, the list of successful and truly new constitutions adopted outside 
of a convention and without explicit constitutional authority during the 
twentieth century is short. The most representative examples likely include 
Georgia’s 1945 Constitution and Virginia’s 1970 Constitution because they 
involved wholesale substantive constitutional change and not editorial or 
focused alterations. However, these two instances represent anomalies when 
compared to the several hundred state constitutions drafted by popularly 
elected conventions.189 Moreover, both of these constitutions were propped 
up or saved by judicial opinions that fundamentally misunderstood the nature 
of the state amendment power.190 Those who have observed contemporary 
voter reluctance to calling conventions have noted that “the commission 
approach to constitutional revision is generally a less desirable substitute for 
the constitutional convention” because “the commission system provides 
considerably less opportunity for popular input” or participation.191 
Ultimately, the weight of historical authority supports the idea that state 
constitutions are most properly created by a convention of specially elected 
delegates. Likewise, most states have a long tradition of respecting and 
enforcing this norm—either through authoritative judicial rulings or political 
custom. 
2. Popular Accountability 
In addition to the requirement of a special election, state convention 
theory has emphasized that a convention should be subject to greater popular 
input and control than ordinary legislative assemblies.192 This characteristic 
was again derived from a commitment to popular sovereignty.193 Despite 
many nuanced understandings of popular sovereignty during the 
revolutionary era,194 there was quickly a recognition that constitutional 
conventions required extraordinary democratic credentials.195 Because 
conventions were tasked with constructing government on behalf of the 
people as the ultimate source of government authority, the convention had to 
 
 189 It should be noted here that constitutional change can be legitimate but extra-legal. See Griffin, 
supra note 150, at 9. My focus here is on lawful constitutional change. 
 190 On Virginia, see Howard, supra note 12, at 33–34 (explaining the role that precedent played in 
the adoption of the Virginia Constitution). On Georgia, see supra notes 91–101 and accompanying text. 
 191 Tarr & Williams, supra note 36, at 1084. 
 192 TARR, supra note 9, at 69 (noting that states sought to ensure “greater popular input and control” 
over constitution making). 
 193 Fritz, supra note 146, at 329. 
 194 The debates during the revolutionary era regarding direct democracy, republicanism, and popular 
sovereignty were complicated and nuanced. See id. at 302, 312. 
 195 See TARR, supra note 9, at 69–70. 
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represent the people as directly and faithfully as possible.196 Moreover, as an 
extraordinary and temporary institution, the convention was not designed 
with an emphasis on internal checks and balances, but with the core objective 
of directly “embod[ying] the sovereignty of the people.”197 Indeed, early 
theorists suggested that a convention would ideally be populated by all the 
people themselves.198 
States have used a great variety of devices to protect the democratic 
credentials of the convention.199 In the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania and 
South Carolina imposed waiting periods before a constitution could be 
proposed to ensure public discussion and input.200 New Jersey ordered copies 
of its new constitution be printed and distributed to the people.201 Maryland, 
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania had similar distribution initiatives.202 
Ultimately, of course, the referenda became the dominant device for 
ensuring democratic accountability. In most instances, referenda are used at 
both the beginning and the end of the constitution-making process.203 
Conventions are usually called by legislation submitting the question of a 
convention to a referendum.204 Then, after a special election for delegates and 
the conclusion of the convention’s work, there is a ratification referendum 
regarding the proposed constitution.205 The ratification referendum was not a 
requirement in early state constitutional theory, but it is now all but essential 
for legitimating a new state constitution.206 
 
 196 See STURM, supra note 163, at 101–02 (“A constitutional convention . . . represents directly its 
sovereign superior—the people.”); Fritz, supra note 146, at 330–31 (describing “indirect ratification” 
practices in early state constitutions designed to enhance accountability). 
 197 KRUMAN, supra note 25, at 15. 
 198 See WOOD, supra note 25, at 307. 
 199 See TARR, supra note 9, at 69–70. 
 200 See id. at 69 (South Carolina); Fritz, supra note 146, at 330 (Pennsylvania). 
 201 See TARR, supra note 9, at 69. 
 202 Id. at 69–70. 
 203 See OBERHOLTZER, supra note 34, at 113. 
 204 See STURM, supra note 163, at 85–90. 
 205 See id. at 104–08. 
 206 See TARR, supra note 9, at 70; Fritz, supra note 146, at 329–33. See generally CHARLES SUMNER 
LOBINGIER, THE PEOPLE’S LAW OR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN LAWMAKING (1909) (tracing the history 
of popular ratification). Some have argued that the ratification referendum signaled a change in state 
convention theory whereby the convention was no longer recognized as an embodiment of the people’s 
constituent power but something more akin to an advisory body. See William Partlett, The American 
Tradition of Constituent Power, 15 INT’L J. CONST. L. 955, 955–56 (2017). On these theories, 
contemporary state conventions cannot stake claim to the people’s original constituent power to create 
government. That power, it is argued, is activated by the ratification referendum. See Fritz, supra note 
146, at 332 (explaining that ratification was necessary for people to “breath ‘life’” into a constitution). 
This perspective is surely true to some degree. Contemporary theory and practice suggest that a 
convention could not adopt a constitution without submitting it to a ratification referendum. See 
OBERHOLTZER, supra note 34, at 112–13. However, as described above, conventions still exercise a 
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3. Generative Mandate 
One of the most overlooked, but important, attributes of the state 
constitutional convention is its generative mandate. State constitutional 
theory prioritizes the people’s inclusion, as directly as practical, in the 
generative process of creating and compiling the constitutional text for 
ratification. Stated simply, for the people to create government—as popular 
sovereignty requires—they must actually participate in the origination of the 
constitution. Simply reacting to a constitution, whose details, nuance, and 
tradeoffs have been negotiated by an institution the people do not recognize, 
does not itself qualify as an exercise of their constituent power. 
Indeed, the convention came into being so delegates could do more than 
vote on a proposal that originated elsewhere.207 Conventions were designed 
to collectively deliberate and compile constitutional text.208 A convention of 
delegates was never necessary for popular approval of a pre-packaged 
proposal. Society as a whole could always cast ballots on a proposal from a 
commission, committee, or legislature.209 Instead, the convention was 
developed because the principle of popular sovereignty required the people 
be included (as directly as possible) in the actual deliberative generation of 
the constitution.210 A specially elected convention gave the people the best, 
and most practical, opportunity to create—rather than just ratify—their own 
 
unique generative function that implicates the locus of constitutional sovereignty. Contemporary 
conventions may no longer have the independent authority to create a constitution without a ratification 
referendum, but they still have as their core mandate to formulate a constitution on behalf of the people 
(subject to ratification). That mandate derives from the people’s exclusive right to create government. 
Stated differently, even if we accept that the referendum has altered state convention theory so that the 
delegates are best conceptualized as an advisory body, state convention theory still presumes that the 
advisory body should be comprised of specially elected delegates because of the convention’s generative 
mandate. The referendum is a check on the convention, but it cannot by nature act as a substitute. 
 207 See supra Section II.A. 
 208 The internal operations of conventions have varied remarkably little over the centuries. See 
STURM, supra note 163, at 99–100 (describing convention operating procedures); JAMESON, supra note 
164, at 208–300 (same). Almost all conventions begin with delegates selecting a chairperson or president 
and several other administrative officers. STURM, supra note 163, at 99–100. The convention then adopts 
rules for its own operation and appoints committees to develop specific substantive proposals. Id. The 
convention’s internal rules are often modelled after the rules for the state’s lower legislative chamber, 
with modifications “to permit greater opportunity for deliberation and discussion.” Id. at 100. The next 
stage in most conventions is dedicated to fact-finding and expert hearings, research, and the study of 
proposals. Id. Committees then complete and distribute their reports to all delegates, who then debate the 
proposals in a plenary session. Id. The proposals can be accepted, modified or rejected by a set majority 
of the attending delegates. Id. If a proposal is accepted, most conventions refer it to a committee on 
“arrangement and style,” which prepares the formal proposal for final consideration by the convention. 
Id. 
 209 The idea of a plebiscite was developing in revolutionary America and might not have immediately 
occurred to early constitutionalists. OBERHOLTZER, supra note 34, at 106–07. It became the norm for 
constitutional ratification by 1829. TARR, supra note 9, at 70 n.37. 
 210 WOOD, supra note 25, at 331–32. 
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constitution.211 Thus, state convention theory reflects the foundational belief 
that only the people can legitimately create government, and that a 
convention of specially elected delegates is the preferred device to achieve 
this. 
The Massachusetts convention of 1780 again provides an especially 
powerful illustration. The convention was preceded by a failed draft 
constitution sent to the people for ratification by the Massachusetts General 
Court.212 The people rejected this constitution, not because of its substance, 
but because “the only convention which could stand for all the people and 
best define its rights and determine its form of government, was a convention 
consisting of delegates to whom the powers of the people were delegated for 
the sole purpose of framing a constitution.”213 In other words, the people of 
Massachusetts refused to accept that the power to ratify the constitution 
could cure their limited inclusion in the generative process conducted by the 
General Court.214 
New Jersey’s failed 1944 constitutional convention provides a more 
recent example of the same principle.215 The process—which began in 1942 
with a special referendum authorizing the legislature to draft a constitution 
for submission at a subsequent referendum216—involved the use of an 
appointed commission, legislative committees, public hearings before the 
legislature, a joint meeting of the legislature to approve the constitution, and 
 
 211 To be sure, conventions themselves have a long history of relying on commissions and experts 
for information and guidance. See Williams, supra note 177, at 7–11. 
 212 See ADAMS, supra note 25, at 90–91 (describing the process used to draft the constitution in 
December 1777 that was finalized in February 1778 but rejected by a vast majority of the towns in March 
1778). The General Court of 1777, which drafted the constitution, was no “ordinary” legislature. See id. 
at 90. It had convened following a general election of the lower house where the sole issue was to select 
representatives who “would have full authority to draft a constitution.” Id. Following the election, the 
upper and lower houses met in joint session to draft the constitution, which was then sent to the people to 
be ratified in town meetings. See id. at 90–91; supra Section II.A. 
 213 HOAR, supra note 133, at 6–7. 
 214 Consider also Jefferson’s comments on the Virginia’s 1776 Constitution, which was drafted by 
an ordinary legislature. Jefferson was not concerned by the content of the constitution nor even the great 
care and deliberation with which it was drafted. See ADAMS, supra note 25, at 72 (stating legislators 
worked harder than any convention); Fritz, supra note 146, at 328–29 (“What disturbed Jefferson more 
than the absence of popular ratification was that the drafters did not clearly identify the distinctive nature 
of constitutional law. He expressed the same concerns with respect to the ‘dangerous doctrine’ that the 
people’s acquiescence was sufficient to overcome the absence of authority to frame a constitution in the 
first place.”). 
 215 See generally RICHARD J. CONNORS, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN NEW 
JERSEY: 1940–1947 (1970) (providing an overview of the constitutional process in New Jersey); ROBERT 
F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 25 (Rutgers University 
Press 2nd ed. 1997) (1990) (same). 
 216 Robert F. Williams, Afterword: The New Jersey State Constitution Comes from Ridicule to 
Respect, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 1037, 1043 (1998). 
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a public referendum to ratify the proposal.217 At the public hearings following 
publication of a draft from the legislature, various groups expressed concern 
that this process was not appropriate for generating a new constitution 
because, despite the referenda at the beginning and end, the process failed to 
adequately include the people in the actual drafting of the constitution.218 
Ultimately, voters handily defeated the proposed constitution, and the 
legislature’s unusual processes played a key role.219 
Of course, these illustrations are anecdotal and involve other complex 
factors. But the basic point persists in state constitutional thought—for 
purposes of creating a constitution, the convention is the preferred and 
universally accepted method because, among other things, it directly 
includes the people in the front-end process of deliberating towards the 
collective drafting of a constitutional text. Legislatures, on the other hand, 
are inherently unauthorized to create or destroy constitutions for the 
people—no matter how extensive their efforts and deliberations. A 
constitution must originate with the people and only a convention is 
presumed to represent the people for purposes of creating a constitution. 
With these foundational principles in mind, I now turn to the historical 
development of state amendment procedures that allow for amendment 
outside of a constitutional convention. 
III. THE STATE THEORY OF “EXTRA-CONVENTIONAL” AMENDMENT 
During most of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century, 
the states relied primarily on conventions to change their constitutions.220 The 
states quickly realized, however, that conventions were cumbersome and 
actually blocked popular reforms.221 Moreover, following violent uprisings, 
 
 217 2 PUBLIC HEARING ON PROPOSED REVISED CONSTITUTION 345 (1944). 
 218 3 PUBLIC HEARING ON PROPOSED REVISED CONSTITUTION 35 (1944) (“Of course, we think the 
ideal way to write a constitution is by a special convention . . . [T]here are certain very great advantages 
[] in having a convention which has no other business before it but consideration of the constitution.”); 
1 PUBLIC HEARING ON PROPOSED REVISED CONSTITUTION 20–21 (1944) (“We feel this thing is too 
hurried and we are asking that you let us recess the hearings until some future date, and give us an 
opportunity of really being publicly heard.”); 2 PUBLIC HEARING ON PROPOSED REVISED CONSTITUTION 
334 (1944) (noting that the committee was comprised of a majority from the dominant political party and 
that this created “practical considerations”). But see ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE 
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE  14–15 (1997) (describing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
endorsement of process in dicta). 
 219 See Tarr & Williams, supra note 36, at 1083. 
 220 See TARR, supra note 9, at 73. 
 221 A famous example of this is the 1801 New York convention, which was called “primarily for the 
purpose of determining the interpretation of one clause of the constitution.” See DODD, supra note 123, 
at 120; see also DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 101 (1864) (framing the legislative model for amendment 
in terms of the need to bypass cumbersome conventions). 
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such as Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts and the Dorr Revolution in Rhode 
Island, there was great interest in ensuring that constitutional change would 
be institutionalized and the “doctrine of the Revolution” would be replaced 
with a set of legally exclusive but accessible amendment processes.222 
Thus, the states soon began to discuss alternative ways to accomplish 
constitutional change by leveraging existing government structures. The first 
major move was to enlist the legislature as an agent of constitutional 
reform.223 The second was to authorize small groups of private citizens to 
formulate amendments through the initiative process. This Part considers 
how each of these procedures developed as a limited and constituted power 
distinct from and subordinate to the people’s inherent sovereign constituent 
power to create constitutions. This forgotten core of the state constitutional 
amendment power is crucial to understanding that the state amendment 
power is presumptively limited. 
A. The Legislature as Limited Amendment Agent 
During the initial wave of state constitution-making in the eighteenth 
century, relatively little time was spent deliberating over the best processes 
for constitutional amendment.224 It was not until around 1820, under 
mounting pressure for a more flexible amendment process, that constitution-
makers “began to reflect in a sustained fashion on the merits of various 
approaches to amendment.”225 
The most efficient approach was to authorize the legislature, as the 
state’s law-making branch, to amend the constitution.226 But this was 
troublesome because states had labored since the revolution to strip 
 
 222 JAMESON, supra note 164, at 548. See also DINAN, supra note 19, at 36–37; REPORTS OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF 1821, ASSEMBLED FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 292–94 (1821) (offering a stylistic 
amendment to remove “people” from amendment rules because “[t]here were frequently warm disputes 
[about] who were the people—party after party sprung up, all claiming to be the people.”). 
 223 This method of amendment actually existed in several inaugural state constitutions but was 
largely neglected in favor of the convention until the early nineteenth century when states began to 
critically evaluate and theorize amendment design. DINAN, supra note 19, at 32. 
 224 See id. at 32–33. 
 225 Id. at 32 (noting that the political impetus for more flexible amendment during this time period 
was primarily related to apportionment in state legislatures); see also Fritz, supra note 146, at 289 n.2 
(explaining that few convention debates were published before 1820). 
 226 JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, CHOSEN TO 
REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS [1820–21], at 413 (New ed. rev. 1853) [hereinafter 
MASS. JOURNAL] (“It was a natural course and conformable to analogy and precedent in some degree, 
that every proposition for amendment should originate in the legislature under certain guards, and be sent 
out to the people.”). 
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legislatures of control over constitution-making.227 Indeed, the triumph of the 
convention was that it institutionalized the people’s right to create 
government in a representative assembly distinct from the legislature—or 
any other official or group subject to the constitution.228 
Thus, the story of the legislative amendment power began with debate 
about the legislature’s legal authority to participate in constitutional change 
and the wisdom of entrusting the legislature with the constitution. As 
proponents of legislative amendment gained ground, what emerged was a 
theory of legislative amendment founded on the principle that the legislature 
has no inherent legal authority to formulate amendments, but the constitution 
can grant that authority subject to conditions that will protect against 
misuse.229 First, I present historical evidence from the convention debates. I 
then discuss a body of largely neglected case law affirming this conception 
of legislative amendment. 
1. Convention Debates 
This Section first presents the arguments made by state constitutional 
convention delegates against legislative amendment. It then discusses how 
those arguments were addressed and how the states landed on an inherently 
limited theory of the amendment power. 
Many early convention delegates argued that legislative amendment 
was improper simply because the legislature had no legal right or authority 
to tamper with the constitution. The power to change government inhered 
only in the people and could be exercised only through a convention 
independent of the legislature. To many early state constitutionalists, it was 
inconceivable that the legislature would be given control over the content of 
the very instrument designed to constrain the legislature on behalf of the 
people. This argument was surely formalistic, but it was also understandable 
in light of the perceived harms attendant to the English doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Indeed, parliamentary sovereignty represented 
 
 227 Although a few early eighteenth-century state constitutions included legislative amendment 
provisions, this was not the dominant approach, and many scholars suggest that these processes were 
included without much critical thought. See DINAN, supra note 19, at 32; DODD, supra note 123, at 120–
27 (providing extensive history of legislative amendment procedures). Indeed, several early state 
constitutions explicitly prohibited legislatures from proposing amendments. See LUTZ, POPULAR 
CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL, supra note 106, at 64 (noting provisions in the Pennsylvania and 
Vermont constitutions of 1776 and 1777). 
 228 OBERHOLTZER, supra note 34, at 154. 
 229 On the anomaly of these provisions as both grants and limitations, see JAMESON, supra note 164, 
at 548–49 (“But however liberal these provisions seem to be, restriction is really the policy and the law 
of the country.”). 
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exactly what the delegates feared—a legislature with unchecked control of 
the constitution.230 
One of the earliest expressions of this argument occurred at the Maine 
convention of 1819. In opposition to a first-of-its-kind provision allowing 
the legislature to formulate amendments for popular ratification,231 Mr. 
Baldwin exclaimed in a tone reminiscent of the revolutionary era: “It appears 
to me this section delegates to our Legislature a stretch of power, that no 
Legislature on earth has a right to exercise.”232 Mr. Baldwin opposed the 
provision because he perceived that it would “[d]eprive the people of their 
power, [and] give unlimited power to their rulers . . . .”233 He concluded: “It 
is more safe to trust the people with the right of revising, or to give their 
rulers unlimited power? Every man acquainted with history can easily 
answer.”234 
Similarly, at the 1835 North Carolina convention, Mr. Hogan asserted 
that he was “entirely opposed” to a provision allowing the legislature to 
formulate amendments because “the People, in revising their fundamental 
law, should act through a Convention, from the deliberations of which, all 
persons should be excluded who were members of the Legislature.”235 
Perhaps the most colorful and poignant articulation of this point came 
from Mr. Howell at the Louisiana Convention of 1864, where he exclaimed 
that “[t]he Legislature is the creature of the constitution, and when you give 
the creature power to destroy the creator, you adopt almost an anomaly.”236 
 
 230 See WOOD, supra note 25, at 348–54. 
 231 This provision was adopted by the convention and was the first process to dispense with an 
intervening-election requirement and permit a single legislature to send amendments directly to 
referendum. DODD, supra note 123, at 120–21. 
 232 THE DEBATES AND JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MAINE, 
1819–’20, at 345 (1894). 
 233 Id. at 346. 
 234 Id. 
 235 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH-CAROLINA 370 (1836). 
 236 DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 102 (1864). Affirmations of this principle are not antiquated. The most recent 
affirmation came during the New Hampshire convention of 1984, where Mr. Ober pejoratively described 
the legislature’s authority to propose amendments as a “new-found power” that did not exist in New 
Hampshire until it was explicitly engrafted into the constitution by a constitutional convention in 1964. 
JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO REVISE THE [NEW HAMPSHIRE] CONSTITUTION 95–96 (1984). Mr. 
Webster at the 1820 Massachusetts convention gave an especially direct statement of the point when he 
declared that formulating amendments “was not an exercise of legislative power.” MASS. JOURNAL, supra 
note 226, at 407. Many other expressions of this principle appear in the debates, especially at moments 
when states initially considered legislative amendment or considered loosening restrictions on the 
legislature. See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
1252 (1956) (“I don’t think that we should delegate the supreme power to the legislature to alter the 
document by which they themselves are constituted and they themselves are governed.”); THE STATE OF 
TENNESSEE, JOURNAL AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1953, at 771 (1953) (“I 
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Thus, as a matter of state constitutional law and theory, opponents of 
legislative amendment were very clear that legislatures had no inherent 
amendment power. 
New Hampshire’s experience is worth highlighting because it 
powerfully illustrates this point across time. New Hampshire’s current 
constitution was adopted in 1784, and it provided for amendment only by a 
convention. Between 1784 and 1964, the state held twelve different 
conventions to consider and propose amendments to the constitution.237 
Across those conventions, there were more than thirty different failed 
proposals to adopt a legislative amendment process.238 The arguments against 
legislative amendment were varied, but a persistent theme throughout all of 
the New Hampshire debates was a clear understanding that the legislature 
had no legal right to formulate changes precisely because it was not an 
assembly of specially elected delegates.239 Perhaps even more revealing, for 
almost one hundred years, the New Hampshire legislature did not propose 
 
think we have the best possible method of amending our constitution before us right now, for we came 
here, as delegates, for the sole purpose of studying the Constitution relative to certain articles and sections, 
and with no particular purpose in mind but to study, and, being free from politics . . . .”); 2 THE [ILLINOIS] 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES OF 1847, at 200 (1919); OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 531 (1866) (“I am 
opposed in toto to giving any one Legislature the power to amend the Constitution, even with a vote of 
ratification by the people.”); REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE 
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1259 (1850); REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF 
KENTUCKY 342 (1849); DEBATES OF THE TEXAS CONVENTION 473 (1846) (“I am in favor of leaving it 
to the people to make these amendments. I would prefer to have no other mode of alteration except by 
way of Convention.”); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 62 (1838). 
 237 See DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION, supra note 19, at 8 tbl.1-1. 
 238 See JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO REVISE THE [NEW HAMPSHIRE] CONSTITUTION 112 
(1964). 
 239 For example, at the 1964 New Hampshire Convention, Mr. Bennett argued that because the 
constitution “has emanated from the people . . . any change in this Constitution should also emanate from 
the people in Constitutional Conventions and not from the General Court.” JOURNAL OF THE 
CONVENTION TO REVISE THE [NEW HAMPSHIRE] CONSTITUTION 112–13 (1964). See also JOURNAL OF 
THE CONVENTION TO REVISE THE [NEW HAMPSHIRE] CONSTITUTION 50 (1959) (“Now this amendment, 
if it goes through we might just as well throw the Constitution out the window, and we won’t have any 
Constitution.”); JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO REVISE THE [NEW HAMPSHIRE] CONSTITUTION 177 
(1956) (“The Convention and the legislature are two different cats, they’re not colored alike at all. The 
Convention is supposed to amend the fundamental laws of the state . . . [t]he legislature is supposed to 
provide . . . laws within these fundamental laws.”); JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 127 (1889) (“A convention elected under the present method comes 
directly from the people and is uninfluenced by the partisan questions which often affect Legislatures. 
The delegates of the convention come here with a single purpose in mind[]—the real benefit of the people. 
Changes in the Constitution should be kept clear of political entanglements and free from those influences 
that ordinarily affect a Legislature.”); JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 256 (1877) (“And the Constitution, in my judgment, ought not to be altered until the 
people, sending representatives directly from themselves, see occasion to modify it.”). 
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amendments despite the fact that by 1964 legislative amendment had become 
the norm in every other state.240 
Opponents of legislative amendment also offered a variety of pragmatic 
arguments. Various delegates argued, for example, that legislative 
amendment would detract from the legislature’s primary law-making 
responsibilities. Implicit in these arguments was the understanding that the 
legislature’s law-making obligations did not include the power to develop 
constitutional amendments. The idea was that the legislature exists primarily 
to pass beneficial laws, and adding a special, nonlegislative responsibility 
was unwise because it would detract from the legislature’s core purpose. 
Specifically, at the 1837 Pennsylvania convention, Mr. Merrill opposed 
legislative amendment by arguing that it would allow “[a] single member of 
the legislature . . . [to] bring forward measures to consume the time of that 
body, and although he may be voted down, he can renew them [and a] great 
portion of time may thus be consumed unprofitably.”241 Similarly, at the New 
York convention of 1821, Mr. Sharpe argued that “[t]he legislature will 
always be troubled with propositions from various parts of the state, to alter 
the constitution, and these from one place or another, will be received year 
after year.”242 These arguments were all predicated on the idea that legislative 
amendment would be a new grant of power that would upset ordinary 
legislative business. 
Another recurring argument was that legislators would be tempted to 
misuse the amendment power precisely because they also acted in a 
legislative capacity. This argument took a variety of forms, but the core idea 
was that legislators were poorly situated to act as faithful constitutional 
agents. Because legislators were primarily motived by winning re-election, 
for example, they were likely to view the amendment power simply as a tool 
to achieving their legislative agenda or a method for demonstrating party 
loyalty.243 These arguments also asserted that the legislature inherently 
 
 240 See also DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 103 (1864) (commenting on omission of legislative mode 
in the 1812 Constitution as precluding the legislature from submitting amendments). 
 241 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 59 (1838). 
 242 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF 1821, ASSEMBLED FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 292 (1821). 
 243 See, e.g., THE STATE OF TENNESSEE, JOURNAL AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF 1953, at 771 (1953); 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1878, at 1277 (1880) (“It would make the constitution a 
foot-ball, to be kicked between the two parties.”); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF 
LOUISIANA 406–07 (1845) (arguing that legislative amendment would be a tool for losers in statutory 
debates to overturn legislation); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE 
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desires to enlarge its own power. Thus, opponents concluded that these 
dynamics were likely to bias or pervert amendment decision-making, 
resulting in outcomes unrepresentative of the people’s constitutional 
preferences.244 Again, this concern was predicated on the understanding that 
the amendment power would be a new and special grant of power to the 
legislature that could undermine the legislature’s internal structure and result 
in bad constitutional decision-making.245 
Another version of the “unfaithful-agent” argument was the concern 
that state legislatures have a propensity towards infringing the rights of 
minorities. Various delegates argued that a written constitution was intended 
to protect minorities from abusive majoritarian legislation. If legislators were 
given the power to amend the constitution, they would likely try to eliminate 
important minority projections during times of “popular excitement.”246 
A final version of the unfaithful-agent argument centered on the 
legislature’s representative structure. Various delegates argued that the 
legislature was an inappropriate institution to formulate amendments 
because it did not represent the majority of the people directly enough. This 
argument was especially prominent prior to the United States Supreme 
Court’s rulings in Baker v. Carr247 and Reynolds v. Simms,248 which forced 
states to ensure that their upper houses were apportioned based on 
population. The basic argument was that the state senate gave 
disproportionate power to certain regions and groups.249 Although that 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1838) 
(“every disappointed politician” would use legislative amendment). 
 244 See, e.g., THE STATE OF TENNESSEE, JOURNAL AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF 1953, at 777 (1953) (arguing that legislative amendment gives legislators the ability to 
“hide behind that procedure; the legislators are going to seek that escape”); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES 
OF THE CONVENTION OF LOUISIANA 407 (1845) (arguing that the legislature does not always represent 
constitutional preferences of people). 
 245 Another version of this argument was that the legislature would not have enough time to seriously 
consider amendments because of their legislative docket. See, e.g., THE STATE OF TENNESSEE, JOURNAL 
AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1953, at 771 (1953). 
 246 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION of 1844, at 54–56 
(1942) (noting that legislature may be “chosen . . . under the influence of some temporary political 
excitement” that poses danger to minorities); see also 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 2398–2400 (1958) (making this argument 
in reverse, saying that removing the successive session requirement would allow the amendment power 
to be used by singular counties). 
 247 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that districting of state legislatures is justiciable). 
 248 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that both houses of state legislatures must comply with one-person, 
one-vote principle). 
 249 See, e.g., MASS. JOURNAL, supra note 226, at 413–14; PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 
CONVENTION OF LOUISIANA 407 (1845) (“[I]t is not always that the majority in the legislature represents 
the majority of the people of the State, and therefore it is no proof, because such majority may be found, 
that the people at large desire such alteration in their constitution . . . .”). 
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structure may have been appropriate for legislative decision-making, making 
constitutional law required more direct popular input.250 
Essentially, all of these concerns stemmed from the recognition that the 
legislature did not have any legal authority to formulate constitutional 
amendments, absent a positive grant of power. In other words, opposition to 
legislative amendment was grounded in an assumption that amendment 
power did not exist until the constitution positively granted it and that it 
would be unwise to do so. 
Despite the passion with which the above concerns were expressed, 
they were overcome in most states rather quickly. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, all states except New Hampshire had adopted legislative 
amendment in some form.251 However, it is important to note how state 
convention delegates addressed the arguments against legislative 
amendment. Proponents of legislative amendment did not argue that the 
legislature had the right to propose amendments pursuant to its legislative 
mandate, nor that the people’s right to change government implicitly 
authorized the legislature to act in that capacity.252 Indeed, any notion of 
implicit legislative authority to change the constitution was anathema to even 
the proponents of legislative amendment.253 Instead, proponents offered a 
series of pragmatic and legal arguments designed to show that legislative 
amendment could be worthwhile and made “perfectly safe.”254 
 
 250 A variant of this argument was that legislators were not representative of the people’s 
constitutional preferences because they were elected based on a legislative agenda and not particular 
constitutional reforms. See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 1251 (1956); PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
of 1844, at 54–56 (1942). 
 251 See DINAN, supra note 19, at 42. 
 252 Perhaps the closest to this position that I saw in the debates was a discussion in the Massachusetts 
convention of 1820, where a delegate suggested that the legislature could propose amendments without 
satisfying ordinary legislative process. See MASS. JOURNAL, supra note 226, at 407. However, the 
assumption in this argument was that the legislature could bypass legislative process because proposing 
amendments was not a legislative function. See id. The delegate implicitly conceded that an affirmative 
constitutional grant of power was required. See id. There was also recognition from delegates that the 
legislature retains an inherent right to propose a constitutional convention, which is a long-standing 
principle of state constitutional law distinct from the power to propose amendments. See PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1844, at 73–74 (1942). There is also some 
rhetoric from delegates arguing that making the legislative amendment processes easier honors the 
people’s right to control content of the document. See, e.g., OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA 3911 (1901) (arguing that convention 
cannot make provisions unamendable by legislature because that would elevate the convention over the 
people themselves). 
 253 See, e.g., MASS. JOURNAL, supra note 226, at 413 (“[T]he only question was in what manner it 
should be provided that particular amendments might be obtained.”). 
 254 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 247 (1838); see MINUTES OF THE DAILY 
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First, this argument was grounded in the notion that conventions were 
unnecessarily costly and inefficient for discrete changes.255 Allowing for 
amendment only by convention often resulted in institutional “overkill” 
because many “ordinary” changes could be fairly resolved without the cost 
or political grandeur of a convention.256 Mr. Read made this point at the 1850 
Indiana Convention. Noting that the session had already dragged on for 
eleven weeks without an end in sight, he suggested that relatively minor 
amendments, such as the establishment of a state bank, would be possible 
without the cost and burden of a convention.257 
This argument was sophisticated and powerful. It rested on the idea that 
constitutional changes can vary in significance or complexity, and that 
discrete, clear changes can be legitimated by less comprehensive processes 
and by agents with a less direct connection to the people.258 In this way, 
proponents of legislative amendment were able to unravel the formalistic, 
all-or-nothing approach taken by their opponents by introducing a sliding 
scale. If a change was significant or complex, a convention was better to 
ensure a direct connection to the people and focused deliberation. If a change 
was clear and discrete, a more efficient and mediated process could be used. 
For example, at the 1867 New York Convention, Mr. Murphy argued 
that New York’s amendment rules, which allowed for legislative amendment 
by a majority but imposed a higher threshold for a convention, were justified 
because: 
[When] there are evils that require remedy such evils should be promptly 
corrected . . . [But] [n]o Convention should be called for the purpose of revising 
 
PROCEEDINGS, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1252 (1956) (“Just remember we are living in a 
jet age, and . . . I think a two-thirds majority is a safe check and balance.”). 
 255 See, e.g., MASS. JOURNAL, supra note 226, at 407 (“The object of the mode proposed for making 
amendments in it, was to prevent the people from being called upon [presumably in convention] to make 
trivial amendments, or any amendments, except when a real evil existed.”); id. at 188 (“Any plan, 
sensible, and useful alterations which might be suggested, the people would see, and in the mode proposed 
would easily be effected.”). 
 256 See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1249 
(1956) (“the object is to save the state expenses” for “amendment[s] that [are] urgent and worthwhile”); 
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, CALLED TO AMEND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE, WHICH ASSEMBLED AT RALEIGH, JUNE 4, 1835, at 347 (1836) (arguing 
that convention process as the sole amendment device was too cumbersome). 
 257 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1259 (1850). 
 258 See Op. of the Justices, 264 A.2d 342 (Del. 1970) (drawing this conclusion from the Delaware 
convention debates). 
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the Constitution, that is, for the purpose of making corrections generally, unless 
upon the most deliberate and full decision of the people on the question.259 
This argument opened the door for proponents of legislative 
amendment to explain why it might be appropriate to involve the 
legislature.260 If popular sentiment on a discrete constitutional issue was 
clear, the legislature, as a democratic assembly, could identify and formulate 
that sentiment for ratification by the people.261 If the issue was complex or 
far-reaching, or the solution unclear, a specially elected deliberative 
convention could be used to ascertain and more directly legitimate the 
people’s constitutional preferences. Thus, Mr. Hinman at the 1915 New 
York convention, argued: 
[T]here might be incidental changes needed from year to year, which would, 
while important, not be important enough to go to the great expense of calling 
a great Convention for the purpose remedying it. Therefore [the committee] 
ha[s] concluded that it was essential that we should retain the legislative method 
in conjunction with the Convention plan.262 
This perspective on constitutional change was crucial in the 
development of legislative amendment in the states because it paved the way 
for a more flexible cost–benefit analysis regarding the design of amendment 
rules. It allowed proponents of legislative amendment to concede that the 
legislature was not ideal for creating amendments. But it also empowered 
them to justify the risks associated with legislative amendment by 
emphasizing the efficiencies gained.263 In many respects, this was the 
conceptual foundation upon which legislative amendment was built. 
To be sure, proponents of legislative amendment recognized its 
dangers. But rather than rejecting legislative amendment outright, they 
proposed constitutional limitations that could guard against abuse while 
 
 259 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK 351 (1868). 
 260 See, e.g., MASS. JOURNAL supra note 226, at 413 (“It was a natural course and comformable [sic] 
to analogy and precedent in some degree, that every proposition for amendment should originate in the 
Legislature under certain guards . . . .”). 
 261 See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO REVISE THE [NEW HAMPSHIRE] CONSTITUTION 110, 
115 (1964); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK 2807 (1868); MASS. JOURNAL, supra note 226, at 406–07 (discussing how the house is especially 
well suited to proposing amendments). 
 262 3 REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 3254 
(1916). 
 263 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1844, at 
66–67 (1942) (many proponents downplayed the risks, suggesting that the legislature is not prone to 
misuse amendment). 
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preserving efficiency.264 In the end, a key argument in favor of extra-
conventional amendment was that the constitution could be used to carefully 
delineate a special legislative power, which would meet the need for 
incremental reform while limiting the legislature’s involvement in 
constitutional change.265 In other words, state amendment rules did not 
originate as broad grants of power that might approximate the people’s 
sovereign constituent power but as limited and restricted grants designed 
principally to protect against legislative supremacy. 
Because the amendment power was initially conceived in limited terms, 
subsequent developments in the design of amendment rules centered on 
questions of agency. Delegates debated and refined legislative amendment 
in terms of how to ensure the legislature would not usurp the people’s 
foundational right to create and change government while also making 
amendment accessible and efficient. The people’s sovereignty was relevant 
to these debates not because the amendment power was designed to embody 
the people’s sovereign constituent power, like the convention, but because 
the amendment power was designed to ensure that the legislature did not 
attempt to take the place of a convention. 
This point was frequently clarified in state convention debates. At the 
Massachusetts convention of 1820, for example, an issue arose as to the 
appropriate legislative thresholds for proposing amendments.266 In 
opposition to supermajority thresholds, Mr. Varnum recited the 
Massachusetts Bill of Rights, declaring that “all the rights of self-
government [are] vested in the people,” which he understood to mean a 
simple “majority of the people.”267 In support of higher thresholds, however, 
Mr. Pickman emphasized that the question was not “what power should be 
vested in the people, but what power should be vested in the Legislature.”268 
 
 264 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 247 (1838) (arguing that a 
successive-session requirement would make legislative amendment “perfectly safe”); PROCEEDINGS AND 
DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA 370 (1836) (arguing that constitutional limitations 
on amendment processes were not intended to limit “the people, but the creatures of the people;” “[i]t is 
to impose a check on the Legislature, that it may not avail itself of an incidental majority to disturb the 
repose of the people . . .”); MASS. JOURNAL supra note 226, at 413 (describing “guards” against abuse to 
be included in the constitution and concluding: “Would not this furnish a reasonable security against 
unreasonable alterations?”) 
 265 See, e.g., 3 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971–1972, at 493 (1981) (“The 
committee feels such a measure is restrictive enough to prevent frivolous legislative action, it is open 
enough to overcome stringent opposition of a few well-placed members of one bicameral house.”); MASS. 
JOURNAL, supra note 226, at 407, 413; PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1838). 
 266 MASS. JOURNAL, supra note 226, at 414. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. at 415. 
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Mr. Pickman “agreed that the people are the sovereigns of the country, and 
that a majority must control the will of the people,” but “the question now 
was, what powers should be given to the Legislature.”269 On that question, 
Mr. Pickman preferred higher thresholds as a way to limit the legislature’s 
influence on constitutional change.270 
The Louisiana convention of 1864 presented a more nuanced discussion 
of the same issue. In supporting legislative amendments but opposing higher 
legislative thresholds, Mr. Cutler argued that higher legislative thresholds 
“abridge” the people’s right to change the constitution because only a 
majority are required to create government and bind society to a 
constitution.271 Accordingly, a small minority in the legislature should not be 
empowered by the amendment process to block otherwise popular changes 
to the constitution.272 In defense of higher thresholds, Mr. Howell explained: 
“It is not the object . . . to restrict the power of the people at all; it is rather 
to restrict the facility of the Legislature in acting upon this matter.”273 By 
imposing higher thresholds, he argued, “the rights of the people will [not] be 
restricted one iota [because] [t]he people have a right to call a convention at 
any time . . . .”274 
The historical progression of amendment design also suggests the states 
understood amendment procedures to be limited grants of power. The first 
era of legislative amendment procedures, in the early nineteenth century, was 
characterized by relatively strong limitations on legislative amendment and 
greater institutional redundancies.275 Most states in the early nineteenth 
century adopted procedures that required supermajority approval in both 
houses, an intervening election for at least one house (usually the lower-
house), and then supermajority approval by both houses to ratify.276 The other 
dominant approach was to require approval in two successive legislative 
 
 269 Id. Debates regarding appropriate voting thresholds often involved popular sovereignty on both 
sides. Some argued that thresholds had to be based on a simple majority because higher thresholds 
offended the notion that a majority of the people decide. Others argued that they had to be high to ensure 
that the legislature did not usurp the people’s power by amending the constitution easily. Id. 
 270 See id. For similar arguments see DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION AND 
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 102 (1864) (noting that higher 
thresholds would limit the influence of legislature and “few men representing private interests”).  
 271 DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 104 (1864). 
 272 Id. at 105. Mr. Cutler emphasized that the legislature would be held accountable by requiring 
prolonged publication before a ratification referendum. 
 273 Id. at 106. 
 274 Id. 
 275 See DINAN,  supra note 19, at 41–45 (explaining the loosening of limitations on legislatures over 
time). 
 276 See DODD, supra note 123, at 120–23. 
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sessions and then ratification at a popular referendum.277 A minority of states 
required a referendum in between two successive supermajority votes in the 
legislature.278 In all, these early procedures were designed to significantly 
restrict legislative involvement in constitutional amendment. They evidence 
the understanding that giving the legislature constitutional amendment 
power was a risky business to be constrained. 
However, by the mid-nineteenth century, there was growing discontent 
that legislative amendment, which was championed as a device with lower 
barriers to constitutional change, had, in the words of Mr. Hammond at the 
1877 Georgia convention, made state constitutions “as unchangeable as the 
laws of the Medes and Persians.”279 While this was surely an exaggeration, 
states had become increasingly frustrated with the rigidity of legislative 
amendment by the onset of the Progressive Era because state constitutions 
were working to block popular social reforms and retain the status quo.280 In 
large part, this was happening because state judges were invalidating 
legislation under state constitutions, and to a lesser degree, because 
legislators were using state constitutional limitations as a pretext for not 
implementing popular policies.281 
Thus, states began reducing barriers to legislative amendment so that 
smaller legislative majorities could more quickly clear the way to popular 
social and economic reforms. Specifically, the Progressive Era set in motion 
a trend towards eliminating successive-session and supermajority 
requirements as well as lowering referendum thresholds to only a majority 
of those voting on the amendment.282 The result was that few formal barriers 
to legislative amendment remained besides the ratification referendum.283 
At first glance, debates from the Progressive Era might suggest that the 
states were fundamentally restructuring the amendment power. These 
debates contain much rhetoric espousing the people’s right to change and 
control government as the basis for liberalizing amendment procedures. The 
 
 277 See id. Some states required only majority thresholds (as opposed to super-majorities) in either 
the first or second session. See DINAN, supra note 19, at 43 (describing many variations). 
 278 The original approach to legislative elections was to hold them annually, which made these 
processes relatively streamlined, at least to a degree. See DINAN, supra note 19, at 43 (noting that 
successive session requirements were initially devised before biennial legislative elections). 
 279 A STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 430 
(1877) (Georgia). The change to biannual legislative elections contributed to the problem. Various 
delegates emphasized how successive-session requirements with biannual elections meant the 
amendments took several years to complete. Id. 
 280 See DINAN, supra note 19, at 48–49. 
 281 See id. at 50. 
 282 See id. at 56–58. 
 283 OBERHOLTZER, supra note 34, at 155–56. 
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referendum in particular was often worshiped as the purest method for 
realizing popular sovereignty as the most effective check on legislatures.284 
Thus, one could argue the Progressive Era’s emphasis on popular referenda 
suggests that amendment rules were supplanting the convention in state 
constitutional theory as the repository of the people’s full constituent power. 
However, this conclusion risks pulling the debates from context and 
proving too much. The core of the Progressive Era indictment of government 
was that it was unrepresentative and captured by private interests.285 
Progressives invoked popular sovereignty as a principle to justify breaking 
apart entrenched institutions that were frustrating popular reform and 
favoring entrenched interests.286 In terms of state constitutional amendment 
procedures, this meant eliminating rules that allowed a minority in the 
legislature to maintain the status quo—most notably, supermajority 
thresholds and successive-session requirements.287 
However, the Progressives’ invocation of popular sovereignty was not 
directed to the underlying structure and theory of extra-conventional 
amendment. Indeed, Progressives liberalized amendment processes 
precisely because of great distrust in the legislature.288 By installing the 
referendum as the primary check on the legislature, Progressives did not 
intend to empower the legislature to act as a substitute for the constitutional 
convention. Instead, they intended to more directly constrain the legislature 
in exercising its existing amendment powers. 
Stated differently, placing great trust in the referendum did not 
necessarily mean Progressive Era delegates also intended to grant a new 
power to legislatures. Rather, the Progressive liberalization of amendment 
rules in favor of referenda evinces a desire to more effectively constrain the 
legislature to its existing powers and guide it towards popular outcomes. 
In fact, thoughtful Progressives revered the convention because of its 
direct accountability to the people and its independence from the 
 
 284 See, e.g., 1 DEBATES OF THE NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1972, at 726 
(1972) (“After all, the people in the final analysis will vote whether or not they want to add or subtract 
from the basic document.”); 1 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 
THE STATE OF OHIO 379 (1912) (“Permit the people themselves by popular vote, after due deliberation 
and discussion . . . to settle what the proper construction of any constitutional point is.”); 1 OFFICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA 3911 (1901). 
 285 See MILLER, supra note 34, at 25–28 (summarizing the core Progressive tenets). 
 286 See id. 
 287 Cf. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION, supra note 19, at 48–53 
(recalling the push to enact more flexible amendment processes). 
 288 Indeed, the Progressive Era was characterized by pervasive distrust in the legislature’s ability to 
formulate laws on behalf of the people. See OBERHOLTZER, supra note 34, at 155–56 (“Faith has been 
put in the referendum as a power to deliver us from evils arising from the legislature through this source 
[i.e., the amendment power].”); Cooper, supra note 7, at 231–32. 
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legislature.289 James Dealey, for example, wrote in 1915 regarding the 
convention: 
It is the great agency through which democracy finds expression. In its latest 
form, that of a body made up of delegates elected from districts of equal 
population, it is one of the greatest of our political inventions. Through it 
popular rights may be secured in the constitution, legislative tyranny restrained, 
and powerful interests subordinated . . . .290 
Thoughtful discussions of this issue by delegates during and after the 
Progressive Era also support the idea that legislative amendment was not 
understood as a substitute for the people exercising their sovereign power in 
convention.291 
2. The Neglected Jurisprudence of “Limited” Legislative Amendment 
Although contemporary case law has tended towards a doctrine of 
referendum sovereignty, a largely overlooked body of case law recognizes 
that legislative amendment is a constituted and inherently limited power. The 
cornerstone of this line of cases is the widely held (but underappreciated) 
rule in state constitutional law that plenary legislative power does not include 
the power to propose amendments.292 All state constitutions are structured 
around a plenary grant of legislative power authorizing state legislatures to 
enact any law in furtherance of the public good, so long as it does not violate 
the Federal Constitution or an explicit limitation in the state constitution.293 
However, plenary legislative authority does not include the power to 
formulate or propose constitutional change. This is a power that inheres only 
 
 289 See James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22 RUTGERS 
L.J. 819, 829 (1991) (identifying James Dealey as a Progressive advocate and noting his reverence for 
the convention). 
 290 See DEALEY, supra note 67, at 258. 
 291 See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1249 
(1956); OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA 
3911 (1901). 
 292 See State v. Manley, 441 So. 2d 864, 868–69 (Ala. 1983) (“This court recognized no authority 
for constitutional revision existing within the ‘“plenary power’” of the legislature . . . .”); Moore v. 
Shanahan, 486 P.2d 506, 513 (Kan. 1971) (“In submitting propositions for specific amendments to the 
Constitution, the Legislature does not act in the exercise of its ordinary legislative power . . . .”); 
Hutcheson v. Gonzales, 71 P.2d 140, 145 (N.M. 1937); Mitchell v. Hopper, 241 S.W. 10, 12 (Ark. 1922); 
see also JAMESON, supra note 164, at 622 (“The power to propose amendments, then, not enuring as a 
part of the general grant, must be authorized by a special provision of the Constitution. And when no such 
provision can be pointed out the power does not exist.”); WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 406 (noting rule that 
“legislative power to propose constitutional amendments to the voters is not within the basic, plenary 
legislative power but rather must be specifically authorized, and limited, by the state constitution”). 
 293 See WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 249–53. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
120 
in the people.294 The policy behind this rule is that the constitution exists to 
create and constrain the legislature on behalf of the people. And, therefore, 
the legislature is presumed to be without power to change its governing 
instrument.295 Thus, state courts generally recognize that amendment rules in 
state constitutions represent extraordinary, affirmative grants of power to the 
legislature; rather than limitations on plenary legislative power.296 
Although this doctrine is deeply embedded in the state constitutional 
jurisprudence, it is widely overlooked in modern cases analyzing the nature 
and substantive scope of legislative amendment. Instead, as noted above, 
modern cases tend to allow amendments from any source so long as they are 
subjected to a referendum.297 However, a few courts have found implicit 
functional limitations on legislative amendment, based on the underlying 
structure and logic of the amendment power.298 Though largely ignored, these 
cases illustrate the inherently limited nature of legislative amendment, and 
they provide support for the doctrine that I more fully develop in Part IV. 
In Livermore v. Waite,299 for example, the California Supreme Court 
considered an amendment to change the state capital from Sacramento to San 
Jose, provided that the state received a donation of land “not less than ten 
acres and one million dollars.”300 In analyzing the amendment, the court 
emphasized that “the power of the legislature to initiate any change in the 
existing organic law is, however, of greatly less extent [than a convention], 
and, being a delegated power, is to be strictly construed under the limitations 
by which it has been conferred.”301 The court further explained that “[i]n 
submitting propositions for the amendment of the constitution, the 
 
 294 See supra note 236 and accompanying text; see also Holmberg v. Jones, 65 P. 563, 564 (Idaho 
1901) (“The power to make constitutions and amend them is inherent, not in the legislature, but in the 
people.”). 
 295 See Holmberg, 65 P. at 564 (“[T]he power to propose amendments has been granted by the people 
to the legislature. While the power of the legislature to enact laws is inherent, so far as legislative 
enactment is concerned, yet the power to propose amendments to the constitution is not inherent.”). 
 296 This is precisely why state courts generally invalidate legislative amendments that do not strictly 
comply with the constitution’s amendment rules and refuse to enlarge legislative amendment power by 
implication. For an extreme example, see Bailey v. Brookhart, 84 N.W. 1064, 1067 (Iowa 1901) 
(invalidating amendment approved at referendum because it was not entered into the legislative journals 
as required by the constitution). 
 297 See supra Section I.B (describing the doctrine of referendum sovereignty). 
 298 Key cases include Smathers v. Smith, 338 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 1976); Houston County v. Martin, 
169 So. 13, 15 (Ala. 1936); Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424 (Cal. 1894). See also Ellingham v. Dye, 
99 N.E. 1 (Ind. 1912) (rejecting the legislature’s attempt to propose a new constitution to the people at a 
referendum because the constitution did not explicitly authorize the legislature to propose a new 
constitution, and no such power was inherent in the legislature). 
 299 36 P. 424 (Cal. 1894). 
 300 Id. at 425. 
 301 Id. at 426. 
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legislature is not in the exercise of its legislative power, or of any sovereignty 
of the people that has been intrusted [sic] to it, but is merely acting under the 
limited power, conferred upon it by the people . . . .”302 Applying this logic, 
the court concluded that the amendment was invalid because it did not make 
a clear change to the existing constitution but instead delegated constitutional 
decision-making to a private individual.303 According to the court, this was 
an unauthorized use of the amendment power because the constitution 
required that legislative amendments “become . . . part of the constitution” 
after ratification by voters.304 
In Houston County v. Martin, the Alabama Supreme Court considered 
a legislative amendment—ratified by the people at a referendum—that 
temporarily suspended all constitutional provisions prohibiting the 
legislature from reducing salaries for public officials.305 Although the court 
ruled that the amendment did not apply to the facts in the case, it insisted a 
constitutional amendment could not be used to “temporarily suspend the 
Constitution or any part thereof to meet a real or fancied emergency.”306 The 
court reasoned that if the legislature could use amendment to temporarily 
suspend the constitution, then the amendment power would “substitut[e] a 
government of men for a government of law.”307 The court concluded that 
temporary suspension was an impermissible use of the amendment power 
because “[c]onstitutions are not primarily designed to protect majorities . . . 
but to preserve and protect the rights of individuals and minorities against 
arbitrary actions of those in authority.”308 
In Smathers v. Smith, the Florida Supreme Court considered the validity 
of an amendment that allowed the legislature to nullify agency rules.309 The 
amendment was tacked onto a loosely related provision that prohibited 
agencies from imposing civil or criminal penalties. In reviewing the 
amendment, the court held that “[i]nherent in the amendatory process for the 
Constitution, by necessary implication, is the . . . notion of 
 
 302 Id. (“The extent of this power is limited to the object for which it is given, and is measured by the 
terms in which it has been conferred, and cannot be extended by the legislature to any other object, or 
enlarged beyond these terms. The legislature is not authorized to assume the function of a constitutional 
convention . . . .”). 
 303 Id. at 427 (“The legislature was not authorized . . . to propose an amendment which, if ratified, 
will take effect only at the will of other persons . . . .”). 
 304 Id. at 427. 
 305 169 So. 13, 15 (Ala. 1936). 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. 
 309 338 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 1976). The amendment allowed the legislature to nullify any agency 
rule “on the ground that the rule is without or in excess of delegated legislative authority.” Id. 
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‘germaneness.’”310 The court further explained that “[a] concept of 
germanity, or rationality, for constitutional amendments is clearly essential 
‘to accomplish harmony in language and purpose between articles and to 
produce as nearly as possible a document free of doubts and 
inconsistencies.’”311 Thus, the legislature could not use the amendment 
power to destroy the constitution’s “rationality.”312 The court ultimately 
upheld the amendment, but “only because there exists a reasonable basis to 
view the new sentence as germane to the provision it amends.”313 Inherent in 
the court’s reasoning, however, was the premise that the legislature could not 
use its delegated amendment power to destroy a key attribute of the 
constitution, i.e., its rationality and internal coherence. 
This line of case law reinforces the basic notion that legislative 
amendment is a limited, delegated power derived from the constitution. Yet, 
the doctrine of referendum sovereignty often ignores this core premise. 
B. Citizens as Limited Amendment Agents 
The constitutional initiative similarly developed as a limited grant of 
power subordinate to the people’s inherent sovereign constituent power to 
create constitutions. The constitutional initiative was first adopted by Oregon 
in 1902 during the heart of the Progressive Era.314 Since then, seventeen other 
states have adopted it.315 The dominant justification for the initiative was to 
address concerns about legislative accountability. Those concerns related to 
(a) legislative capture by private interests, and (b) legislators’ own incentives 
for retaining the political status quo.316 The initiative was thus viewed as a 
device for correcting those agency problems by bypassing the legislature and 
allowing private citizens to initiate constitutional change. 
For present purposes, it is crucial to recognize that the initiative was 
first adopted against the backdrop of a universal recognition that 
“amendments are to be made only in the modes pointed out in the 
 
 310 Id. at 830. 
 311 Id. (quoting Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824, 829 (Fla. 1970)). 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. at 831. 
 314 DINAN, supra note 2, at 16. South Dakota is often mistakenly attributed with originating the 
constitutional initiative in 1898. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 7, at 230; Kafker & Russcol, supra note 16, 
at 1283 (discussing South Dakota as first adopting initiative in context of constitutional initiative). In fact, 
South Dakota adopted only the statutory initiative in 1898 and did not adopt the constitutional initiative 
until 1972. See DINAN, supra note 19, at 6 n.132. 
 315 See DINAN, supra note 19, at 6 n.132 (listing dates of adoption for all states). 
 316 See Dinan, supra note 42, at 74–84. For an example of Progressive Era literature making this 
point, see J.W. SULLIVAN, DIRECT LEGISLATION BY THE CITIZENSHIP THROUGH THE INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM 93 (1893) (“Among the plainest signs of the times in America is the popular distrust of 
legislators.”). 
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constitution, and that any departure therefrom is revolution.”317 Although 
proponents of the initiative championed it as a way to “exercise . . . 
sovereignty without the consent of the ordinary government agencies,” the 
initiative was not inherent or original in any particular citizen or group, as a 
matter of state constitutional law.318 That is, no citizen or private group could 
claim a legal right to propose a constitutional amendment on behalf of the 
people. To be implemented, the initiative had to be created through positive 
constitutional law deputizing some number of private citizens to act as agents 
for all of the people in formulating constitutional amendments.319 Thus, like 
the legislative amendment power, the state constitutional initiative is derived 
entirely from the constitution that creates it. 
In this Section, I first present evidence from the convention debates 
addressing the constitutional initiative. I then discuss the body of case law 
affirming this conception of the initiative. 
1. Convention Debates 
Convention debates regarding the initiative were extensive, often 
involving lecture-type treatises addressing the history, theory, and purpose 
of the initiative.320 Indeed, the Ohio convention of 1912 drew speeches from 
William Jennings Bryan and Theodore Roosevelt.321 
In general terms, proponents of the initiative hoped to correct agency 
problems in government by allowing private citizens to bypass government 
and formulate constitutional proposals on their own.322 Proponents viewed 
 
 317 Garner, supra note 70, at 219. 
 318 See DELOS F. WILCOX, GOVERNMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE: OR THE INITIATIVE, THE 
REFERENDUM AND THE RECALL AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 117 (1912). This is not to say that all 
proponents of the initiative appreciated the finer nuances of this point. Some brushed over the mechanics 
of the initiative in favor of broad rhetorical assertions that because all power resided in the people, the 
initiative was the essence of popular sovereignty because it bypassed existing representatives. See id. This 
rhetoric obscures the fact that when the initiative is operationalized, it necessarily creates new 
representatives or agents on behalf of the people. See Staszewski, supra note 82, at 399. The small number 
of citizens needed to qualify an initiative bypasses existing government officials, but they do not truly 
constitute the “people” for purposes of the doctrine of popular sovereignty. See id. Instead, they are a 
small representative group that the full sovereign people have authorized to act as constitutional agents 
through positive law in the constitution itself. See WILCOX, supra, at 117 (“The Initiative affords an 
available method for the exercise of sovereignty without the consent of the ordinary governmental 
agencies.”). 
 319 See OBERHOLTZER, supra note 34, at 384–85. 
 320 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 546–82 (1907). 
 321 See MILLER, supra note 34, at 26; PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 751–54 (1912) (providing an enumerated list of arguments for and 
against initiative). 
 322 See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 547 (1907) (making a point about the nonrepresentative nature of legislature); THE RECORDS 
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the initiative as a way to address particular substantive problems in 
constitutional law and correct judicial barriers to popular reforms.323 
Proponents also hoped the mere presence of the initiative in the 
constitutional structure would prevent legislators and judges from acting 
inconsistently with public will.324 Opponents argued that the initiative is 
inherently prone to empower special interests because it authorizes private 
groups to formulate constitutional changes.325 They also argued the initiative 
tends to clutter constitutions with stifling and irreconcilable policy 
provisions, is prone to be used by majorities to limit the rights of minorities, 
and eliminates the deliberative benefits of representative law-making.326 
Therefore, I focus primarily on portions of the debates that address the 
legal foundations of the constitutional initiative. Within the debates there are 
frequent references to the initiative as an “old” and “inherent” right held 
directly by the people.327 In support of this, delegates frequently drew upon 
language from early state constitutions that discussed popular sovereignty 
 
OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1910, at 189 (John S. Goff ed., 1991) (“I believe it 
initiates a true republican form of government, and will enable the people of this state to hold the 
government within their control.”). 
 323 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 560 (1907) (“The history of legislatures for the recent past decades is prolific with disregard 
for the prayers of the people.”). 
 324 See id. at 551 (explaining that initiative was necessary to correct democratic deficiencies and that 
legislatures were “an adverse government controlled by selected men, selected by some one other than 
the people,” and initiative was to “enforce faithful service by loyal officials”); Cooper, supra note 7, at 
232. 
 325 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 688 
(1912); id. at 690 (“It enables every well organized interest, such as single tax, socialistic measures, 
corporations and kindred interests, by concentrating upon a single law where a number are submitted to 
have their pet measures pass, thus putting a dangerous power in the hands of selfish interests . . . .”); 
SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 456 (1970) (“[T]he majority report indicates that they 
fear the initiative process will lend itself to abuse by special-interest groups.”). 
 326 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 547–48 (1907) (noting problems associated with bypassing deliberation in a representative 
assembly). There were other historical arguments as well. For example, at the Michigan convention a 
recurring issue was whether the initiative violated the Guarantee Clause. Id. at 552–53. Proponents also 
relied heavily on recent application of the initiative in Switzerland. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 677–78, 689 (1912). 
 327 See 2 DEBATES IN THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1917–1918, at 752 
(1918) (“The purpose . . . for the initiative . . . is based upon a right inherent in the people to correct, to 
alter, to change mistakes made by the Legislature . . . .”); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 778 (1912) (arguing in favor of initiative based 
on assertions that “the people . . . are all-powerful; it is the people who are the fountain of power and 
honors. They are the sovereign. It is they who can reform the legislatures”); id. at 779 (describing the 
initiative as flowing from the principle of popular sovereignty that allows people to take back power from 
legislature at will). 
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and the people’s right to amend government however they see fit.328 They 
also pointed to older versions of the initiative that existed at the local 
government level.329 They made these claims to legitimize the initiative and 
respond to arguments that the initiative was un-American, and perhaps even 
unconstitutional under the Guarantee Clause of the Federal Constitution.330 
Proponents of the initiative were surely correct that direct law making 
was not entirely absent from American political thought before the 
Progressive Era. Madison and Jefferson famously sparred over direct 
democracy in various forms.331 Some early state constitutions also included 
more direct democratic structures (unrelated to constitutional amendment) 
that align with anti-federalist thinking on constitutional design.332 And there 
was a long tradition of things akin to direct democracy in American local 
government.333 
Nevertheless, the constitutional initiative as conceptualized and 
adopted during the Progressive Era was in fact new to the American 
constitutional system.”334 The key novelty was the notion that state 
constitutions could be used to create a legal right for private citizens to 
initiate constitutional change.335 This idea was surely connected to popular 
sovereignty, but unlike the convention, the states had not recognized the 
initiative as an institutional necessity flowing from popular sovereignty. 
Indeed, Ellis Oberholtzer wrote about the difference between the long-
standing right to petition government and the initiative: 
 
 328 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 547–48 (1907). 
 329 See id. at 552 (discussing initiative-type actions from New England towns during the Eighteenth 
Century); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 
675 (1912) (discussing the source of initiative and referendum in Switzerland and in New England town 
meetings). These arguments appear to largely mirror James W. Sullivan’s famous 1892 work. See 
SULLIVAN, supra note 316. Sullivan is largely attributed with having introduced the idea of the initiative 
into American politics in the 1890s. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 6. He visited Switzerland in 1888 
and self-published his book, which provided a plan for how to introduce the initiative into American 
constitutionalism in the form he observed in Switzerland. Id. 
 330 A frequent retort to the initiative in the debates was that it was a foreign institution with no place 
in America. See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
OHIO 678 (1912) (“[T]his smells too much of Swiss cheese.”). 
 331 MILLER, supra note 34, at 19–20. 
 332 See id. at 21–22 (describing state constitutions as aligning with anti-federalist thinking about 
direct democracy as a necessary check on officials). 
 333 OBERHOLTZER, supra note 34, at 368–72. 
 334 MILLER, supra note 34, at 23–24 (noting that the initiative was first introduced in America in the 
1890s and that as late as 1892 “the initiative . . . [was] still largely unknown in the United States”).  
 335 See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 
752 (1912) (“It may be conceded that the adoption of direct legislation is contrary to the original plan 
upon which both the national and state constitutions were based [but] [t]hat is not a conclusive argument 
against it.”). 
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The petition is not the initiative in the form that the advocates of this feature of 
popular government desire to see it introduced into this country. The right of 
initiation includes the right to demand a vote of the people, not only on laws 
already proposed or passed by the representative legislature, but also on new 
measures. The right of initiation is the right to initiate the law as well as the 
election for and against the law. It is a democratic agency by which a minority 
party and elements which are without representation in the legislature may force 
the latter’s hand and compel it to submit any desired measure to popular vote.336 
Although proponents of the initiative likely believed popular 
sovereignty compelled the right of citizens to directly initiate amendments, 
they conceded that the right to an initiative had never existed in the United 
States as a matter of state constitutional law.337 At the 1917 Ohio convention, 
for example, proponents noted that adopting the initiative would “mean[] a 
fundamental changing of our state government.”338 Similarly, at the 1907 
Michigan convention, a delegate remarked that the initiative would be an 
entirely “new and untried method of constitutional amendment.”339 More 
recently, at the 1971 Montana convention, a proponent of the initiative 
explained that the initiative provision “creates a new power for the people of 
Montana, the right to initiate constitutional amendments.”340 Therefore, in 
the state tradition, the constitutional initiative was a new creation brought 
 
 336 OBERHOLTZER, supra note 34, at 384; SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 5–10 (describing the “advent 
of initiative” in United States as occurring between 1885 and 1917). Not all proponents of the initiative 
accepted Oberholtzer’s distinction between the right to petition and the initiative. See 2 DEBATES IN THE 
MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1917–1918, at 306 (1918) (arguing that the right to 
petition is similar to initiative). 
 337 See, e.g., 1 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE 
OF OHIO 778 (1912) (arguing in favor of initiative provisions because they were necessary to “enable the 
people to act”). Indeed, obtaining such a right through positive constitutional law was an “obsession” of 
many populists during this time. SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 7–8; 1 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 664 (1912) (speech by William Jennings Bryan 
describing initiative as “the most useful government invention which the people of the various states have 
had under consideration in recent years. It is the most effective means yet proposed for giving the people 
absolute control over their government”).  
 338 1 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 
679 (1912). 
 339 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 562 (1907). 
 340 3 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971–1972, at 505–06 (1981); see also id. at 507 
(“I wish to advise these people that they’re putting in a brand new way of []amending the Constitution, 
by initiative, that we haven’t had previous to this.”). 
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into being by constitutional provisions.341 Absent those provisions, the 
initiative did not exist as a legal right.342 
Additionally, these convention debates reflect an understanding that 
initiative provisions effectively deputized private citizens to act as agents of 
constitutional change on behalf of the people. Opponents of the initiative 
argued that the process was inherently vulnerable to misuse by special 
interests because it allowed for private formulation of constitutional 
amendments supported by only a minority of the electorate.343 Proponents of 
the initiative responded that the signature thresholds could be set high 
enough to limit inappropriate proposals but low enough to make 
constitutional change accessible to well-meaning citizens.344 All sides 
agreed, however, that the initiative was structured to authorize private 
 
 341 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 562 (1907) (“[W]ill you incorporate in the fundamental law of Michigan a new and untried 
method of constitutional amendment . . . ?”); id. at 560 (“To simplify the proposition this is to be done 
by providing in the new Constitution for proposing or initiating amendments thereto by petition of the 
people themselves.”); id. at 547 (noting that adopting the initiative would require delegates to “engraft 
upon [the constitution] a method of making laws fundamentally different from that which has prevailed 
since our nation was founded”); THE RECORDS OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 
1910, at 686–87 (John S. Goff ed., 1991) (finding that the provision is “drawn up in such a way as to 
make the machinery for amendment of the constitution operative immediately upon the adoption of the 
constitution.”). 
 342 See SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 490 (1969) (emphasizing that unless 
provisions under consideration are adopted, initiative would not exist); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 674 (1912) (describing constitutional 
provisions as providing necessary “machinery” for the initiative); id. at 686 (“And it is proposed to 
accomplish this by injecting into our constitution what is termed and known as the ‘initiative, referendum 
and recall.’”); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 606 (1907) (asserting that initiative had to be “put into the constitution” to be effective). 
 343 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 563 (1907) (“If this system is adopted a constitutional amendment must be submitted when a 
petition is signed by a sufficient number of electors who want it, without regard to the interest or the 
welfare of those who do not want it, and without providing for any legislative action or for any tribunal 
before which the opponents of the measure can be heard before its submission.”); PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1919–1920 497–98 (1921); id. at 511 (“An amendment to 
the Constitution may be framed by one man if he has the time and energy and money to spend and 
willingness to do it. One man could start an initiative to amend the Constitution. He may frame it to suit 
himself, without consultation with others, without deliberation, without discussion . . . .”). 
 344 See MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1971–1972, at 506 (1972) (15% of the 
population for signatures designed to ensure that petition standards “will operate to check any erratic 
whimsy”); id. at 507 (arguing to keep the threshold high to ensure against “attempts made to raid the 
Constitution”); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
OHIO 778 (1912) (arguing that signature threshold will require statewide effort that cannot be captured 
by petty interests); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE 
OF MICHIGAN 546 (1907) (thresholds chosen to ensure that “amendments to the Constitution [are] safe, 
and . . . will not permit the constitution to be amended hastily or recklessly”). 
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citizens to formulate amendments and then obtain sufficient signatures to 
trigger a legal right to demand a referendum.345 
Finally, the debates include frequent suggestions that the initiative was 
not intended as a substitute for the convention.346 Indeed, proponents of the 
initiative were often strong supporters of accessible convention provisions.347 
Progressive Era delegates seem to have understood both the convention and 
the initiative as instruments of direct democracy that could be used to correct 
errors in representative government.348 However, they distinguished between 
the two devices by designating the initiative as a mechanism for piecemeal 
changes and the convention as most appropriate for wholesale change.349 
They objected to the convention only insofar as it existed without the 
initiative and tended to make popular constitutional change difficult and 
infrequent.350 Ultimately, this position was reflected in several state 
constitutions that explicitly permit the initiative to be used for “amendment” 
but not for “revision.”351 
Thus, properly understood, the convention debates make clear that both 
sides viewed the initiative as a creation of positive constitutional law, which 
deputized private citizens to initiate constitutional change. The constitutional 
initiative created a legal right that was previously nonexistent and did not 
inhere in any private citizen or group. This point is often lost in the rhetoric 
surrounding the initiative, but it is crucial to understanding the initiative as a 
constituted and limited power. 
2. The Neglected Jurisprudence of the “Limited” Initiative 
Generally, courts apply great deference to the constitutional initiative.352 
This deference may be warranted when reviewing the constitutionality of 
 
 345 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1919–1920, at 511–
13 (1921). 
 346 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 552 (1907). 
 347 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 489–90 (1969) (arguing for either periodic 
convention call or the initiative); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
OF THE STATE OF OHIO 778 (1912) (arguing in favor of initiative and exclaiming that convention is the 
“voice of the people”). 
 348 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
OHIO 1368 (1912) (arguing for convention call based on initiative and referendum in addition to specific 
amendments by initiative and referendum); id. at 779 (arguing that convention was actually a form of 
initiative and that initiative “made every constitution under which we have lived”). 
 349 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 552 (1907) (arguing that people are properly allowed to call a convention for revision, and 
they should therefore also be permitted to initiate “separate amendment[s]” though the initiative). 
 350 See id. 
 351 Cain & Noll, supra note 6, at 1524. 
 352 See generally MILLER, supra note 34, at 101–04 (describing forms of deference). 
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legislation regulating the initiative. Various courts, for example, maintain 
that “initiative and referendum provisions should be liberally construed to 
maintain maximum power in the people.”353 Nevertheless, courts collectively 
hold that the initiative is subject to the proscriptions contained in the 
constitution.354 I found no case suggesting that there is an implicit legal right 
to amend a state constitution by initiative. Thus, although courts defend the 
initiative from legislative encroachment, they recognize (even if only 
implicitly) that the initiative power derives from the constitution itself.355 
At least two courts have gone a step further and have enforced implied 
limitations on the constitutional initiative.356 In State v. Waltermire, the 
Montana Supreme Court held that the constitutional initiative may not be 
used “to enact a legislative resolution” or to enact a temporary law.357 The 
initiative at issue was a constitutional amendment that “direct[ed] the 1985 
Legislature to adopt a resolution requesting Congress to call a constitutional 
convention for the purpose of adopting a balanced budget amendment” to 
the U.S. Constitution.358 The initiative further provided that if the 1985 
Legislature failed to adopt the resolution, it would remain perpetually in 
session without compensation to legislators until adoption of the 
resolution.359 
After the U.S. Supreme Court denied review regarding any federal 
constitutional issues, the Montana Supreme Court held that although the 
initiative was procedurally perfect, it was “beyond the power of initiative 
granted to the people by the Montana Constitution.”360 The court reasoned 
that the power to amend the constitution was functionally different from the 
power to adopt a legislative resolution and that temporary and specialized 
 
 353 Carlson v. Cory, 139 Cal. App. 3d 724, 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); see In re Initiative Petition No. 
349 State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 12 (Okla. 1992) (“The right of the initiative is precious and it is 
one which we are zealous to preserve to the fullest measure of the spirit and the letter of the law.”). 
 354 See, e.g., Scott v. Vaughn, 168 N.W. 709, 713 (Mich. 1918) (“Of the right of qualified voters of 
the state to propose amendments to the Constitution by petition it may be said, generally, that it can be 
interfered with neither by the Legislature, the courts, nor the officers charged with any duty in the 
premises. But the right is to be exercised in a certain way and according to certain conditions; the 
limitations upon its exercise, like the reservation of the right itself, being found in the Constitution.”). 
 355 See, e.g., Assoc. Indus. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 55 P.2d 79, 82 (Okla. 1936) (“Courts can approve 
only those acts of the people which are in substantial conformity with the procedure provided by or under 
authority of the Constitution.”). 
 356 See also Holmes v. Appling, 392 P.2d 636, 640 (Or. 1964) (rejecting initiative proposing new 
constitution as impermissible “revision” under an amendment rule allowing revisions only by legislature). 
 357 691 P.2d 826, 828 (Mont. 1984). 
 358 Id. 
 359 Id. 
 360 Id. 
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laws were antithetical to the underlying purpose of a constitution.361 The 
court emphasized that the constitutional initiative was a limited power and 
that “the electorate cannot circumvent their Constitution by indirectly doing 
that which cannot be done directly.”362 The court also emphasized that the 
initiative was invalid because compelling “the legislature to reach a specific 
result under threat of confinement and no pay,” was “repugnant to the basic 
tenets of our representative form of government guaranteed by the Montana 
Constitution.”363 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has similarly held that the constitutional 
initiative is a constituted power with implicit functional limitations.364 In In 
re Initiative Petition No. 364, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered the 
validity of a constitutional initiative that declared a public policy favoring 
Congressional term limits and instructed legislators to apply to Congress for 
an amendment to the United States Constitution establishing term limits.365 
Because it was “beyond the power of the initiative granted [to] the people in 
the Oklahoma Constitution,” the court held that the initiative violated the 
state constitution.366 The court explained that the constitutional initiative 
could not be used to adopt “a nonbinding legislative resolution.”367 The 
“subject matter of the initiative” was beyond the initiative power, held the 
court, because it purported to “create a transient amendment for a specialized 
purpose.”368 Finally, the court concluded that the initiative amendment power 
“does not include the power to use the initiative process to attempt to change 
federal constitutional law.”369 
These cases, although largely overlooked, illustrate an understanding of 
the constitutional initiative as a derivative and constituted power. Although 
there are benefits to interpreting initiative provisions liberally to protect 
against legislative encroachment on the initiative, it is important to recognize 
that initiative is entirely a creature of positive constitutional law. 
Accordingly, courts should not infer that an initiative is limitless or a 
substitute for the convention, from its mere creation. 
 
 361 Id. (“A temporary initiative measure is not a part of the permanent fundamental law of a state and 
should not be submitted under the guise of a constitutional amendment.”). 
 362 Id. 
 363 Id. at 829. 
 364 In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186, 193 (Okla. 1996) (“The initiative process was 
designed to propose laws and amendments to our State Constitution and the power of the people may not 
be extended past those limits.”). 
 365 See id. at 189 n.1 (reproducing the proposed amendment in entirety). 
 366 Id. at 193. 
 367 Id. 
 368 Id. at 195. 
 369 Id. 
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IV. TOWARD A DOCTRINE OF IMPLICIT LIMITS ON AMENDMENT 
The doctrine of referendum sovereignty, which currently predominates 
judicial review of state constitutional amendments, has lost the structural 
presumptions at the core of state constitutionalism. In the state tradition, 
extra-conventional amendment processes are inherently derivative and 
creations of the constitution itself. The referendum does not change this 
because the crucial task of negotiating and crafting constitutional reform 
presumptively inheres only with the people acting through a convention. 
This Part argues that the state tradition surrounding extra-conventional 
amendment processes necessarily implies certain outer limits on state 
constitutional amendment, and courts should enforce those outer limits. 
First, it articulates the substance of the doctrine that courts should apply 
when assessing an extra-conventional amendment. It next illustrates how the 
doctrine could be applied by analyzing the validity of two hypothetical 
amendments: an amendment to eliminate direct democracy under 
Oklahoma’s Constitution and an amendment to eliminate New Hampshire’s 
provisions guaranteeing public education. Finally, it provides a preliminary 
outline of the costs and benefits of the doctrine. 
The purpose of this Part is not to fully delineate a state doctrine of 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment. Rather, I aim to show that (1) the 
doctrine’s underpinnings are grounded in state constitutional theory, (2) 
there are valid and important reasons for courts to consider enforcing limits 
on state constitutional amendments, and (3) the doctrine is workable for 
courts. Further work is surely necessary to fully explore a state doctrine of 
implied limits on the amendment power. 
A. Substance and Logic of the Doctrine 
The doctrine that I propose involves three steps. First, courts should 
recognize a standing presumption that ordinary officials and private groups 
lack authority to destroy, replace, or create state constitutions.370 Second, 
courts should hold that the power to destroy, replace, or create a constitution 
outside of a convention exists only if the constitution explicitly grants that 
power.371 All ambiguities should be construed against finding the power. 
Third, if a constitution does not give amendment actors power to create or 
destroy a constitution, courts should enforce the amendment power’s outer 
limits by reviewing amendments to ensure that they do not destroy or 
effectively re-create the constitution. Each step is explained in turn. 
 
 370 See supra Part I. 
 371 See supra Part III. 
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1. The Presumption 
The first step rejects the doctrine of referendum sovereignty in favor of 
a presumption recognizing inherent limits on extra-conventional 
amendment. Specifically, courts should reject the premise that the 
referendum represents the full sovereign capacity of the people, and, 
consequently, that the referendum can legitimate constitutional changes 
crafted by unauthorized agents.372 Most of this article is dedicated to 
substantiating the premise that the authority to create or change a state 
constitution inheres only in the people, and the convention is the only 
institution with the presumed authority to act on the people’s behalf for the 
purpose of crafting constitutional reform.373 Besides a constitutional 
convention, no other institution, official, or group has an inherent right to 
formally initiate constitutional change.374 When ordinary government 
officials or private groups participate in extra-conventional change, they 
exercise powers that exist only because the constitution created them through 
positive constitutional law. This suggests that state amendment rules are best 
understood as deputizing agents of constitutional change. Because those 
agents derive their authority entirely from the constitution, they implicitly 
lack the authority to destroy or replace the source of that power. This 
presumptive outer limit on extra-conventional amendment processes is the 
core of the proposed doctrine.375 
The presumption that extra-conventional amendment actors are 
powerless to create or replace a constitution is not simply a formalistic 
deduction from the general structure of state constitutional power. Rather, it 
is consistent with the underlying rationale of state constitutional design. State 
amendment procedures developed with a clear understanding that the 
foundational act of creating a constitution required an extraordinary 
 
 372 See supra Section II.B (describing state court opinions adopting this premise); supra note 157 
and accompanying text (discussing Thomas Jefferson’s astute early assertion that a referendum cannot 
sanitize a constitutional reform originating from an unauthorized agent). Clear examples of how courts 
adopt the doctrine of referendum sovereignty (incorrectly, in my view) include Smith v. Cenarrusa, 
475 P.2d 11, 17 (Idaho 1970) (finding constitutional convention not necessary for constitutional 
amendment); Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 722 (Ky. 1966) (finding an “inalienable right of 
the ultimate sovereign to reform the government” in the people); Wheeler v. Board of Trustees of Fargo 
Consolidated School District , 37 S.E.2d 322, 328−29 (Ga. 1946) (“When the people adopt a completely 
revised or new constitution, the framing or submission of the instrument is not what gives it binding force 
and effect. The fiat of the people, and only the fiat of the people, can breathe life into a constitution.”). 
 373 See supra Part II. 
 374 Indeed, conventions are the only democratically accountable institution designed expressly for 
the purpose of creating or changing constitutions on behalf of the people. 
 375 Although the doctrine of referendum sovereignty predominates state review of amendments, the 
approach that I propose is not unprecedented. In fact, the Alabama Supreme Court has consistently and 
clearly conceptualized the amendment power in this way. See, e.g., State v. Manley, 441 So. 2d 864, 873–
74 (Ala. 1983). 
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institution distinct from existing government officials and insulated from 
undue influence by private faction.376 The convention was created precisely 
because it was believed to satisfy those conditions.377 Extra-conventional 
amendment, on the other hand, was created against the backdrop of great 
mistrust in giving legislatures or private groups a legal right to propose 
constitutional change.378 Extra-conventional amendment processes were 
designed with the understanding that those risks could be managed by 
limiting and controlling amendment actors through the constitution.379 To 
assume that extra-conventional amendment power encompasses the power 
to destroy or replace a constitution inverts the underlying logic and rationale 
of state constitutional design by releasing amendment actors from the very 
instrument intended to constrain them. Instead, state constitutional tradition 
suggests a presumption against revision, replacement, or creation of a state 
constitution by extra-conventional actors. This presumption should serve as 
the starting point for courts’ analysis of the validity of state constitutional 
amendments.380 
2. Rebutting the Presumption 
The second step in the doctrine requires courts to examine their state 
constitutions to determine whether the constitution explicitly grants the 
constituent power to extra-conventional actors. Applying the doctrine as a 
rebuttable presumption respects the principle that the people retain the right 
to amend their constitution in any matter they choose.381 Importantly, 
however, applying a rebuttable presumption also ensures that courts apply 
amendment rules consistent with their historical and theoretical context.382 
Thus, if the text of the state constitution does not clearly grant 
constituent power to extra-conventional actors, courts should enforce the 
presumption that only a convention has authority to create or replace a 
constitution. If, on the other hand, the constitution explicitly grants 
 
 376 See supra Section II.A. 
 377 See id. (describing the historical origins of the state constitutional convention). 
 378 See supra Sections III.A.1 and III.B.1. 
 379 Id. 
 380 Although this presumption has been largely forgotten or ignored by modern state courts, it is not 
without precedent in state constitutional jurisprudence. See supra Sections III.A.2 and III.B.2. Especially 
good examples of how courts have articulated and applied this presumption include Smathers v. Smith, 
338 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 1976); Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1, 5 (Ind. 1912); Houston County v. Martin, 
169 So. 13, 15 (Ala. 1936); Holmberg v. Jones, 65 P. 563, 564 (Idaho 1901) (“The power to make 
constitutions and amend them is inherent, not in the legislature, but in the people.”); Livermore v. Waite, 
36 P. 424, 426 (Cal. 1894). 
 381 See supra note 23. 
 382 Indeed, to presume that extra-conventional amendment actors have implicit authority to create or 
destroy a constitution, is to flip state constitutional history and theory on its head. 
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constituent power—by authorizing extra-conventional actors to craft new 
constitutions for the people, for instance—this will likely rebut the 
presumption against extra-conventional revision.383 Conversely, some state 
constitutions clearly authorize the legislature to propose only amendments 
and require wholesale change and constitutional creation to occur through a 
convention. Those constitutions tend to confirm the presumption. 
This step is straightforward in the sense that courts should rely on 
ordinary interpretive methods to determine whether the constitution rebuts 
the presumption. It can also be a complex analysis, however, because state 
constitutions describe the amendment power in myriad ways and some state 
constitutions are more difficult to analyze. The Kansas Constitution, for 
example, describes the legislative amendment process in this way: 
One amendment of the constitution may revise any entire article . . . and in 
revising any article, the article may be renumbered and all or parts of other 
articles may be amended, or amended and transferred to the article being 
revised. Not more than five amendments shall be submitted at the same 
election.384 
This language could be read to support the presumption of a limited 
amendment power because it explicitly authorizes the revision of an entire 
article, suggesting, by implication, that revision of the entire constitution is 
impermissible.385 On the other hand, the language clearly authorizes the 
legislature to revise “any entire article” and allows for the revision to include 
amendments or wholesale integration of other articles in the constitution. 
Such a far-reaching power arguably supports the idea that the legislature is 
authorized to functionally recreate the constitution. Kansas is just one 
example of this complexity. Other interpretive difficulties exist when 
examining state constitutional amendment rules for evidence of a clear 
delegation of the constitution power.386 
This framework does not solve every complex interpretative issue. State 
courts will surely need to engage in rigorous constitutional interpretation to 
determine whether the constitution delegates the constituent power. 
 
 383 For example, three state constitutions explicitly authorize legislatures to adopt entirely new 
constitutions and submit them to referendum. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Those provisions 
would likely support rebutting the presumption. 
 384 KAN. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
 385 This is based on the logic that if the constitution explicates something particular, the best 
interpretation is that explicit authorization of that sort is required. 
 386 A further complexity relates to theoretical problems associated with amendments to amendment 
rules. Although most major developments in state amendment processes have occurred in conventions, 
states have made meaningful adjustments to their amendment processes through singular amendments. 
This can complicate the interpretive process when searching for evidence that a state intends to delegate 
the constituent power to extra-conventional actors. 
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However, this framework provides a roadmap for how the presumption 
should be applied when the constitution is unclear. When considering the 
scope of amendment, courts should look for evidence that the state 
constitution intends to delegate the people’s original sovereign power to 
create or recreate a constitution to some institution or group other than a 
convention. Courts should conduct this analysis with a background 
assumption that the people did not delegate that power. Thus, when a state 
constitution’s text, history, and structure are unclear as to whether the people 
have reposed their constituent power in an institution other than a 
convention, courts should presume that they have not and thus hold that 
ordinary amendment processes cannot lawfully create or recreate a 
constitution. 
3. Implicit Limits 
If the court determines that the state constitution does not rebut the 
standing presumption against extra-conventional constitution-making, 
courts should impose limits on the amendment power by reviewing 
amendments to ensure they do not effectively destroy or recreate the 
constitution. This analysis can be both straightforward and complex. It is 
most straightforward when an amendment proposes an entirely new 
constitution as an amendment to the existing constitution.387 Although 
extreme, this occurred at least six times in the twentieth century, and courts 
struggled with how to assess challenges to these wholesale amendments.388 
Under my proposed framework, courts should refuse to recognize these 
changes as lawful transitions, unless the constitution clearly authorizes such 
wholesale change outside of a convention. 
More importantly, however, this framework provides a basis for 
assessing whether a singular amendment exceeds the amendment power 
because it effectively destroys or recreates a constitution. After all, “some 
constitutional amendments are not amendments at all.”389 Although styled as 
amendments, they are more accurately recognized as “efforts to repudiate 
the essential characteristics of the constitution and to destroy its 
foundations.”390 They are efforts to reconstitute a jurisdiction around a new 
foundation. These sort of fundamental changes effectively destroy existing 
 
 387 Even this “straightforward” case might present complexity depending on the circumstances. See 
Sturm & May, supra note 172, at 119 (describing North Carolina’s 1971 constitution as an “editorial 
revision” of its 1868 predecessor). 
 388 See supra notes 168–178 and accompanying text. 
 389 Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
 390 Id. at 2–3; see also State v. Manley, 441 So. 2d 864, 874 (Ala. 1983) (“As this court has noted, 
‘to destroy is not to amend. A thing amended survives.’”) (quoting City of Ensley v. Simpson, 52 So. 61, 
65 (Ala. 1909)). 
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constitutions by “alter[ing] a fundamental right, a load-bearing structure, or 
a core feature of the identity of a constitution.”391 In other words, they 
fundamentally change a constitution’s central institutions or substantive 
values.392 These sort of changes implicate the people’s original right to create 
government because they effectively create a new constitution by destroying 
the existing constitution’s core. 
The difficulty, of course, is in identifying when an amendment 
effectively destroys the existing constitution or when it simply “corrects” or 
“elaborates” on the existing constitution. This analysis surely requires 
difficult decisions by courts. It requires courts to identify and articulate a 
constitution’s core commitments and then determine whether an amendment 
alters those commitments in ways that destroy the constitution. This, in turn, 
may require courts to assess not only the face of an amendment, but also its 
likely effects. In some cases, this analysis may be too open-ended or 
speculative for courts to make principled rulings.393 
But this analysis is not so far beyond the judicial pale as one may think, 
and some cases may be clearer than others. As noted above, several state 
courts already enforce a distinction between constitutional amendment and 
revision.394 The dominant approach to that distinction is for courts to assess 
not only an amendment’s quantitative impact on the constitutional text, but 
also its qualitative effect on constitutional substance.395 The California 
Supreme Court, for example, has held that “even a relatively simple 
enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our 
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.”396 This analysis requires 
California courts to identify the constitution’s “basic government plan” and 
measure the effects of a proposed amendment on that plan.397 Importantly, at 
least two justices on the California Supreme Court have asserted that an 
 
 391 Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, supra note 18, at 2–3. 
 392 Identifying a state constitution’s core commitments is a complex task and one that I cannot fully 
address here. In other research, I am exploring whether there are any common factors in state 
constitutionalism that might better guide courts in identifying core institutions or commitments. For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to note that factors such as constitutional prevalence, interconnectedness, 
and historical longevity may guide courts towards a state constitution’s core. 
 393 See, e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 100 (Cal. 2009) (refusing to “undertake an evaluation 
of the relative importance of the constitutional right at issue or the degree to which the protection of that 
right had been diminished”). 
 394 See supra Section I.A. 
 395 See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 403–05 
(explaining this analysis in California). 
 396 Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087 (Cal. 1990) (internal citation omitted). 
 397 In Raven v. Deukmejian, the Court invalidated as a qualitative revision an amendment that would 
have required California courts to interpret provisions of the California Constitution consistent with how 
the Supreme Court interprets analogous federal provisions. Id. 
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amendment may qualify as a revision even if it does not relate to government 
institutions or structures. According to those justices, a singular amendment 
may amount to a qualitative “revision” if it “strikes directly at the 
foundational constitutional principle” such as equal protection.398 
Scholars of state constitutions have also noted that courts may be able 
to identify and enforce deep constitutional norms. Professor David B. Cruz, 
for example, has argued that equality is central to California’s constitutional 
structure.399 Professor Cruz summoned an impressive tome of evidence from 
California’s constitutional convention, the constitutional text, and centuries 
of California case law. He concludes that “[e]quality is central to the 
California Constitution and is necessary for the state constitution’s 
independent political legitimacy.”400 Similarly, various scholars have 
emphasized that state constitutions contain distinctive fundamental 
commitments that might guide courts in identifying a constitution’s core.401 
Professor Lawrence Friedman, for instance, has argued that the 
Massachusetts Constitution may contain an “unamendable core.”402 Drawing 
on a line of cases from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Professor 
Friedman concludes that the state constitution may contain a core 
commitment to political equality.403 
Determining whether an amendment destroys a constitution’s core 
structure and substantive commitments will surely be state-specific and may 
be easier in cases where the amendment is more radical. The doctrine 
proposed here will necessarily depend on further analysis, research, and 
scholarship. My more modest, immediate, aim is to emphasize that judicial 
review of state constitutional amendments should be grounded in a robust 
state tradition and foundational principles of popular sovereignty. Some 
amendments represent foundational reform of the existing government 
structure and they should be undertaken only by agents with a clear mandate 
 
 398 See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 99 (quoting Petitioner’s argument). Moreover, as noted above, the 
Alabama Supreme Court invalided an amendment that sought to temporarily suspend a constitutional 
provision because the court determined that temporary suspension was inconsistent with the constitution’s 
essential purpose as a check on extant majorities. See supra Section III.A.2. A sitting justice on the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has also suggested that this analysis is within the judiciary’s 
abilities and role. Kafker & Russcol, supra note 16, at 1308–09 (“[A] court should be able to determine 
how much an initiative would change the constitution on the face of the proposal . . . .”). 
 399 David B. Cruz, Equality’s Centrality: Proposition 8 and the California Constitution, 19 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 45, 48 (2010). 
 400 Id. at 48. 
 401 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 402 Lawrence Friedman, The Potentially Unamendable State Constitutional Core, 69 ARK. L. REV. 
317, 325 (2016). 
 403 Id. at 328. 
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from the people to formulate that reform.404 Courts should not allow 
amendment actors with a limited mandate to reconstitute government. Such 
an approach undermines popular sovereignty as the basis for state 
constitutional legitimacy and realizes the precise danger that state 
constitutionalists sought to avoid when they created extra-conventional 
amendment processes. 
B. Illustrating the Doctrine 
To demonstrate the doctrine’s viability, I apply it to two hypothetical 
amendments: (1) an amendment eliminating direct democracy from the 
Oklahoma Constitution, and (2) an amendment eradicating New 
Hampshire’s public education provision. I have chosen these examples 
because courts in both Oklahoma and New Hampshire have noted that their 
respective state constitutions contain deep commitments to certain 
institutions and normative values. Thus, they provide helpful illustrations of 
how courts might apply the doctrine to hypothetical amendments that attack 
recognized constitutional values. The doctrine surely has application in other 
situations and other states, but these illustrations aim to demonstrate the 
doctrine’s workability for courts. 
1. Eliminating Direct Democracy in Oklahoma 
Consider an amendment to the Oklahoma constitution that eliminates 
the initiative and referendum. This would represent a momentous reform, 
and the proposed framework provides a principled basis for assessing 
whether it exceeds extra-conventional amendment powers in Oklahoma. 
First, a reviewing court should recognize the presumption against extra-
conventional reconstitution. Although not precisely articulated, this is a 
principle that Oklahoma courts have already eluded to in various cases. It 
would not be foreign to Oklahoma’s existing jurisprudence,405 and, as 
explained above, it is grounded in state constitutional history and logic. 
Second, a reviewing court should determine whether the Oklahoma 
constitution rebuts the standing presumption against extra-conventional re-
constitution. Oklahoma’s provisions regarding both legislative and initiative 
 
 404 As explained in Section IV.C, the practical effect of the doctrine that I propose is for the judiciary 
to enforce the background jurisdiction of the constitutional convention and ensure that fundamental 
change is channeled toward the convention. In holding that extra-conventional amendment actors do not 
have authority to propose foundational change, courts are not standing in the way of the people. Instead, 
they are protecting the people from their government allowing the people to retain control of their 
constitution through the more accountable device of a convention. 
 405 See, e.g., Assoc. Indus. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 55 P.2d 79, 82 (Okla. 1936) (“Courts can approve 
only those acts of the people which are in substantial conformity with the procedure provided by or under 
authority of the Constitution.”) 
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amendment speak only in terms of proposing an “amendment” or 
“amendments” to the constitution.406 The constitution also limits legislative 
proposals to a single subject.407 In contrast, the constitution provides that a 
convention may propose “alterations, revisions,” “amendments,” or “a new 
Constitution.”408 Nothing in these provisions or the general structure of the 
constitution suggests that it intends to rebut the standing presumption against 
extra-conventional reconstitution. Indeed, the Oklahoma constitution seems 
to mirror the presumption. Thus, the court would proceed to analyze whether 
the proposed amendment effectively destroys the existing constitution. 
Third, the reviewing court should assess whether eliminating the 
initiative and referendum would strike at the existing constitution’s core. 
Here, the court would draw on Oklahoma’s unique constitutional history, 
tradition, and structure. That review would surely tilt in favor of a finding 
that the initiative and referendum are essential to Oklahoma’s constitutional 
structure. 
Indeed, Oklahoma was the first state to include direct democracy in its 
original constitution of 1907,409 and the 1906 convention was deeply 
committed to direct democracy as a core constitutional structure.410 Indeed, 
102 of the 112 delegates to the convention pre-committed in writing to 
support the initiative and referendum, and the final vote at the convention 
was eighty to five to include them.411 More importantly, the convention 
debates show that the Oklahoma constitution was structured around direct 
democracy as the crucial institution necessary to prevent the people from 
being “despoiled” by their government.412 J.F. King, president pro-tempore 
 
 406 See OKLA. CONST. art. 24, § 1 (“Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be 
proposed in either branch of the Legislature . . . .”); id. art. 5, § 1 (“[T]he people reserve to themselves 
the power to propose . . . amendments to the Constitution . . . .”). 
 407 See id. art. 24, § 1. 
 408 See id. § 2. 
 409 SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 8. 
 410 See WATERS, supra note 67, at 342. See generally ALBERT H. ELLIS, A HISTORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA (1923) (explaining commitment to direct 
democracy). 
 411 See ELLIS, supra note 410, at 145 (“There had been a popular demand that the Constitution should 
provide for the Initiative and Referendum and the provision had been freely promised; and many of the 
Delegates very much desired to become the author of the provision.”); WATERS, supra note 67, at 342.  
 412 Cooper, supra note 7, at 231–32 n.28 (quoting the president pro-tempore at the 1906 convention 
proceedings: “More than a hundred years of experience in popular government in the United States has 
demonstrated that the great problem confronting the American people in constitution making is not so 
much to control or limit the executive as to control and properly limit the legislative department. By this 
latter department have people been despoiled. And while the Constitutions of the different states contain 
the germ and principles of good government, and while it is true of law as it is of farming that out of the 
old fields cometh the new corn, nevertheless these principles have been stated in such general terms and 
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of the convention, explained that after “more than a hundred years of 
experience in popular government in the United States,” the “great problem 
confronting the American people in constitution making” was how “to 
control and properly limit the legislative department.”413 The initiative and 
referendum were therefore incorporated into the Oklahoma constitution 
based on the belief that they were the core institutions necessary to the 
preservation of democracy and popular government.414 In other words, 
Oklahoma was constituted around the conviction that legislative power 
should not exist without the initiative and referendum as necessary checks.415 
This history suggests that removing direct democracy from the 
Oklahoma constitution would destroy its core structure. Oklahoma seems to 
conceptualize democracy as requiring the coexistence of representative law-
making alongside a robust initiative and referendum process. Indeed, 
Oklahoma was apparently constituted around the notion that legislative 
power without the initiative was “the great problem” facing American 
constitutional design.416 Consequently, a reviewing court could reach the 
principled conclusion that such an amendment is beyond the limits of extra-
conventional amendment and would be lawful only through the convention 
process.417 
Of course, this is a simplified caricature of the analysis. Oklahoma’s 
constitutional history and structure is nuanced, complex, and multi-variant. 
But its dominant themes suggest that my framework could be applied by 
courts to enforce the outer limits of the amendment power. 
2. Eradicating Public Education in New Hampshire 
Another hypothetical from New Hampshire illustrates how the doctrine 
may be applied to an amendment altering a constitution’s substantive values. 
Consider an amendment to eradicate New Hampshire’s constitutional 
provisions providing for public education. 
 
with so little provisions for their application to the affairs of the people that little assistance can be derived 
from them in the way of administrative government.”). 
 413 Id. Other delegates emphasized the need to constrain courts in their practice of judicial review. 
Id. 
 414 See id. at 232; ELLIS, supra note 410, at 146–47. 
 415 This is also reflected in the structure of the Oklahoma constitution, which locates the initiative 
and referendum within its legislative article and introduces the legislative power of the state with the 
explicit qualification that “the people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws . . . and to enact 
or reject the same at the polls.” See OKLA. CONST. art. 5 §§ 1, 3. 
 416 Cooper, supra note 7, at 231 n.28. 
 417 Oklahoma is arguably unique in its deep institutional commitment to direct democracy. Other 
states, such as Massachusetts and Illinois, have more complicated and measured experiences with direct 
democracy devices. In those states, the initiative may not be a core institution and it could be eliminated 
by extra-conventional amendment without exceeding the mandate of the ordinary amendment power. 
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Regarding the first and second steps in the analysis, New Hampshire’s 
constitution suggests that it has not rebutted the presumption against extra-
conventional reconstitution. The amendment provisions allow for the 
legislature to propose “amendments” subject to a ratification referendum.418 
A convention may also propose amendments.419 The constitution provides no 
process for adopting a new constitution or for wholesale revision.420 
Moreover, until 1964, the constitution required all amendments to proceed 
through a convention.421 Nothing in New Hampshire’s constitutional history 
or structure rebuts the presumption against extra-conventional re-
constitution. 
Regarding the third step, New Hampshire has a long-committed history 
to public education as a core substantive value. The constitution provides 
that the encouragement of literature, “[k]nowledge and learning generally 
diffused though a community” is “essential to the preservation of a free 
government.”422 It continues that “it shall be the duty of the legislators and 
the magistrates, in all future periods of this government, to cherish the 
interest of literature and the sciences” because “spreading the opportunities 
and advantages of education” is “highly conducive” to sustaining free 
government.423 This language has been described as making education 
“fundamental,” “primary,” and “paramount” to New Hampshire’s 
constitutional structure.424 
Importantly, New Hampshire prioritizes public education because of its 
connection to democratic government.425 According to the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court, public education has long been fundamental in New 
Hampshire as a “means to the end of preserving a free, democratic state.”426 
As the court further explained, because the people “‘by the constitution have 
 
 418 N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 100. 
 419 See id. 
 420 See id. 
 421 See supra notes 238–239 and accompanying text (discussing New Hampshire’s history with 
amendment procedures). 
 422 N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83. 
 423 Id. 
 424 See Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in 
Basic Skills, 63 Tᴇx. L. Rᴇᴠ. 777, 816 n.146 (1985) (categorizing New Hampshire as a “Category IV” 
state); William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance 
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Thro, supra, at 25 n.36 (explaining that the author disagrees with Ratner’s categorization of New 
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 425 See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1378 (N.H. 1993). 
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a share in the Government, it is certainly of importance they should be able 
to sustain the part they are to bear with honor to themselves & with prosperity 
to the State which without such an Education is hardly feasibl[e].’”427 In other 
words, the New Hampshire constitution was built around the notion that 
democracy necessarily imposed an obligation on the state to provide 
education.428 
This suggests that removing New Hampshire’s “encouragement of 
literature” provision would strike at its core. In New Hampshire, 
constitutional democracy and public education are inseparable and mutually 
dependent. To destroy public education is to fundamentally reconstitute the 
state around a new set of basic values and assumptions about government. 
Of course, the people may bring about that change, but it may not be within 
the scope of the limited amendment power granted to the legislature under 
the New Hampshire Constitution. 
C. Costs, Benefits, and Critiques of the Doctrine 
Understandably, this doctrine would come with meaningful costs and 
concerns. Most notably, it would place the judiciary in the precarious 
position of regulating the substance of constitutional amendment. Indeed, a 
compelling critique of this framework is that even if the amendment power 
is inherently limited, the best enforcement mechanism is the political process 
and not the judiciary.429 However, there are several points to consider here. 
First, state courts have universally rejected the idea that amendment 
rules are nonjusticiable.430 Courts routinely invalidate amendments approved 
through the political process (including at a referendum) when they violate 
amendment rules.431 In state jurisprudence, the judiciary, not the political 
process, is the final arbiter of amendment disputes.432 Second, judicial 
abstention overlooks state constitutional history. Extra-conventional 
amendment processes were developed with a clear distrust of ordinary 
 
 427 Id. at 1380 (quoting a statement of the General Assembly from 1771). 
 428 Id. (“Without a competent share of information diffused generally through the community, the 
natural as well as the acquired rights, and the duties to which the social compact necessarily subjects us, 
must be imperfectly understood, and consequently will be liable to be perverted and neglected.” (quoting 
the New Hampshire House and Senates response to Governor Gilman’s 1975 address)). 
 429 See Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial 
Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 442–43 (1983) (making this point regarding federal court review of Article 
V amendment and noting that judicial review of amendments is improper because amendments are by 
nature intended to “override” the political system within which the courts operate). 
 430 See WILLIAMS,  supra note 9, at 402 (2009) (noting that state courts universally review proposed 
amendments). 
 431 See TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 9, at 26–27 (describing instances 
and practice by state courts).  
 432 See id.  
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politics.433 The whole idea behind extra-conventional amendment was to 
protect popular sovereignty by using the constitution to limit and constrain 
extra-conventional political processes.434 Thus, allowing ordinary politics to 
resolve amendment disputes is in tension with a core assumption in state 
constitutional design. Finally, it is important to note that the proposed 
doctrine recognizes limits on only extra-conventional amendment. In my 
framework, changes made by a convention are theoretically unlimited 
(subject to federal law, of course). This distinction is crucial for 
understanding the court’s role in enforcing limits on amendment. The 
doctrine would require courts to regulate the outer boundaries of extra-
conventional amendment, but it would not establish the judiciary as the final 
arbiter of constitutional content. That sacred position belongs to the 
constitutional convention. Thus, the judicial role is only to ensure that 
reforms follow the proper pathway and not to prevent the people from 
making any changes they desire. 
Another related cost of the doctrine is that it would create significant 
barriers to constitutional change because conventions are too risky and 
costly. This concern is surely true to a degree. A limitless amendment power 
facilitates wholesale change quickly and without many political barriers.435 
However, more frequent use of state conventions is plausible and should be 
taken more seriously. Unlike the Federal Constitution, where a convention 
is very unlikely and risky, the states have a long history of successfully 
utilizing the convention.436 Concerns about a runaway convention and 
constitutional regression are significantly lessened at the state level because 
all state constitutions must comply with minimum standards set by the 
federal constitution. Stated simply, there is far less risk in holding a state 
constitutional convention than holding a federal convention. Conventions are 
surely a more difficult pathway to reform, but they are not impractical nor 
impossibly dangerous at the state level. Although my proposed doctrine 
would likely frustrate some reforms by requiring a convention, it would not 
make those changes impossible. 
A final concern is that, in reality, conventions may be no better than 
ordinary political processes for creating a constitution. Scholars have argued, 
for example, that although conventions are meant to be independent of 
existing government, they are often populated by legislators and officials 
 
 433 See supra Part II. 
 434 See supra Sections III.A and III.B. 
 435 See Tarr & Williams, supra note 36, 1083–84. 
 436 Of course, the contemporary public seems less inclined to authorize conventions. See Benjamin 
& Gais, supra note 180, at 54–55. 
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with party affiliations.437 Consequently, delegates “may be affected by the 
same interest groups that seek to influence the legislative and executive 
branches.”438 This is a real concern, and it is likely a principal reason why 
voters in many states have rejected recent convention calls.439 There seems 
to be a popular perception that the convention is itself captured, and, 
therefore, the electorate is better off retaining the status quo than creating 
opportunities for further distortion. 
However, these critiques of the convention do not prove that ordinary 
amendment actors are better situated to formulate foundational change. It 
proves only that the convention may be no better. In fact, there is compelling 
evidence that this critique of the convention is overstated and oversimplified. 
Professor Alan Tarr has found, for example, that notwithstanding party 
influence in a convention, delegates often “view themselves and their 
responsibilities as distinctive, more concerned with the future of the state 
than with immediate political advantage.”440 Professor Bruce Ackerman has 
also suggested that convention delegates distinguish between ordinary 
politics and higher-law-making and recognize an obligation to “rise above 
politics” during the convention.441 The convention is surely not perfect, but 
there is evidence to believe that it still performs its essential function better 
than an ordinary legislature or private group. 
Furthermore, the proposed doctrine may help mediate known defects in 
contemporary state amendment politics. There are, for example, 
longstanding concerns about the reliability of referenda results to 
approximate a constituency’s collective preferences.442 These concerns relate 
to voter turnout, ballot fatigue, and voter information deficiencies. 
Additionally, scholars have long suspected that special interest spending has 
a significant distorting effect on referenda.443 To the extent popular 
sovereignty has been reduced to nothing more than a referendum, this may 
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 439 See WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 388. (“The public seems to view a constitutional convention as 
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 440 See Tarr, Explaining State Constitutional Changes, supra note 158, at 21. 
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be concerning.444 Because my framework would channel fundamental 
change into the constitutional convention, some of these concerns may be 
mitigated regarding deep constitutional reform if we assume that the 
convention would be more deliberative and publicly accountable than 
ordinary amendment processes. 
There are also concerns about democratic defects in the initiative 
processes.445 Many scholars note that special interests have captured the 
initiative by industrializing signature-gathering, spending significant money 
to undermine otherwise popular initiatives, and even introducing poison 
initiatives that have the effect of confusing voters and retaining the status 
quo.446 There are also real concerns that the initiative is prone to abuse by 
majorities because it removes constitutional policy from public deliberation 
and exposes minorities to the privately expressed preferences of a 
majority.447 
The doctrine proposed will not comprehensively fix these problems. 
But it can work to cabin their impact. By enforcing limits on extra-
conventional amendment, courts would ensure that foundational change 
would not occur without clear popular consent: either by explicit 
constitutional language allowing amendment actors to exercise the 
constituent power, or by channeling foundational change into a convention 
with more democratic accountability and popular salience. In this way, the 
doctrine could operate as a check on legislatures and private groups who 
might capitalize on referendum defects to destroy the constitutional 
framework in their favor. In short, the doctrine could promote more 
deliberation and accountability regarding at least core constitutional issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Contemporary state jurisprudence is moving towards a doctrine that 
allows ordinary amendment procedures to fundamentally alter state 
constitutions. This doctrine is at odds with the underlying logic and historical 
development of state constitutional amendment procedures. In the state 
tradition, ordinary amendment actors are presumed unqualified to destroy or 
recreate a constitution. Only a convention of specially elected delegates is 
presumed to have that authority on behalf of the people. Consequently, state 
courts should enforce inherent limits on extra-conventional amendment in 
 
 444 Of course, there are counterarguments to this concern: namely that not-voting is in effect voting, 
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the states. A state doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment 
would not only honor the rationales underlying state constitutionalism, but it 
would also respond to various known defects in contemporary state 
constitutional politics. 
APPENDIX A 
TABLE 1: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES ADDRESSING CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT RULESa 
State Convention Year(s) State Convention Year(s) 
Alabama 1901 Minnesota 1857, 1857b 
Alaska 1955 Missouri 1875 
Arizona 1910 Montana 1889, 1971 
California 1849, 1878 Nebraska 1871, 1919 
Connecticut 1818, 1965 Nevada 1864 
Delaware 1831, 1852, 1896 New Hampshire 
1876, 1889, 1902, 1912, 
1920, 1930, 1938, 1948, 
1956, 1959, 1964, 1974, 
1984 
Georgia 1877 New Jersey 1844, 1947 
Hawaii 1950, 1968, 1978 New York 
1821, 1846, 1867, 1894, 
1915, 1938, 1967 
Idaho 1889 North Carolina 1835 
Illinois 1847, 1869, 1920, 1969 North Dakota 1889, 1972 
Indiana 1850 Ohio 1850, 1873, 1912 
Iowa 1857 Pennsylvania 1837, 1872 
Kansas 1859 Rhode Island 1842, 1964, 1973 
Kentucky 1849, 1890 Tennessee 1953 
Louisiana 1845, 1864, 1973 Texas 1845, 1875, 1974 
Maine  1819 Utah 1895 
Maryland 1851, 1864, 1867, 1967 Virginia 1829, 1901 
Massachusetts 1820, 1853, 1917 West Virginia 1861 
Michigan 




a See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 302 n.13 (2009) (listing 
specific page numbers and formal titles for all convention debates addressing amendment rules). 
b In 1857, Minnesota held two concurrent, partisan conventions. See id. at 12. 
  
114:65 (2019) Forgotten Limits 
147 
APPENDIX B 
FIGURE 1: TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF CONVENTION DEBATES BY DECADE (1810–2019)c 
 
c Figure 1 shows the number of convention debates by decade where amendment rules were 
explicitly discussed. 
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FIGURE 2: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF CONVENTION DEBATES BY STATEd 
 
d Figure 2 illustrates the thirty-nine states with convention debates where amendment rules were 
explicitly discussed. Hawaii and Alaska have responsive convention debates but are not included in the 
figure. 
